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Nearly two years after [the conclusion of] the last of the major 
Holocaust-era negotiations in the waning hours of the Clinton 
administration, justice is still beyond reach for too many aging 
victims.  The unfinished business from World War II includes . 
. . a final accounting still owed by the American government 
itself.  [T]he American government has properly called upon 
other countries to face their past. . . .  It is time now, more 
than 55 years after the end of World War II . . . to finish at 
last the unfinished business of World War II and to bring jus-
tice to elderly Holocaust survivors.  They must wait no longer.1   
I. INTRODUCTION 
hile the United States has been the leading force behind 
European governments and corporations examining 
their roles in the Holocaust, little has been done by American 
industry and, to an extent, by the U.S. government to help 
Holocaust survivors.2  Following the accusations of wartime 
wrongdoing raised against various European concerns, greater 
scrutiny has now also been applied to the conduct of the U.S. 
government and American corporations during World War II.  
Although Europe was the site of the Holocaust and the perpe-
trators of the “Final Solution,” including the attendant financial 
machinations, were also primarily from Europe, the conduct of 
American industry and government during the war is not en-
tirely blame-free.   
  
 1. Stuart Eizenstat, Justice Remains Beyond Grasp of Too Many Holo-
caust Victims, FORWARD, Oct. 18, 2002, available at http://www.forward.com/ 
issues/2002/02.10.18/oped1.html (statement by Stuart Eizenstat, President 
Clinton’s Special Representative on Holocaust Issues).   
 2. For a collection of documents pertaining to the U.S. government's ac-
tivities involving Holocaust issues, see the official website of the U.S. Depart-
ment of State, at http://state.gov/p/eur/rt/hlcst/ (last visited June 21, 2003).  
See also Law-Related Resources on Nazi Gold and Other Holocaust Assets, 
Swiss Banks During World War II, and Dormant Accounts, available at 
http://www.lib.uchicago.edu/~llou/nazigold.html (last visited June 21, 2003). 
  To date, three books have been published on the Holocaust restitution 
movement.  See JOHN AUTHERS & RICHARD WOLFFE, THE VICTIMS FORTUNE: 
INSIDE THE EPIC BATTLE OVER THE DEBTS OF THE HOLOCAUST (2002); MICHAEL J. 
BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE:  THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN AMERICA’S 
COURTS (2003) [hereinafter BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE]; STUART E. 
EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE:  LOOTED ASSETS, SLAVE LABOR, AND THE 
UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WORLD WAR II (2003).   
W 
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The litigation against European companies has forced Ameri-
can companies to confront their own shady wartime past.  The 
Holocaust restitution movement — born in the United States 
with the specific aim of uncovering financial misfeasance in 
wartime Europe — has now enmeshed both the U.S. govern-
ment and corporate America.  The finger of blame that was first 
pointed from the United States to Europe is now being pointed 
back to the United States.  Unfortunately, there seems to be a 
double standard at play.  The demands made by the United 
States towards European governments and corporations to hon-
estly confront and document their wartime financial dealings 
and other activities are not being registered in the United 
States itself.   
This Article will examine the effects of the Holocaust restitu-
tion movement on the U.S. government and industry.  Part II 
sets out the critical role played by the United States in prompt-
ing European governments and corporations to recognize their 
long overdue wartime financial obligations to survivors of the 
Holocaust and other victims of World War II.  Part III focuses 
on steps taken by the U.S. government to recognize its own ob-
ligations.  Part IV analyzes the lawsuits filed against the U.S. 
government and American corporations for their wartime and 
postwar financial dealings.  Finally, in Part V, the Article con-
cludes with two sets of recommendations — one directed to-
wards the U.S. government and the other towards American 
industry — regarding what each needs to do to confront their 
unfinished business of World War II.   
II. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN RESTITUTION EFFORTS 
ABROAD 
The unresolved controversies involving unscrupulous finan-
cial dealings during the Holocaust and its aftermath finally be-
gan to be settled at the end of the 20th century not in Europe, 
where the Holocaust took place, but in the United States.  The 
United States has been the prime mover behind the numerous 
agreements concluded between 1998 and 2001 that led to com-
pensation for individuals whose families’ bank accounts had 
been looted either during or after the war.  The United States 
also forced Germany to pay former slaves of German companies 
seeking payment for their wartime labor, and European insur-
ance companies to recognize survivors’ claims to benefits of in-
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surance policies issued to their family members who perished 
during the war.  These settlements brought about by the U.S. 
government and in U.S. courts since August 1998, when the 
first settlement was made between the Swiss banks and Holo-
caust-era claimants for $1.25 billion, have now reached a figure 
somewhere between $8 to $11 billion, depending on the method 
of calculation.3  
All levels of government in the United States — local, state, 
and federal — were involved in the efforts.  At the federal level, 
the seriousness of commitment (at least during the Clinton 
Administration) was illustrated by the fact that at one time 
there were concurrently at least two federal government offi-
cials with the word “Holocaust” in their titles:  Stuart Eizenstat, 
a Jewish-American lawyer with a long history of public service, 
was the Special Representative of the President and Secretary 
of State for Holocaust Issues, and J.D. Bindenagel, a career dip-
lomat, was made the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues and 
given the rank of Ambassador.4  Various other officials also held 
lower-level posts working under Eizenstat and Bindenagel on 
Holocaust restitution matters.  Without the Clinton Admini-
stration’s determination to resolve by the close of the 20th cen-
tury what has been labeled the “unfinished business” of World 
War II,5 the efforts by other supporters of the Holocaust restitu-
tion movement would have failed.   
Holocaust restitution, however, is not merely a federal issue.  
Although the subject is strongly connected to U.S. foreign af-
fairs, state and local government officials have also been deeply 
and passionately involved in the struggle — often to the con-
sternation of federal officials, who considered the non-federal 
officials to be intermeddlers.  The lead was taken by California, 
which passed numerous laws allowing suits to be brought in its 
state courts against European private concerns doing business 
in California for their long-forgotten activities in wartime 
  
 3. See, e.g., EIZENSTAT, supra note 2, at 345 (citing $8 billion figure).  See 
also World Jewish Congress, at http://www.wjc.org.il/ (last visited June 21, 
2003); Claims Conference, at http://www.claimscon.org (last visited June 21, 
2003) (citing $11 billion figure). 
 4. On May 1, 2002, Randolph Bell replaced Bindenagel as Special Envoy 
for Holocaust Issues, and was also given the title of Ambassador.  
 5. See generally EIZENSTAT, supra note 2. 
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Europe.6  In New York, Alan Hevesi, then-Comptroller of New 
York City, and Carl McCall, then-Comptroller of New York 
State, led efforts to compel the same concerns doing business in 
New York likewise to settle Holocaust-era claims.  In December 
1997, Hevesi formed and then spearheaded the Executive Moni-
toring Committee, which boasted over 900 state and local offi-
cials throughout the United States working to pressure the 
Europeans to resolve Holocaust era claims.7 
Not to be forgotten is the all-important role played by Ameri-
can judges, both at the federal and state level.8  After U.S. law-
yers began filing suits against the Europeans in American 
courts in 1996, the presiding judges issued critical rulings al-
lowing the cases to go forward.  While not all rulings were for 
the Holocaust claimants, the plaintiffs’ lawyers obtained 
enough favorable decisions to sustain the momentum of the 
Holocaust restitution litigation.  The judges also played an im-
portant role in bringing about the settlements.  Once the cases 
were settled, there came the difficult task of deciding how — 
and to whom — the funds should be distributed.  Here, Ameri-
can judges became overseers of the settlements, ensuring that 
the agreements they approved in principle were effectuated in 
reality.   
  
 6. For a listing of state and federal laws dealing with Holocaust restitu-
tion, see Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust 
in United States Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, app. B, at 272–83 (2000) [here-
inafter Bazyler, Nuremberg in America].  The list can also be found at the 
website of the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the 
United States, at http://www.pcha.gov/lawsinfo.htm (last visited June 21, 
2003). 
 7. For information on the Executive Monitoring Committee, see Press 
Release, Hevesi: $10 Billion in Restitution Must Be Distributed to Holocaust 
Survivors as Quickly as Possible (Jan. 19, 2003), available at 
http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/press/2001_releases/01-01-003.shtm.  The 
Committee used to issue a newsletter, International Monitor, discussing its 
work. Since Hevesi’s departure from the New York City Comptroller’s Office 
for an unsuccessful run for New York City mayor, the Executive Monitoring 
Committee has become dormant.  It may now be resurrected, as Hevesi was 
recently elected Comptroller of New York State. 
 8. For a discussion of the critical role played by various U.S. federal and 
state judges in the Holocaust restitution movement, see Bazyler, Nuremberg 
in America, supra note 6, at 61–63 (federal judge Edward R. Korman); id. at 
240–42 (federal judge Shirley Wohl Kram); id. at 131–36 (California state 
judge and now federal judge Florence-Marie Cooper); id. at 105–08 (federal 
judge Michael Mukasey); id. at 244 (federal judge Sterling Johnson).   
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The following sections discuss the Holocaust restitution 
movement abroad and the role the United States played in driv-
ing the movement.  The purpose of this discussion is straight-
forward:  the United States, having accomplished what it could 
in Europe, should now redirect some of the pressure placed on 
the Europeans to efforts within the United States itself. 
A. Switzerland 
The beginning of the Holocaust restitution litigation move-
ment can be traced to October 1996, with the filing of class ac-
tion lawsuits in New York against the three largest Swiss 
banks for failing to return monies that had been deposited by 
Holocaust victims.9  Only after a U.S. government report con-
firmed the claims did the major Swiss banks begin to take the 
lawsuits seriously.10  In April 1996, Senator Alfonse D’Amato, 
the Chairman of the U.S. Senate Banking Committee, began 
holding hearings on the matter, forcing the banks to testify 
about their wartime and postwar behavior.  In December 1996, 
the Swiss government created a commission of historians to 
look into the financial dealings of the Swiss government and 
industry with the Nazis.11  Earlier, the Swiss banks themselves 
created the Independent Committee of Eminent Persons 
(“ICEP”), headed by former U.S. Federal Reserve Bank Chair-
man Paul Volcker, to ferret out the dormant accounts belonging 
to Holocaust victims that might have been left in Swiss banks 
  
 9. For a detailed discussion, see id., at 31–93.  See also BAZYLER, 
HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 1–58. 
 10. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, UNITED STATES AND ALLIED EFFORTS TO 
RECOVER AND RESTORE GOLD AND OTHER ASSETS STOLEN OR HIDDEN BY 
GERMANY DURING WORLD WAR II: PRELIMINARY STUDY (1997) [hereinafter 
EIZENSTAT REPORT I]; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, UNITED STATES AND ALLIED 
WARTIME AND POSTWAR RELATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARGENTINA, 
PORTUGAL, SPAIN, SWEDEN, AND TURKEY ON LOOTED GOLD AND GERMAN 
EXTERNAL ASSETS AND U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE FATE OF THE WARTIME 
USTASHA TREASURY (1998) [hereinafter EIZENSTAT REPORT II]  See also William 
Scally, U.S. Report Details Close Swiss-German War Ties, REUTERS, Dec. 17, 
1996, available at http://www.english.upenn.edu/~afilreis/Holocaust/nazi-
swiss-dealings.html. 
 11. For information about the so-called Bergier Commission, see Inde-
pendent Commission of Experts Switzerland — Second World War, at 
http://www.uek.ch/en/uekinkuerze.htm (last visited June 21, 2003).   
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for over a half century.12  In 1997 the Swiss Bankers Association 
published two lists containing approximately 1,756 names of 
holders of dormant accounts from the World War II era that 
may have belonged to Holocaust victims.  The Swiss banks later 
added another 3,500 names to the list.  The aim of these lists — 
in addition to getting the Swiss out of the public relations disas-
ter resulting from their now-revealed failure to return monies 
after the war — was to help survivors and heirs locate assets 
that might have been deposited in Swiss banks.  The investiga-
tion resulted in the Swiss banks settling the class action litiga-
tion in August 1998 for $1.25 billion dollars, at that time the 
largest settlement of a human rights case in U.S. history.13   
The settlement reached by the Swiss banks with the plaintiffs 
was the direct result of U.S. pressure.14  Only after the U.S. gov-
ernment issued a report condemning the Swiss for their war-
time and postwar behavior, which led to the creation of the 
ICEP and the Bergier commissions, did Switzerland finally be-
gan to reevaluate its own history.  Once the Swiss were forced 
completely to reevaluate their wartime behavior and pay resti-
tution, other nations followed suit — also under U.S. compul-
sion. 
B. Germany 
Germany and its industry have likewise been forced to recog-
nize the slave labor claims they had steadfastly rejected for the 
last fifty-five years.  While the Federal Republic of Germany 
(West Germany) acknowledged its role as the legal successor to 
  
 12. For information about the so-called Volcker Committee, see The Inde-
pendent Committee of Eminent Persons: “The Volcker Commission,” at 
http://www.icep-iaep.org (last visited June 21, 2003). 
 13. For information about the Swiss banks settlement, including a list of 
dormant account holders, awards issued, and links to other websites dealing 
with the Swiss banks settlement, see Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation 
(Swiss Banks) CV-96-4849, at http://www.swissbankclaims.com/home_main. 
asp (last June 21, 2003) (official web site maintained by the federal court).  
The $1.25 billion Swiss banks settlement amount was topped in December 
1999, by the German slave labor settlement of DM10 billion (approximately 
$5 million).  See discussion infra Part II.B.  
 14. In his memoir, Eizenstat discusses in detail how officials in the U.S. 
government, as well as other state and local officials and private individuals, 
forced the Swiss to settle.  See EIZENSTAT, supra note 2.  See also AUTHERS & 
WOLFFE, supra note 2, at 94–106.  
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the Nazi regime and began paying certain reparations to Jewish 
victims in the 1950s,15 West German industry failed to recog-
nize, with some very minor exceptions, claims for slave and 
forced labor by individuals made to work for private German 
companies during World War II.  Between eight to ten million 
people worked either as slaves or forced laborers.16  In the end, 
Germany had to react swiftly considering the success of the 
previous claims made against the Swiss.  Only after the Ger-
man industrialists began to feel the pressure of American litiga-
tion did they agree to pay their still-uncompensated slave la-
borers.17  
Beginning in 1998, aging survivors filed over fifty class action 
lawsuits in the United States against their former German 
masters,18 including such prominent firms as DaimlerChrysler, 
Volkswagen, BMW, Allianz, Siemens, and Degussa.  In addi-
tion, German banks with U.S. offices also began to face litiga-
tion for their wartime theft of Jewish assets, and German in-
surance companies were asked to answer for their failure to 
honor insurance policies purchased by Holocaust victims. 
The first slave labor lawsuit in the United States was filed in 
March 1998 against Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) and its Ger-
  
 15. See U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Website, German Restitution 
Law, available at http://www.ushmm.org/assets/frg_restitution.htm (last vis-
ited June 21, 2003) (summary provided by the Embassy of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany to the United States).  However, slave labor claims by both 
Jewish and non-Jewish victims had been excluded from the early reparations 
program.  BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 61–62.  The German 
Democratic Republic (East Germany) refused to make any payments during 
its existence, claiming that it was not the successor state to Nazi Germany.  
 16. See Bazyler, Nuremberg in America, supra note 6, at 191–94.   An ex-
planation of the terms “slave labor” and “forced labor” is necessary.  The Ger-
mans did not have separate terms to distinguish between those who were 
worked to death and those who were treated as capital assets.  The term 
“Zwangsarbeiter” (forced laborer) was applied to both.  Recently, however, the 
term “slave laborer” has been applied to the former and “forced laborer” to the 
latter.  It is important to recognize, however, that both were slaves, as that 
word is commonly known, and for that reason this Article uses the term 
“slave” for both.  For a further discussion of these terms and their application, 
see id, at 192, n.784.   
 17. For a fuller discussion of these claims and the settlement, see AUTHERS 
& WOLFFE, supra note 2, at 189–246; BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra 
note 2, at 59–109; EIZENSTAT, supra note 2, at 205–92. 
 18. These lawsuits are listed in Bazyler, Nuremberg in America, supra note 
6, app. A, at 265–72. 
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man subsidiary, Ford-Werke, A.G.19  The complaint alleged that 
Ford had knowingly used forced labor in Nazi Germany during 
World War II through its subsidiary Ford-Werke, A.G., and that 
it had benefited economically.  Ford-Werke, A.G. was one of 
fifty-one companies that had used Nazi victims from Auschwitz 
and Buchenwald in its factories as slave laborers.  Following 
this lawsuit against Ford, fifty-six other lawsuits were filed in 
California, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, and New York against 
more than twenty different German and Austrian firms for 
their use of slave labor during the war.  Some of the more noto-
rious cases included Degussa being sued for supplying the Zyk-
lon-B used in the Nazi gas chambers and processing the gold 
taken from Holocaust victims.20  Bayer, Hoechst, and Schering 
were sued for their involvement in medical experiments per-
formed on the victims of the Nazi regime.21  Hugo Boss, now an 
Italian clothier but originally a German company, was sued for 
its use of slave labor to make SS uniforms.22  Volkswagen was 
sued twice in the same day in New Jersey and New York fed-
eral courts by its former Jewish and non-Jewish slaves.23  
The effects of the U.S. litigation were far reaching.  The head 
of a Polish foundation working on behalf of former Polish slaves 
stated, “As long as there were no lawsuits, German companies 
refused to talk.  Our lawsuit is intended to force German busi-
nesses to talk about our claims. . . . We hope that thanks to fil-
ing the lawsuit in the United States, America will become a 
spokesman for all victims.”24 
The U.S. media also kept up the drumbeat.  Holocaust resti-
tution became a “hot story” in newspapers and magazines.  
  
 19. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999).  For a 
detailed discussion, see Bazyler, Nuremberg in America, supra note 6, at 191–
236.  See also REINHOLD BILLSTEIN, ET AL., WORKING FOR THE ENEMY: FORD, 
GENERAL MOTORS, AND FORCED LABOR IN GERMANY DURING THE SECOND WORLD 
WAR 239–49 (2000) [hereinafter WORKING FOR THE ENEMY]. 
 20. Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999). 
 21. Holocaust Experiment Survivors Sue Three German Drug Firms, 
JERUSALEM POST, May 27, 1999, at 5. 
 22. Hugo Boss Used Slaves to Work for Nazis; Charge by Holocaust Survi-
vors, DAILY MAIL (London), May 15, 1999, at 30. 
 23. Marilyn Henry, Advocate for Former Slave Laborers: VW Lawsuits 
“Crazy,” JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 3, 1998, at 4. 
 24. Beata Pasek, Nazi Slaves Still Feel Victimized, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 
5, 1999, available at 1999 WL 15999622. 
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Lawyers working for survivors launched a newspaper cam-
paign, including full-page ads in the New York Times, “naming 
and shaming” German companies with seemingly sterling repu-
tations in the United States.25  The ads reminded consumers 
that these same companies had participated in the most shame-
ful crime in history.  Prime-time U.S. television shows broad-
cast stories on the subject, with the lawyers’ elderly clients ap-
pearing to discuss how they were forced to work as slaves for 
Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz, Siemens, and other prominent 
German companies.   
At the state and local governmental level, Hevesi and his fel-
low regulators refocused their campaign from Switzerland to 
Germany, threatening German industry with the same kind of 
economic sanctions and boycotts they had previously used 
against the Swiss banks.  One example of how state and local 
officials became passionate activists in the Holocaust restitu-
tion campaign was the filing by California governor Gray Davis 
in his capacity as a private citizen of a lawsuit against Ford.  
Brought in California state court in San Francisco, the suit also 
named General Motors, through the actions of Opel A.G., its 
German subsidiary, as a defendant, as well as several German 
companies doing business in California claimed to have used 
slave laborers during World War II.26  Davis and his fellow 
plaintiffs alleged that the companies’ continued refusal to pay 
their former slaves for wartime servitude while at the same 
time doing business in California was an unfair trade practice 
under that state’s law.27 
In the face of such constant pressure, German government 
and industry began to negotiate with various Jewish organiza-
tions and plaintiffs’ attorneys in the United States on the de-
tails of a settlement fund.  The first meeting was held at the 
U.S. Department of State and chaired by then-Under Secretary 
of State Stuart Eizenstat, the Clinton Administration’s “point 
  
 25. See BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 68 (reproducing ad 
directed at DaimlerChrysler with the tag line “Mercedes-Benz.  Design.  Per-
formance.  Slave Labor.”).  
 26. Davis Joins Holocaust Lawsuit Targeting U.S. Auto Makers, L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 1, 1999, at A3.  
 27. Id.  See also WORKING FOR THE ENEMY, supra note 19, at 241. 
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man” on Holocaust issues.28  Just as with the Swiss bank nego-
tiations, the major obstacle was money.  The slave labor claims 
eventually led the German government and leading German 
firms to establish on February 16, 1999, a $1.7 billion (DM3 
billion) fund to compensate the laborers, called the German 
Economy Foundation Initiative.29    German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder explicitly stated that the fund was being established 
“to counter lawsuits, particularly class action suits, and to re-
move the basis of the campaign being led against German in-
dustry and our country.”30  Both plaintiffs’ attorneys represent-
ing the uncompensated slave laborers and American Jewish 
leaders unanimously felt that the $1.7 billion offered by the 
Germans was woefully inadequate.31   While negotiations still 
had a long way to go after the announcement of the $1.7 billion 
fund, Schröder’s statement explicitly demonstrated that until 
the U.S. lawsuits were filed, both the German government and 
its industry were content to avoid seriously dealing with the 
issue. 
A month later Germany’s Foreign Minister met with Jewish 
leaders in New York.  Further, the German government and 
industry leaders began negotiating with both plaintiffs’ attor-
  
 28. See David E. Sanger, Germans Approve Plan to Pay Holocaust Victims, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999, at A10.   
 29. Roger Cohen, German Companies Adopt Fund for Slave Laborers Un-
der Nazis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999, at A1. According to the New York Times, 
the announcement of the fund “was clearly aimed at stopping a wave of law-
suits in American courts against German companies that used slave labor and 
forced labor during World War II.” Id.  See also Michael J. Bazyler, Litigating 
the Holocaust, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 601, 615 (1999). 
German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder made it obvious that the fund 
was being established as a means to shortcut lawsuits filed against 
German industry in the United States.  Such an admission is as-
tounding because it explicitly demonstrates the strength of the 
American system of justice.  Fear of American litigation led the Ger-
mans to capitulate and agree to pay the slave laborers.  
Id. 
 30. Roger Cohen, German Companies Adopt Fund for Slave Laborers Un-
der Nazis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999, at A1. 
 31. See Roger Cohen, Germans Lag in Reaching Slave Labor Settlement, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1999, at A11.  (“The sticking point really is the numbers . 
. . . Although the talks have been going on since February [1999], the sides are 
some way apart.”) (quoting Alissa Kaplan, Jewish Claims Conference spokes-
woman). 
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neys and various Jewish organizations on the details of the 
fund.  The first meeting was held at the U.S. State Department, 
with Eizenstat chairing the meeting.32 
On September 13, 1999, there was a significant setback when 
two different federal judges in New Jersey dismissed five slave 
labor lawsuits, including the lawsuit against Ford.33  The judges 
reasoned that treaties enacted after World War II prevented the 
American judiciary from examining the substance of these law-
suits.  Such claims, ruled the judges, could only be resolved 
through government-to-government negotiations, not private 
litigation.34  Despite this legal victory, Germany and its industry 
did not walk away from the negotiating table. 
On December 17, 1999, U.S. and German negotiators agreed 
to a global settlement of all American litigation for DM10 bil-
lion (approximately $5 billion) to compensate the roughly one 
million surviving Nazi-era slave and forced laborers.35  Stuart 
Eizenstat represented the U.S. government during the negotia-
tions.  The fund precludes any future legal claims against any 
German firms and their subsidiaries for their wartime acts by 
obligating the U.S. executive branch to make an appearance in 
any lawsuit filed in an American court against a German entity 
for such acts with a request to the court that the lawsuit be 
dismissed.  On July 17, 2000, President Clinton and German 
Chancellor Schröder finalized the agreement between the two 
nations.36  
  
 32. See U.S. Diplomatic Mission — Information Resource Centers, Holo-
caust Issues, Policy Statements, at http://www.usembassy.de/policy/holocaust 
(last visited June 21, 2003). 
 33. See, e.g., Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 285 
(D.N.J. 1999); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 491 (D.N.J. 
1999).  
 34. Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 285; Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 491.  
 35. Statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat, Treasury Deputy Secretary, Plenary 
Session, Slave and Forced Labor Negotiations, Berlin, Germany, Office of 
Public Affairs, U.S. Department of Treasury, LS-298 (Dec. 17, 1999), available 
at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ls298.htm (official U.S. government 
announcement of German slave labor settlement).   For information about the 
German fund, see the official website of the German Economy Foundation 
Initiative Steering Group, at http://www.stiftungsinitiative.de/eindexr.html 
(last visited June 21, 2003).  See also BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra 
note 2, at 79–109. 
 36. See William Drozdiak, Germany Sets Fund for Slaves of Nazis; $5 Bil-
lion Will Go to Aging Survivors, WASH. POST, July 18, 2000, at A17.  See also 
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While the agreement obligated the U.S. executive branch to 
seek dismissals of all present and future litigation against any 
German entity arising out of World War II, the German gov-
ernment was obligated to pass legislation establishing a joint 
public-private German Fund Foundation, which the German 
parliament promptly enacted the next month, on August 12, 
2000.  Over 1,600 German companies, including American sub-
sidiaries of German companies, pledged to contribute to the 
fund.  In June 2001, the first payments began to go out to the 
survivors. 37  
The German slave labor agreement would never have been 
reached without pressure from and direct involvement by the 
United States.  The German government acknowledged that the 
major incentive for establishing the fund was to end the litiga-
tion in American courts, as German companies did not fear be-
ing sued anywhere else in the world, even in their own courts.38  
The German companies were also well aware that state and 
local governments would seek sanctions against German indus-
try if a speedy resolution of these claims was not achieved once 
  
Statement by the President: Payments to Victims of Nazi Slave and Forced 
Labor, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Camp David, Mary-
land (July 17, 2000), available at http://www.usembassy.de/policy/holocaust/ 
clinton1.htm. 
 37. See AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 
OF GERMANY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
CONCERNING THE FOUNDATION “REMEMBRANCE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE 
FUTURE,” available at the website of the German Economy Foundation Initia-
tive Steering Group, at www.stiftungsinitiative.de/eindexr.html (last visited 
June 21, 2003).  See also A Law on the Creation of a Foundation Remem-
brance, Responsibility and Future.  Id.  It should be noted that Germany and 
its industry, despite making these payments, continues to deny that German 
companies which used Jews and others as slaves during the war have any 
legal liability for such acts.  See id. (“No legal basis exists for claims against 
German enterprises with regard to forced labor or to injuries consequential 
upon persecution during the Nazi era.”).  
 38. See BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 347, n.33; Marilyn 
Henry, U.S. and Germany Agree on Terms for “Legal Peace” on Slave Labor 
Claims, JERUSALEM POST, June 14, 2000, at 7; William Drozdiak, Germans Up 
Offer to Nazis’ Slave Laborers; Survivors Would Receive Over $5 Billion From 
Government, Industry Under Settlement, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1999, at A36; 
William Drozdiak, Germans Reach Settlement With Slave Laborers, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 18, 1999, at A20. 
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the litigation was underway.39  In the U.S. Congress, legislation 
was also introduced that would have overturned previous court 
rulings and specifically allowed survivors to sue the German 
companies in the courts of the United States.  Finally, German 
companies did not want to risk any of their business in the 
United States as their wartime history was resurrected for 
American consumers.  
C. France  
Even before the litigation was launched against German in-
dustry, lawsuits were being filed in the United States against 
French banks.40  In December 1997, the first lawsuit, Bodner v. 
Banque Paribas, was filed against the six large French banks 
on behalf of “the Jewish victims and survivors of the Nazi Holo-
caust in France, their heirs and beneficiaries.”41  The suit was 
brought by sixteen Holocaust survivors, all U.S. nationals who 
were either former French nationals or refugees living in 
France during the occupation, for the banks’ theft of their as-
sets in the aftermath of the German occupation of France in 
1940. 
A second class action lawsuit, Benisti v. Banque Paribas,42 
was filed a year later on behalf of another group of survivors, all 
of whom were foreign nationals.43  This suit added other French 
banks, as well as two American banks with branches in war-
time Paris, Chase Manhattan and J.P. Morgan, to the litigation.  
Three months later, in March 1999, yet another suit was filed 
against the French banks in California.44  This suit alleged that 
the French banks’ refusal to return Holocaust victims’ deposited 
  
 39. Imre Karacs, Ex-Nazi Slaves Tell Germany: Raise Payout or Face 
Trade War Threat to Boost £2.7m Payout Offer, INDEP. (London), Dec. 10, 
1999, at 19.  See also Imre Karacs, Germany’s £3.2bn Bid to Close Book on 
Nazi Past Leaves Only Rifts and Rancour in its Wake, INDEP. (London), July 
18, 2000, at 3. 
 40. For further discussion, see BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 2, 
at 176–201. 
 41. Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).  
 42. See id. at 124.   
 43. Id. at 121.  
 44. See Complaint at ¶ 1, Mayer v. Banque Paribas (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1999) 
(No. BC 302226).  
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assets amounted to unfair business practices under California 
law.  
With the mounting litigation, other entities in the United 
States began pressuring France and its banks to settle the 
suits.  In September 1999, the House of Representatives Bank-
ing Committee, chaired by Republican Congressman Jim Leach, 
held hearings at which officials of the French government’s his-
torical commission came to testify before U.S. federal legisla-
tors, who scrutinized their past misappropriations of Holocaust 
victims’ assets.  Leach, taking on the role played three years 
earlier by Senator Alfonse D’Amato during the Senate Banking 
Committee’s hearing on the Swiss banks, chastised the French 
financial institutions.  Alan Hevesi, then-New York Comptrol-
ler, also chose to enter the fray.  Hevesi’s Executive Monitoring 
Committee not so coincidentally added the issue of the French 
banks to its September 1999 meeting agenda.  This was also 
seen as “a way to pressure French banks to settle the law-
suits.”45   
A significant legal victory came in August 2000, when Brook-
lyn federal judge Sterling Johnson denied the French banks’ 
motion to dismiss and ordered the banks to engage in pre-trial 
discovery.46  Forced to produce documents of their wartime deal-
ings, the French banks began looking for a way to end the liti-
gation.   
In January, 2001, during President Clinton’s last month in of-
fice, Eizenstat skillfully crafted a settlement with the French 
banks and, in the last few days of the Clinton administration, 
French negotiators came to the United States to meet their 
American counterparts and finalized the agreement to compen-
sate Holocaust victims for lost assets.  The French banks agreed 
to pay more than $172.5 million to 64,000 known account hold-
ers and other undocumented claimants.  The payments to the 
victims would be made through the Drai Commission.47  In turn, 
the agreement also settled the three lawsuits that had been 
filed against the French banks.48  
  
 45. Pauline Jelinek, Holocaust Compensation Promised, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Jan. 18, 2001, available at 2001 WL 9867508.  
 46. Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 47. For further information, see Part V, infra. 
 48. Pauline Jelinek, Holocaust Redress Deals Enter Last Phase; That’s the 
Timely Payment to Victims, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 19, 2001, at A9.  In 
 
File: BAZYLER Base Macro Final_2.doc Created on: 6/24/2003 12:17 PM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:22 PM 
2003] U.S. HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION 699 
The political pressure, together with the legal decision in fa-
vor of the plaintiffs, proved to be a significant element in caus-
ing the French banks to seek a speedy end of the litigation.  To 
their credit, the French banks realized that if they were to 
avoid the trauma experienced one year earlier by the Swiss 
banks at the hands of federal and local politicians — and not 
jeopardize their ability to do business in the United States — 
they needed to remove the issue from the American political 
arena.   
D. Austria 
At about the same time the settlement was reached with the 
French banks, Eizenstat also achieved a settlement with Aus-
tria on wartime profiteering activities during World War II.  As 
in Germany, Austrian government and industry created a fund 
under Austrian law — called the Austrian Fund for Reconcilia-
tion, Peace and Cooperation — to compensate their former 
slaves.49  In October 2000, Austria and the United States, with 
the concurrence of the World Jewish Congress and the class 
action lawyers, finally agreed to the $410 million fund, which 
came into existence in November 2000.  As with the German 
  
July 2002, the Belgian banks, which also engaged in theft of the bank ac-
counts of their Jewish account holders during the war, likewise settled.  See 
BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 201.  As a result of that settle-
ment, the American-based bank Wells Fargo & Co. (“Wells Fargo”) became 
inadvertently enmeshed in the Holocaust restitution saga.  In 1996, Wells 
Fargo acquired a Belgian bank in business during the war.  When twenty-two 
banks in Belgium agreed to pay approximately €59 million to settle these 
wartime claims, Wells Fargo initially balked at participating in the settle-
ment, arguing that it did not have any relationship with the Belgian bank 
during the war.  A day later, it changed its mind.  On Mar. 11, 2003, Wells 
Fargo both apologized to the Belgian Jewish community and agreed to con-
tribute €267,000 to the Belgian banks settlement.  See Wells Fargo Plans 
Holocaust Payout After Refusing, HA’ARETZ (Israel), Mar. 13, 2003, available at 
http://www.haaretzdaily.com; Thomas S. Mulligan, Bank Has Change of Heart 
on War Claims, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2003, at C1.  See also Thomas S. Mulli-
gan, Wells Refuses Belgium Claim, Bank Does Not Believe It Is Responsible for 
Jewish-Owned Deposits Seized During WWII, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 200, at C1. 
 49. For information about the Austrian slave labor fund, see Austrian 
Fund for Reconciliation, Peace, and Cooperation, The Austrian Reconciliation 
Fund: Voluntary Payments by the Republic of Austria to Former Slave and 
Forced Labourers of the Nazi Regime on the Territory of Present-Day Austria, 
at http://www.reconciliationfund.at/history.htm (last visited June 21, 2003). 
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fund, the Austrian fund began to make payments only after all 
of the lawsuits pending in the United States against Austrian 
firms were dismissed.  Over 20,000 former slaves are expected 
to receive payments.  
A second agreement was also crafted between the Austrians 
and Eizenstat relating to non-labor restitution issues.50  With 
this agreement, Austria agreed to provide compensation for the 
seizure of Jewish property in Austria after the Nazis came to 
power and to pay pensions to all Jewish survivors who had been 
persecuted and stripped of their Austrian citizenship.  Only a 
month after the settlement was established, however, a suit for 
non-labor claims was filed in a California federal court in an 
attempt to void the deal.51  As with Germany, Austria is not 
willing to make payments unless all suits are dismissed.  As of 
June 2003, with the litigation still pending, no payments have 
been made to the survivors.  
E. Israel 
The initial accusations that the Swiss banks failed to return 
funds deposited by Holocaust victims led to inquiries as to 
whether banks in other countries might also be holding such 
pre-war and wartime dormant accounts.  One surprising an-
swer was Israel.  In the 1930s, thousands of European Jews had 
opened accounts at the Anglo-Palestine Bank in British Pales-
tine.  These accounts typically contained £1,000 (approximately 
$4,500),52 the amount required to be eligible for an entry permit 
into British Mandate Palestine.  As World War II progressed, 
Great Britain classified these deposits as belonging to enemy 
aliens, since the European Jewish depositors came from Ger-
many, Austria, and eventually other nations conquered by Nazi 
Germany. 
The fate of the deposits remained a mystery for over a half 
century — until the onset of the campaign against the Swiss 
  
 50. For information about compensation by Austria for non-slave labor 
claims, see National Fund of the Republic of Austria for Victims of National 
Socialism, at www.nationalfonds.org (last visited June 21, 2003). 
 51. Chava Anderman, et al. v. Federal Republic of Austria, et al., CV-01-
01769 (U.S. Dist. Ct. C.D. Cal. 2003), available at 2003 US Dist LEXIS 6395. 
 52. See Michael J. Bazyler, www.swissbankclaims.com: The Legality and 
Morality of the Holocaust-Era Settlement With the Swiss Banks, 25 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 64, 87–88 (2001). 
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banks.  In January 2000, Bank Leumi, Israel's largest bank and 
the Anglo-Palestine Bank's successor, admitted to holding ap-
proximately 13,000 dormant accounts, many of which are be-
lieved to have belonged to victims of Nazi persecution.53  Like 
the Swiss banks, Bank Leumi initially refuted the accusations 
that it might be holding such funds.  This led to Bank Leumi 
being accused of being no better than the Swiss banks.  Bank 
Leumi soon gave up the fight.  Embarrassed into following the 
model adopted by the Swiss banks and other European corpora-
tions, it created a claims settlement process — still continuing 
as of the date of this writing — for survivors and heirs entitled 
to the funds.  The Bank Leumi episode illustrates an important 
legacy of the Swiss campaign.  Restitution claims made by 
Holocaust survivors — or for that matter any other historical 
claims for financial wrongs — can no longer be ignored by those 
accused of benefiting from such wrongs.  The accusations are 
now taken seriously.54 
In July 1999, the Israel Museum in Jerusalem, Israel’s pre-
mier art institution was discovered to be holding a painting by 
Impressionist Camille Pissarro stolen by the Nazis from its 
Jewish owners.  The Pissarro had made its way into the post-
war New York art market and was purchased by an American 
couple, who then donated it to the Israel Museum.  The mu-
seum had been displaying the painting since 1997.  The Israel 
Museum reached an agreement with the elderly heir of the pre-
  
 53. EIZENSTAT, supra note 2, at 347. 
 54. Information about Bank Leumi’s Holocaust-era dormant accounts and 
claims process can be located at Unclaimed Assets.com, at 
http://www.unclaimedassets.com/israel.html (last visited June 21, 2003).  For 
a discussion of the efforts by Israeli companies and the Israeli government 
with respect to Holocaust restitution, see Netty C. Gross, Cheating Our Own: 
Israel Stalls on Holocaust Reparations, JERUSALEM REPORT, Dec. 16, 2002, at 
14; Allyn Fisher-Ilan, Israel’s Unfinished Holocaust Business, JERUSALEM 
POST, Jan. 21, 2000, at 7B.  See also Jack Katzenell, Israel Has WWII Assets, 
AP ONLINE, Apr. 13, 2000, available at 2000 WL 19049913 (discussing publi-
cation of treatise in Israel, Forgotten Property by Israeli professor Yossi Katz, 
regarding “land, houses, and other assets in what was then British Mandatory 
Palestine . . . purchased by European Jews, many of whom later died in the 
Holocaust”); Nina Gilbert, Panel to Probe Holocaust-Era Assets, JERUSALEM 
POST, Apr. 20, 2001, at 5A. 
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war owners, allowing the museum to display the painting on a 
long-term loan.55   
In November 2001, an Israeli parliamentary commission con-
cluded that the total value of unclaimed Holocaust-era assets 
held by Israeli banks, the State of Israel, and various Israeli 
public institutions amounted to approximately 25 billion shek-
els ($6.25 billion), a much larger figure than previously be-
lieved.56  Most of this was land purchased by European Jews in 
pre-war Mandatory Palestine.57  When these individuals per-
ished, the land remained unclaimed.58  If the Holocaust restitu-
tion campaign had not begun in Europe, Israel would never 
been pressured to look at its own role.  As with the other Holo-
caust restitution settlements, the original pressure came from 
the United States.  
F. Insurance Claims 
Before the two world wars, insurance policies and annuities 
were popular investment vehicles in Europe.59  Upon coming to 
power in Germany, the Nazis’ persecution of Jews included the 
confiscation of insurance policies from its Jewish citizenry.  
  
 55. See David B. Green, Israel Museum Drags Its Feet Over Its Looted Pis-
sarro, JERUSALEM REPORT, Aug. 2, 1999, at 4.  See also Rebecca Trounson, 
After Circuitous Journey, Painting Lost to Nazis Finds a Home in Israel, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 19, 2000, at A6.  
 56. EIZENSTAT, supra note 2, at 347. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Etgar Lefkovits, Dormant Holocaust-era Assets Valued at NIS 25b, 
JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 9, 2001, at 1A.  
 59. Jews in pre-war Europe often purchased insurance, and an insurance 
policy was known as a “poor man’s Swiss bank account.”  A particularly poign-
ant example of the theft of insurance proceeds by the Nazis, and German in-
surers’ collusion in such theft, occurred in the aftermath of Kristallnacht in 
November 1938.  Since many of the Jewish merchants whose shops and other 
properties were damaged or looted during the campaign held casualty insur-
ance to cover such losses, the Nazis ordered the insurance companies to pay 
all such claims to the state rather than to the injured parties.  In a deal made 
with the insurers, the companies were allowed to expunge the claims of their 
Jewish policyholders by paying only a fraction of the claims’ value to the Ger-
man state.  For a discussion of the scheme concocted in the aftermath of 
Kristallnacht, as well as a general discussion of the Holocaust-era restitution 
claims, see DEBORAH SENN, WASH. ST. INS. COMM’N, PRIVATE INSURERS & 
UNPAID HOLOCAUST-ERA INSURANCE CLAIMS (1999), available at 
http://www.insurance.wa.gov/publications/holocaust/Rev_Report.pdf [hereinaf-
ter SENN, PRIVATE INSURERS]. 
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Jews were also forced to cash in their insurance policies on a 
mass scale, both to pay Nazi taxes assessed especially against 
them and also for the costs of emigration from Germany.60  After 
the war, insurance companies that had sold insurance to Jews 
in Germany and other parts of prewar Europe refused in many 
instances to honor these policies.61  
Like the Swiss banks, the European insurance companies or 
their successor companies that sold policies to the Jews in pre-
war Europe are still operating today.  Unbeknownst to most 
Americans, European insurance business are big players in the 
U.S. insurance market.  In 1996, for example, Germany’s Al-
lianz collected more than $6 billion in premiums in the United 
States.62  Allianz also owns the Fireman’s Fund Insurance Com-
pany and thirteen other U.S. subsidiaries.63  Switzerland’s Zu-
rich Insurance Group collected $5.8 billion in premiums in the 
United States in 1996.64  Zurich owns over twenty U.S.-based 
subsidiaries, including Farmers Group, Inc., Kemper Investors 
Life Insurance Co., Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, 
and the Maryland Casualty Co.65  Another Swiss insurance 
company, Winterthur Group of Switzerland, owned by Credit 
Suisse Bank, collected in 1996 $1.4 billion in premiums in the 
United States.66  Winterthur owns twenty-eight U.S.-based sub-
sidiaries, including Vanguard Insurance, Unigard Insurance, 
and Southern Guaranty Insurance.67  In 1999, Italy’s Assicura-
zioni Generali collected over $600 million in premiums in the 
United States, which it also earned through various U.S.-based 
subsidiaries.68   
The United States once again took the lead in forcing Euro-
pean insurers to recognize long dormant Holocaust-era insur-
ance claims.  All levels of the U.S. government became involved.  
  
 60. Id. at 17. 
 61. Id. at 14. 
 62. Id. at 21. 
 63. DEBORAH SENN, WASH. ST. INS. COMM’N, SUMMARY REPORT TO THE NAIC 
HOLOCAUST INSURANCE ISSUES WORKING GROUP app. A (June 18, 1998) avail-
able at http://www.insurance.wa.gov/industry/holocaust/sumrpt.asp [hereinaf-
ter SENN, SUMMARY REPORT]. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 9.  
 67. SENN, SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 63, at app. A. 
 68. See SENN, PRIVATE INSURERS, supra note 59, at 21. 
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At the state level, U.S. state insurance commissioners began to 
threaten European insurance companies doing business in their 
states with loss of their licenses unless they quickly recognized 
these claims.69 Some commissioners also began holding hearings 
on the matter.70   
Other state government officials also started to put political 
pressure on the insurance companies to expeditiously settle the 
claims.71  In May 1999, California Governor Gray Davis and 
California Insurance Commissioner Chuck Quackenbush held a 
bipartisan press conference at the Simon Wiesenthal Center in 
Los Angeles, issuing stern warnings to the European insurers.72  
Governor Davis announced, “We come to send a message [to the 
insurance companies].  You can pay now or we guarantee you 
will pay more later.”73  With a special budget allocation from the 
California Legislature for this work, the California Department 
of Insurance began running full-page ads chastising the insur-
ance companies.  Under the bold headline of “Time Is Running 
  
 69. Michael J. Bazyler, The Holocaust Restitution Movement in Compara-
tive Perspective, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 11, 20 (2002). 
 70. Id.  
 71. In the United States, insurance is regulated at the state level.  To op-
erate in a state, insurance companies must receive a license and are subject to 
heavy business regulations.  All states have some government official, 
whether an appointed or elected insurance commissioner or some other official 
in another state agency, in charge of regulating insurers operating in the 
state.  An insurance company failing to meet the state’s license requirements 
can be expelled from doing business in the state by having its state insurance 
charter revoked by the insurance commissioner.  
 72. Simon Wiesenthal Center, California Insurance Commissioner Chuck 
Quackenbush Launches Aggressive Program to Secure Restitution for Holo-
caust Survivors and Their Heirs, at http://www.wiesenthal.com/swiss/ 
CalInsConf.cfm (last visited June 21, 2003). 
 73. Added Quackenbush, then the highest-ranking Republican officeholder 
in California: “There is a limit to our patience.  When they feel the heat, they 
will see the light.”  Elli Wohlgelernter & Tom Tugend, California Pressures 
Insurance Companies on Holocaust-Related Payments, JERUSALEM POST, May 
3, 1999, at 5.  Quackenbush, along with Deborah Senn, the Washington State 
Commissioner of Insurance, took the most aggressive and principled stances 
against the European insurers in the Holocaust restitution arena.  The next 
year Quackenbush was forced to resign from office after revelations that he 
entered into “sweetheart” deals with other insurance companies he was regu-
lating.  Senn, who ran for the U.S. Senate, failed in her election bid.  As a 
result, claimants of the Holocaust insurance restitution movement lost two of 
their most effective government supporters. 
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Out,” one advertisement began as follows: “For sixty years, in-
surance companies have profited by not paying on insurance 
policies issued to Jews and others who were murdered by the 
Nazis during the Holocaust.”74  
Beginning in 1997, two class action lawsuits were filed 
against more than one dozen European insurers in a New York 
federal court, followed by six individual actions filed in Califor-
nia.75  The claims were brought either by Holocaust survivors or 
their heirs against insurance companies doing business in the 
United States. 
The European insurance company with the most notoriety in 
the field of Holocaust-era restitution is Assicurazioni Generali 
S.p.A., the largest insurance company in Italy and owner of 
Migdal, Israel’s largest insurer.76  Generali, as the company is 
commonly known, was founded in 1831 by a group of Jewish 
merchants77 and, until recently, its chairman was a Jewish sur-
vivor of Auschwitz.78  In pre-war Europe, Generali was known 
as a “Jewish company whose sales agents saturated the major 
Jewish population centers before the war.”79  Generali, along 
with other European insurers, has been accused of failing to 
honor policies purchased by Holocaust victims in pre-war 
Europe.80  In May 1998, after the lawsuit against Generali was 
  
 74. California Department of Insurance, Time is Running Out, May 1999 
(advertisement run by the California Department of Insurance) (on file with 
the authors).  
 75. For a comprehensive discussion on the subject of insurance claims, see 
Bazyler, Nuremberg in America, supra note 6.   
 76. ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ECONOMIC SURVEY, 
COMMUNICATED BY GPO ECONOMICS DESK (Aug. 1, 1996), available at 
www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/home.asp. 
 77. Marilyn Henry, A Holocaust Paper Trail to Nowhere?, JERUSALEM POST, 
May 12, 1998, at 11. 
 78. David Zev Harris, A Questionable Policy, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 7, 
1999, at 11. 
 79. Henry, supra note 77. 
 80. Id.  Generali originally maintained that it had no records of policies it 
issued before the war.  In late 1997, however, it revealed that a warehouse at 
its headquarters in Trieste, Italy, was found to contain partial records  (called 
“water copies,” akin to carbon copies) of such policies.  Id.  Originally said to 
contain records of between 330,000 and 384,000 pre-war policyholders, Gener-
ali culled the list down to approximately 100,000 policies, which it transferred 
to a CD-ROM disc.  In mid-1998, it turned over the disc to Yad Vashem to 
match the names of Holocaust victims found in Yad Vashem’s archives with 
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filed, California enacted the Holocaust Victims Insurance Act, 
which provided jurisdiction over Holocaust-era insurance cases, 
nullified any forum selection clauses, and extended the statute 
of limitations until 2010 for the insurance claims.81  
The other insurance company with a large stake in the pre-
war European market is Allianz of Germany, presently the sec-
ond largest insurance concern in the world.82 Allianz’s CEO, 
Kurt Schmidt, was Hitler’s Minister of Economy.83  Allianz also 
insured a number of concentration camps, including Auschwitz 
and Dachau.84   
Around the same time that the lawsuits were being filed, the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners,85 composed of 
the insurance regulators in all fifty states, created a working 
group on Holocaust and insurance issues.86  Some of the regula-
tors began holding hearings, inviting the companies to explain 
their reasons for not paying pre-war policies.  Commissioners 
began threatening to revoke the licenses of the European insur-
ers for failure to honor these claims.  
The commissioners from California, New York, and Florida — 
states where the combined populations contained the largest 
concentration of Holocaust survivors in the United States — 
prodded five of the insurers being sued, including Generali and 
  
its list.  In early 2002, Generali finally released a list containing 8,740 names 
of pre-war Jewish policyholders.   
 81. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 127. 
 82. See Brendan Noonan, On a Grand Scale, BEST’S REV. — LIFE-HEALTH 
INS. ED., Dec. 1, 1999, at 41, available at 1999 WL 29605916 (providing de-
tailed analysis of Allianz’s world-wide business empire).  See also the webpage 
of Allianz, at http://www.allianz.de (last visited June 21, 2003). 
 83. See BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 114.  
 84. John Marks and Jack Egan, Insuring Nazi Death Camps: History 
Catches Up with Another German Corporation, U.S. NEWS &WORLD REPORT, 
Feb. 22, 1999, at 52 (citing report by German weekly periodical Der Spiegel).   
 85. Headquartered in Kansas City, Missouri, the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) is a voluntary organization of the chief 
insurance regulatory officials of the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and 
four U.S. territories.  The association’s overriding objective is to assist state 
insurance regulators in protecting consumers and helping maintain the finan-
cial stability of the insurance industry by offering financial, actuarial, legal, 
computer, research, market conduct, and economic expertise.  Formed in 1871, 
it is the oldest association of state officials.  For more information see NAIC, 
The NAIC: A Tradition of Consumer Protection, at http://www.naic.org/about/ 
background.htm (last visited June 21, 2003).  
 86. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 133.  
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Allianz, to form and fund the International Commission on 
Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (“ICHEIC”).  The organization 
was headed by former U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagle-
burger. 87  ICHEIC was established in 1998 by the National As-
sociation of Insurance Commissioners in cooperation with sev-
eral European insurance companies, European regulators, rep-
resentatives of several Jewish organizations, and the State of 
Israel. 88  The commission is charged with establishing a just 
process to expeditiously address the problem of unpaid insur-
ance policies issued to victims of the Holocaust.89 
Following the model of the Swiss banks’ ICEP, ICHEIC is 
similarly intended to be a non-adversarial alternative to the 
U.S. litigation brought against the insurance companies.  In 
February 2000, ICHEIC announced after numerous delays that 
it would begin a two-year claims process to locate and pay un-
paid Holocaust-era insurance policies.90 That same month, 
ICHEIC began placing advertisements in newspapers and jour-
nals around the world, inviting Holocaust survivors and heirs to 
submit claims.91    
Unfortunately, ICHEIC has done a poor job to date.92  By early 
2002, ICHEIC, while spending $30 million on expenses, had 
made offers on only approximately 1,000 of the 81,000 claims 
received.93  The individual California lawsuits, five of which 
  
 87. Id. at 133–34.  The other three insurers participating in ICHEIC are 
France’s AXA, Swiss insurers Winterthur Lieben (owned by Credit Suisse 
Bank) and Zurich.  Eagleburger has attempted to have the other European 
insurers sued join the Commission, but without success.  Id. 
 88. In addition to the participating insurance companies and the insurance 
commissioners of the three states, the World Jewish Congress, the Claims 
Conference, and the World Jewish Restitution Organization (all related 
NGOs), as well as the State of Israel, have a seat on the ICHEIC board. 
 89. See The International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims, 
at http://www.icheic.org/eng (last visited June 21, 2003). 
 90. Henry Weinstein, Spending by Holocaust Claims Panel Criticized, L.A. 
TIMES, May 17, 2001, at A1. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id.  See also Henry Weinstein, Insurers Reject Most Claims in Holo-
caust Cases, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 2000, at A1; Michael Maiello & Orbert Lenzer, 
The Last Victims, FORBES, May 14, 2001, at 112.  For the current status of the 
ICHEIC claims settlement process, see ICHEIC, Claims Processing, at 
http://www.icheic.org/eng/claims.html (last visited June 21, 2003). 
 93. See Weinstein, Spending by Holocaust Claims Panel Criticized, supra 
note 90; Michael Maiello & Robert Lenzer, The Last Victims: As the Jews Fled 
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have settled, have yielded higher payments than the amounts 
distributed through ICHEIC.94  While the settlement terms re-
main confidential, the New York Times reported that one of the 
California cases alone settled for $1.25 million.95 
On September 19, 2002, a $275 million agreement between 
ICHEIC and the German foundation Remembrance, Responsi-
bility and the Future was reached to settle unpaid insurance 
claims for Holocaust survivors and their families worldwide.96  
As discussed above, the Foundation is an entity funded by the 
German government and companies and was created pursuant 
to the July 2000 Executive Agreement between the United 
  
the Holocaust, European Insurers Pocketed Their Premiums. Decades Later, 
They Promised Compensation. But So Far, They’ve Paid Out a Pittance, 
FORBES, May 14, 2001, at 112.  
 94. A substantial reason for the settlement of the individual suits in Cali-
fornia has been California’s aggressive stance against the insurers accused of 
failing to honor Holocaust-era insurance claims.  California led the way in 
enacting new laws threatening suspension of licenses of such insurers (CAL. 
INS. CODE §§ 790–790.15 (West 2003), enacted in 1998), requiring the insurers 
to open their pre-war insurance records (CAL. INS. CODE § 13800 (West 2003), 
enacted in 1999), and extending the limitations period for filing suits for such 
claims until December 3, 2010 (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.5 (West 2003), 
enacted in 1998).  The states of Washington and Florida have followed suit by 
enacting similar statutes.  See Holocaust Victim Insurance Act, FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 626.9543 (West 2003), enacted in 1999; Holocaust Victims Insurance 
Relief Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.104.060 (West 2003), enacted in 1999; 
Holocaust Victims Insurance Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.104.040 (West 
2003), enacted in 1999.  The insurance companies have challenged these stat-
utes, asserting that they are unconstitutional.  To date, no final ruling has 
been issued on this question.  
 95. Holocaust Insurance Settlement Reported, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1999, at 
A4 (reporting settlement of Stern v. Assicurazioni Generali, a case filed by a 
Holocaust survivor, Adolf Stern, eighty-two years old, and his family for poli-
cies purchased from Generali by his father Moshe “Mor” Stern, a wealthy wine 
and spirits merchant from Uzghorod, Hungary who perished at Auschwitz.  In 
June 1945, Adolf, who survived Buchenwald and was then twenty-eight years 
old, presented himself at Generali’s offices in Prague seeking payment on the 
policies.  At his deposition, Adolf testified that Generali officials demanded 
that he produce a death certificate for Mor.  When Adolf explained that the 
Nazis did not issue death certificates, he was forcibly ejected from Generali’s 
offices.  (Deposition of Adolf Stern, at 26–27)).   
 96. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Philip T. Reeker, Deputy 
Spokesman, Holocaust Insurance Agreement Reached (Sept. 19, 2002), avail-
able at www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/13580.htm. 
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States and Germany,97 entered into effect on October 17, 2002.98   
ICHEIC will work with the German Foundation and the Ger-
man insurance industry association to distribute the $275 mil-
lion fund.   
G. Art 
The Nazis stole an estimated 220,000 works of art from both 
museums and private collections throughout Europe.99  The 
value of this plundered art — amounting to $2.5 billion in 1945 
prices, or $20.5 billion today — exceeded the total value of all 
artwork in the United States in 1945.100  After the war, Nazi-
looted art was soon transplanted throughout the world.101  Since 
1997, a number of prominent American museums have been 
embarrassed to find that their collections include Nazi-stolen 
art.102  
  
 97. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Holo-
caust Insurance Agreement Signed (Oct. 17, 2002), available at www.state. 
gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/14455.htm.  
 98. For a copy of the Agreement between the International Commission on 
Holocaust Era Insurance Claims and the foundation Remembrance, Responsi-
bility and Future and the German Insurance Association, see 
http://www.icheic.org/eng/press.html.  
 99. For further discussion, see BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra note 2, 
at 202–68.  One of the most publicized books on the subject of Nazi-stolen art 
is HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE 
WORLD’S GREATEST WORKS OF ART (1997).  Feliciano, a Paris-based journalist, 
first published his book in France, where it caused a sensation and led to the 
first identification of Nazi-stolen art found in French museums and private 
collections.  Another worthy treatment of the subject can be found in LYNN 
NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF EUROPE’S TREASURES IN THE 
THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1994).  Pillaging of art treasures in 
the aftermath of war continues to this day, the looting of the Iraqi antiquities 
in the aftermath of the Iraqi war being the latest example.  For a proposal by 
Holocaust art historians on adopting the postwar model in retrieving Nazi 
stolen art to the situation in Iraq, see Constance Lowenthal and Stephen 
Urice, An Army for Art, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2003, at A25.   
 100. Bazyler, Nuremberg in America, supra note 6, at 161. 
 101. For a thorough overview of the activities of art recovery in various 
countries, see the Commission for Art Recovery, at http://www.comartreco 
very.org/common/htm/welcome.html (last visited June 21, 2003).  This Com-
mission is associated with the World Jewish Congress and the World Jewish 
Restitution Organization.   
 102. For an excellent discussion of the problem of Nazi-stolen art found in 
the United States and possible solutions, see Lee Rosenbaum, Will Museums 
in U.S. Purge Nazi-Tainted Art?, ART IN AMERICA, Nov. 1, 1998, at 37. 
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The worldwide movement to recover Nazi-looted art also has 
its roots in the United States.  In late 1998, the U.S. Depart-
ment of State and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum hosted 
the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets at the U.S. 
Department of State.103  Forty-four governments, as well as nu-
merous international non-governmental organizations, sent 
delegations to the conference to deal with Nazi-stolen assets, 
including artwork found throughout the world.104  The confer-
ence was designed as an international effort to help research 
and uncover cultural assets seized by the Nazis during World 
War II and to return those assets to their pre-war owners or 
heirs.105  At the conclusion of the conference, the participating 
nations adopted by consensus the Washington Principles, an 11-
point plan created to help individuals in their efforts to recover 
Nazi-looted works of art.106   
The principles are “comprehensive guidelines intended to 
identify artworks looted by Nazis during World War II, locate 
the prewar owners and settle conflicting claims to property 
worth billions of dollars on today’s market.”107  Small steps have 
been made to comply with these principles and return Nazi-
looted assets.  For example, as recently as December 2002, the 
United States returned to Russia an archive that Germany cap-
tured when it occupied Smolensk during World War II.  The 
Germans took a small portion of the archive to Bavaria, where 
U.S. forces retrieved it at the end of the war and finally brought 
it to the United States in 1947.  The documents then remained 
for many years at the National Archives.108  In the end,  with the 
assistance of the private Commission on Art Recovery, which 
  
 103. Washington Conference Principles On Nazi-Confiscated Art, Released 
in connection with the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets, 
Washington, D.C. (Dec. 3, 1998), available at http://www.state.gov/www/ 
regions/eur/981203_heac_art_princ.html [hereinafter Washington Principles]. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Norman Kempster, 44 Nations Set Guidelines for Retrieving Nazi 
Loot Art: Washington Conference, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1998, at A8. 
 106. Washington Principles, supra note 103.  These principles were reaf-
firmed at an international conference in Vilnius, Lithuania in October 2000. 
 107. See Kempster, supra note 105.  
 108. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, MEDIA NOTE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, 
RETURN OF SMOLENSK ARCHIVE (Dec. 13, 2002), available at http://www.state. 
gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/15942.htm. 
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helped to effectuate an agreement, the U.S. government  re-
turned  the documents  to Smolensk.109   
In late 2000, the American Association of Museums (“AAM”) 
and American Association of Museum Directors (“AAMD”) 
agreed to implement a more proactive role regarding Holocaust-
looted art works.110  The U.S. museum community also agreed to 
establish a centralized database of the stolen Holocaust-era 
art.111  As of June 2003, this “Nazi-era Provenance Internet Por-
tal” was still not functioning.  
To date, unlike in the other Holocaust-era claims litigation, 
less than a handful of lawsuits have been filed in the United 
States involving World War II looted art.112  Since each lawsuit 
involves a specific work of art, all were individual lawsuits, 
rather than class action litigation.  Furthermore, litigation in 
the United States involving Nazi looted art has not produced 
the same results as litigation pertaining to other Holocaust is-
sues.  No Holocaust artwork suit has ever reached trial; all have 
either settled or are still ongoing. Thus far, the community of 
museums, galleries, and art dealers seems unwilling to estab-
lish any fund similar to others created.  Instead, the profes-
sional art world leaves each defendant who unluckily ends up 
with Nazi-stolen artwork to fend for itself.  This situation con-
tinues despite the fact that museums, art dealers and collectors, 
through their postwar practice of turning a blind eye towards 
  
 109. “The return of the Smolensk Archive is part of the U.S. Government’s 
effort to resolve outstanding disputes over cultural property from the World 
War II era.  It is our belief that such returns help to build an atmosphere of 
trust and mutual respect between peoples.”  Id.   
 110. See PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMM’N ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS, PLUNDER 
AND RESTITUTION: THE U.S. AND HOLOCAUST VICTIMS’ ASSETS app. E (2000) 
(letters of agreement from the AAM and AAMD to the PCHA on Oct. 20, 2000) 
[hereinafter PCHA FINAL REPORT]. 
 111. See American Association of Museums (“AAM”), AAM Recommended 
Procedures for Providing Information to the Public About Objects Transferred 
in Europe During the Nazi Era (May 2, 2001), available at http://www.aam-
us.org/initiatives/nazi-era/procedures_nazis.cfm. 
 112. For a general discussion of the law in the United States dealing with 
stolen art, see RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR 
COLLECTORS, INVESTORS, DEALERS, AND ARTISTS 201–58, 550–63, 1431, 1434 
(1998).  One body successful in resolving Nazi looted art claims without litiga-
tion is the New York State Banking Department’s Holocaust Claims process-
ing Office (“HCPO”).  Without the HCPO, many more Nazi looted art claims 
would have been forced into litigation.  
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art with suspicious provenance that suddenly appeared in the 
marketplace,113 are responsible for creating a market that per-
mits looted art to be purchased by innocent buyers. 
H. Role of Historical Commissions 
One of the results of the pressure from the United States in 
the area of Holocaust restitution has been the creation through-
out the world of historical commissions devoted to Holocaust 
issues.114  European governments and private companies have 
been forced to examine and expose the truth about their histo-
ries during the Nazi era.  After a half century of silence, the full 
historical record of German, Austrian, French, British, and also 
American companies profiting from the Holocaust is only now 
coming to light.  The historical black hole of commerce in Nazi-
era Europe is finally being filled in by Holocaust historians, 
who are now much in demand to staff the historical commis-
sions being created by governments and private companies to 
research and issue reports about their financial dealings with 
the Nazis.  All of this is being done in the aftermath, and as a 
consequence of, the Swiss campaign.  
1. Switzerland 
As discussed below, in response to the allegations made 
against them, the Swiss banks and the Swiss government cre-
ated, respectively, the Volcker Committee and the Bergier 
Commission to uncover the truth about Switzerland’s financial 
shenanigans during World War II.  The Swiss model is now the 
prototype used by other European governments and private 
  
 113. See Judith Dobrzynski, Loot-Holders Learn that Honesty Can Be 
Tricky, RALEIGH (N.C.) NEWS & OBSERVER, Sept. 13, 1998, at G3.  
When the idea of levying a tax on dealers and auction houses, or their 
transactions, has come up at symposiums and conferences, it has not 
won resounding support from the art trade, with few people in the 
business feeling a responsibility for what happened in the war.  
Id. 
 114. This method of investigation has been so prominent that the New York 
Times reported that “the lawsuits have also created a mini-boom for . . . 
[World War II-era] historians and research specialists.”  Barry Meier, Histori-
ans Are in Demand to Study Corporate Ties to Nazis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 
1999, at C2.  
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corporations when confronted with accusations about their war-
time role.  
a. Volcker Report 
In December 1999, an independent committee of experts cre-
ated by the Swiss Bankers Association and headed by American 
Paul Volcker, the former head of the U.S. Federal Reserve 
Board, concluded a three-year study of the World War II-era 
dormant accounts held by the Swiss banks.115  In an interview 
following the issuance of the report, Volcker made the following 
comment: “They were lackadaisical, to say the least . . . .  The 
banks had no incentive to find out the truth about the assets 
because they felt they should protect the honor of Switzerland.  
They could have solved this problem a long time ago if they 
really wanted to.”116   
The so-called Volcker Committee found 53,886 accounts in 
Swiss banks that could have been linked to people persecuted 
by the Nazis.117  It eventually published 21,000 of these names, 
which were most likely to be accounts of persecuted Jews.118  
The committee’s report cautioned, however, that its numbers 
were imprecise because “[t]here can be no assurance that all 
possible accounts have been identified or that some have not 
been misidentified as those of victims.”119  Nevertheless, even 
this figure was much higher than the number of dormant ac-
counts the Swiss banks originally claimed to have uncovered.   
In February 1996, the Swiss Bankers Association announced 
  
 115. See PAUL A. VOLCKER ET AL., INDEPENDENT COMMITTEE OF EMINENT 
PERSONS, REPORT ON DORMANT ACCOUNTS OF VICTIMS OF NAZI PERSECUTION IN 
SWISS BANKS (1999), available at http://icep-iaep.org/final_report/ [hereinafter 
ICEP REPORT]. 
 116. William Drozdiak, Panel Discovers 54,000 Accounts of Nazi Victims; 
Swiss Banks Cleared of Conspiracy, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1999, at A1. 
 117. See ICEP REPORT, supra note 115, at 10. 
 118. See The Special Masters for Claims Resolution Process for Deposited 
Assets, Press Release, The Claims Resolution Process Begins, Feb. 5, 2001, 
available at http://www.specialmasters.org/_press_releases/pr010206.phtm. 
 119. Id. at 6.  Moreover, the figure issued by the Volcker Committee is 
probably underestimated.  As the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz pointed out, the 
committee auditors were “able to examine only four million out of a total of 6.7 
million accounts in Swiss banks at the end of the war.  Details on the remain-
ing accounts were not kept.”  See Yair Sheleg, Israel: Volcker Panel Numbers 
Too Low, HA’ARETZ (Israel), Dec. 7, 1999.  
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that it knew of only 774 unclaimed bank accounts opened by 
foreign clients before 1945.120  The auditors then matched the 
names of holders of the discovered dormant accounts to lists of 
those who had perished in the Holocaust kept by the U.S. Holo-
caust Museum and the Yad Vashem Holocaust Center in Is-
rael.121  Both these lists of victims, however, are incomplete.122  
While the Volcker Committee report cleared the Swiss banks of 
any criminal wrongdoing, the actions of the banks “led the 
Committee to question whether their duty of due care in their 
dealings with customers was observed by a number of banks 
and their officers in the special situations following World War 
II.”123  The Committee found that:  
The record is clear, certainly by today’s standards, that the 
handling of these funds was too often grossly insensitive to the 
special conditions of the Holocaust and sometimes misleading 
in intent and unfair in result. Our inquiry is one reflection of a 
willingness by Switzerland to deal with that heritage more 
forcefully and openly.124 
  
 120. See Veil Lifted on Holocaust Accounts in Swiss Banks, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Dec. 6, 1999 [hereinafter Veil Lifted on Holocaust Accounts] (on file 
with authors).  
 121. Yair Sheleg, Israel: Volcker Panel Numbers Too Low, HA’ARETZ (Israel), 
Dec. 7, 1999, available at 1999 WL 29286184.  
 122. For example, “the list of victims maintained by Yad Vashem includes 
only about half of all those who died in the Holocaust.” Veil Lifted on Holo-
caust Accounts, supra note 120. 
 123. ICEP REPORT, supra note 115, at 14.  
 124. Id. at 23. In the section entitled “Evaluation of Bank’s Conduct,” the 
report also made the following findings:  
In setting the record straight, the Committee has come to certain 
conclusions about the appropriateness of the actions of the Swiss 
banks in dealing with the accounts of victims of Nazi persecution. As-
sessing the record as a whole, the committee concluded:  
(a) The auditors have reported no evidence of systematic destruc-
tion of records of victim accounts, organized discrimination 
against the accounts of victims of Nazi persecution, or concerted 
efforts to divert the funds of victims of Nazi persecution to im-
proper purposes; and 
(b) There is, however, confirmed evidence of questionable and de-
ceitful actions by some individual banks in the handling of ac-
counts of victims, including withholding of information from 
Holocaust victims or their heirs about their accounts, failure to 
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b. Bergier Final Report 
At the end of 1996, the Swiss federal assembly established by 
unanimous vote the Independent Commission of Experts Swit-
zerland — Second World War (“ICE”) to investigate assets 
moved into the country before, during, or immediately after the 
war.125   The commission consisted of an international panel of 
  
keep adequate records, many cases of insensitivity to the efforts 
of victims or heirs of victims to claim dormant or closed accounts, 
and a general lack of diligence-even active resistance-in response 
to earlier private and official inquiries about dormant  
accounts. . . . 
No less important were various actions resulting in the closing of ac-
counts. Normal fees and charges, assessed on all dormant accounts, 
were applied even to victims where banks knew or should have 
known that the account holder was dead or had disappeared leading 
to eventual closing by exhaustion of the account values. Moreover, 
long dormant accounts were transferred to the banks’ profit accounts, 
most without retaining readily available documentation necessary to 
easily identify the accounts of returning depositors. The criticism, 
applicable in this case to the treatment of all dormant accounts, of 
such actions is even more pointed with respect to the extraordinary 
charges for searches for victims’ accounts or to close accounts. This 
criticism also applies to the placing of accounts in fee-free suspense 
accounts without payment of interest and, in many cases, without 
adequate documentation. In these cases, tracing of ownership was 
difficult or impossible, with a consequent greater impact on Holo-
caust victims whose accounts became involuntarily dormant. These 
actions . . . led the Committee to question whether their duty of due 
care in their dealings with customers was observed by a number of 
banks and their officers in the special situation following World War 
II.  
. . . .  
Finally, the Committee also notes that a factor in the indifferent 
treatment of many claimants to the accounts of victims of Nazi perse-
cution was a fear of embarrassment and litigation arising out of 
transfers of victims’ accounts to Nazi authorities after these victims 
had been coerced into signing transfer papers. At the time, ethical 
and business dilemmas were plainly created for the bank in this 
situation. However, the practice apparently adopted after the War by 
a few banks or bank officials of denying to claimants in such cases all 
knowledge of the existence of an earlier closed account relationship is 
impossible to justify.    
Id. at 13–15. 
 125. For the complete final report and information on the Independent 
Commission of Experts Switzerland — Second World War (“ICE”), including 
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historians, economists, and lawyers, headed by Swiss historian 
Jean Francois Bergier.126  The government of Switzerland allo-
cated approximately $15 million for the research needed to the 
complete final report, which was published in March 2002.127  
The role of the commission was “to shed light upon certain con-
troversial or insufficiently analyzed aspects of this history, as-
pects in which it appeared that Switzerland, that is to say its 
political authorities and economic decision-makers, had perhaps 
been derelict in assuming their responsibilities.”128  
  
its mandate, see http://www.uek.ch.  Besides the final report, ICE completed 
several other reports on a variety of topics, such as: 
Switzerland and refugees during the  Nazi Era, Flight Assets/Looted 
Assets, Interhandel, Clearing, Transit, Electricity, Swiss Subsidiary 
Companies in the Third Reich, Swiss Refugee and Foreign Economic 
Policies as covered by the Press; Camouflage/Transfer, Transit, Trade 
with Securities, Dormant Accounts, Refugee Policy (reedited with 
supplementary information), Research contributions on aspects of 
private and public law, the Swiss Land Bank (Bodenkreditanstalt), 
Swiss-Italian financial relations, Swiss policy regarding gypsies, and 
German ransom demands, (the last two being unchanged re-editions 
of the complementary studies which had already appeared as sup-
plements to the Refugee Report); Swiss foreign economic policy, Ar-
maments industry/trade in war material, Swiss insurance companies 
in the Third Reich, the Swiss financial center, Gold transactions 
(supplemented re-edition), Aryanization in Austria, and Franco-Swiss 
financial relations.   
Id.  ICE also participated in the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era 
Assets.   
 126. ICE consists of a president, and four Swiss and four non-Swiss mem-
bers (Britain, Israel, Poland, and the United States).  See Independent Com-
mission of Experts Switzerland, Second World War, The Most Important In-
formation at a Glance, at http://www.uek.ch (last visited June 21, 2003). 
 127. The financing of ICE’s research work and the publication of its reports 
is derived from the Swiss Confederation’s general funds.  See id.  In adopting 
the December 13, 1996 Federal Decree, parliament approved a guarantee 
credit which was initially fixed at 5 million francs.  In view of the extremely 
comprehensive mandate which was formulated by the Federal Council, and 
given the enormous number of documentary sources to be examined both at 
home and abroad, the Swiss parliament, in the December 18, 1997 Federal 
Decree on the 1998 estimated budget, granted an additional credit of 17 mil-
lion francs to cover the period running from 1998 to 2001.  This means that a 
total of 22 million francs has been placed at the disposal of the ICE.  Id.  
 128. See Jean-Francois Bergier, Introductory Address, ICE Press Confer-
ence, (Mar. 22, 2002), available at http://www.uek.ch [hereinafter Bergier 
Address]. 
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The 600-page report contains devastating information about 
the role of Switzerland during the Nazi era.129  ICE recognized 
that former Swiss political leaders had not always responded to 
the “humanitarian needs of the time” when neutral Switzerland 
was surrounded by countries plagued with war.130   The commis-
sion stated that it had found “quite egregious failures,” espe-
cially concerning three areas.131  The first area was the Swiss 
treatment of refugees seeking protections within its borders.  
Bergier stated “the refugee policy of our authorities contributed 
to the most atrocious of Nazi objectives — the Holocaust.”132  He 
further explained: 
The uncertainty as to the figures and the speculation they give 
rise to, do nothing to alter the fact that a large number of per-
sons whose lives were in danger were turned away — need-
lessly.  Others were welcomed in, yet their human dignity was 
not always respected.  The courage of certain citizens along 
with their sense of justice, plus the selfless commitment of 
large segments of the population succeeded in toning down of-
  
 129. See id.  See also Elizabeth Olson, Commission Concludes that Swiss 
Policies Aided the Nazis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2002, at A4; Elizabeth Olson, 
Panel Criticizes Swiss Wartime Past Historians Say Actions Assisted the Na-
zis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2002, at A5; Did the Swiss Help the Nazis?, DESERET 
NEWS (Salt Lake City), Dec. 2, 2001, at A17.  In addition to the 600-page re-
port, the Bergier Commission produced twenty-five volumes of detailed and 
generally high-quality studies on specific issues, such as looted art, insurance 
policies, gold transactions and immigration policy.  See 
htpp://www.uek.ch/en/index.htm (last visited June 21, 2003).  The breadth of 
the work of the Bergier Commission stands in sharp contrast to the paltry 
studies issued by the Presidential Commission on Holocaust Assets in the 
United States.  See discussion infra.    
 130. William Hall, Switzerland Seeks to End Bitter Debate over War, FIN. 
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2002, at P6.  To aid its investigation, the Commission issued a 
press release on August 14, 1997, inviting anyone to give statements to ICE in 
confidence “who possess information about the scope and fate of assets 
brought to Switzerland as a result of national-socialist rule, about business 
activities of Swiss enterprises abroad, about the attitude of Swiss authorities 
and individuals towards refugees and prisoners as well as general informa-
tion.”  Press Release, Independent Commission of Experts Receives Testimo-
nies (Aug. 14, 1997), at http://www.uek.ch/en/presse/pressemitteilungen/ 
970814e.htm. 
 131. See JEAN-FRANCOIS BERGIER ET AL., FINAL REPORT: SWITZERLAND, 
NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR (2002) (final report of the 
Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland-Second World War), avail-
able at http://www.uek.ch [hereinafter ICE FINAL REPORT]. 
 132. See Bergier Address, supra note 128. 
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ficial policy.  But they were unable to bend it.  Yet the authori-
ties knew the fate that was in store for the victims.  They also 
knew that a more flexible and magnanimous attitude would 
not have generated consequences of an unbearable nature ei-
ther for the country’s sovereignty or for it’s inhabitants’ living 
standard however precarious it might have been at the time.133 
The second area involves the concessions that both the Swiss 
government and Swiss private business made to the Nazi re-
gime: “Businesses saw the chance to make a profit; others, like 
the Federal state itself, viewed their actions as a condition for 
survival.”134  The Commission noted that the neutrality 
preached was often not legitimate and cited several examples 
such as the shipments of war materials, improper control of the 
train route between Germany and Italy, and the Swiss govern-
ment’s issuance of a credit line to Germany.135  
The third area concerns the inadequacy of the restitution 
process after World War II.136  Bergier further commented that 
the Swiss government’s and private businesses’ refusal to re-
turn assets “is at the root of the property claims along with the 
problems of Switzerland’s image and history, problems which 
Switzerland was forced to confront in recent years since it had 
neglected to do so back when the time was ripe for them to be 
resolved.”137  
After the issuance of the report, the Swiss government ac-
knowledged that past errors could never fully be mended, 
though it was convinced that “by facing history we not only be-
come more aware of our obligations to today's victims, but can 
also draw inspiration which will guide our actions.”138 
  
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Specifically, ICE found that: 
Neither the Swiss Confederation by virtue of its insufficient and in-
adequate legal provisions, nor the private sector of industry, banks, 
insurance and trust companies, art galleries and museums, accorded 
the matter its due importance by undertaking in a timely manner the 
measures necessary for the legitimate beneficiaries to regain posses-
sion of their assets. 
Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Peter Capella, Wartime Swiss Authorities Contributed to Holocaust: 
Commission, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 22, 2002, available at 2002 WL 
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2. Germany 
The government of Germany has both apologized and taken 
responsibility for the horrific acts committed by the German 
people during the Nazi era.  Since the 1950s, Germany (first as 
West Germany and later as unified Germany) has paid ap-
proximately $80 billion to some Jewish victims of Nazi persecu-
tion.139  German industry, however, has been less open about its 
role during the war.  Official histories of major German compa-
nies were often circumspect regarding the companies’ eager 
participation in Nazi-era crimes.  The Holocaust restitution 
lawsuits filed in the United States, which specifically targeted 
German companies, forced them to confront the dark years of 
their corporate history.  
As important as the DM10 billion financial settlement was in 
itself, the litigation led German companies to hire Holocaust 
historians to examine their wartime archives and to issue find-
ings about corporate activities during World War II.140  As re-
ported by the London-based Guardian, the words “independent 
critical review” have become the mantra for German companies 
attempting to come to grips with their wartime past.  Major in-
dustrial firms such as Volkswagen, Daimler-Benz, Deutsche 
Bank, Dresdner Bank, Allianz, and Bertelsmann have all com-
missioned “independent critical reviews” of their business re-
cords from the Nazi Era.141  Moreover, constructive self-criticism 
has in itself become something of a growth industry in Ger-
many, with bodies such as the Society for Business History and 
the Institute for Bank Historical Research assisting firms to 
face their past.142   
  
2368750.  See also Elizabeth Olson, Panel Criticizes Swiss Wartime Past His-
torians Say Actions Assisted the Nazis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2002, at A5; Did 
the Swiss Help the Nazis?, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), Dec. 2, 2001, at 
A17. 
 139. Roger Cohen, Germans Lag in Reaching Slave Labor Settlement, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 25, 1999, at A11. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Barry Meier, Chronicles of Collaboration: Historians Are in De-
mand to Study Corporate Ties to Nazis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8 1999, at C1. 
 142. Dan Glaister, Shadow of Shame, GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 22, 1998, at 
2.  For information about the Society for Business History [Gesellschaft für 
Unternehmensgeschichte e.V] see http://www.unternehmensgeschichte. 
de/english/index.htm (last visited June 21, 2003).  For information on the In-
stitute for Bank Historical Research [Institut für bankhistorische Forschung 
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German subsidiaries of some American companies have also 
begun to examine their wartime role.  In 1998, Ford began an 
in-house study of the wartime role of Ford-Werke A.G., Ford’s 
German subsidiary, which had exploited the vast pool of slave 
labor that the Nazis made available to German private industry 
during the war.143  In December 2001, Ford released the study, 
which concluded that the parent company did not profit from its 
German subsidiary's operations in Nazi Germany.  At the same 
time, Ford announced that it would be “donating the documents 
for this project, along with a searchable database, to the Benson 
Ford Research Center at Henry Ford Museum & Greenfield Vil-
lage, where they will be available for research [by the public].”144  
In 1999, General Motors hired Yale University historian 
Henry Turner to identify, collect, and catalog documents rele-
vant to the role of its German subsidiary, Opel A.G., during the 
Third Reich.145  
For further discussion of claims against American companies 
arising from their wartime activities and dealings with Nazi 
Germany and in occupied Europe, see Part IV.B., infra.  
3. Austria 
The Austrian Historical Commission was established on Oc-
tober 1, 1998 and published its final report on February 24, 
  
e.V], see http://home.t-online.de/home/0696311134-0001/brosceng.htm (last 
visited June 21, 2003).  
 143. RESEARCH FINDINGS ABOUT FORD-WERKE UNDER THE NAZI REGIME (Dec. 
6, 2001), at http://media.ford.com [hereinafter FORD-WERKE REPORT].  See also 
Henry Weinstein, Ford Says WWII Study Clears Firm, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 
2001, at C1.   
 144. FORD-WERKE REPORT, supra note 143.  See also Tom Brown, Report 
Explains Ford’s Role in Nazi Germany, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 7, 2001 
(discussing the Ford-Werke Report); David Runk, Ford Releases Nazi Labor 
Report, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 6, 2001. 
 145. According to Yale Library staff, Professor Turner deposited with the 
Yale Library the scanned images of Opel and General Motors documents that 
he generated as part of his research.  They are available on CD-ROMs.  The 
Yale Library also has a printed list of the documents.  However, the materials 
are not available on-line.  Under GM's agreement with Yale, patrons must be 
physically present in the library to view the materials.  E-mail from Richard 
Szary, Director, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale Library, to Amber L. Fitz-
gerald (May 15, 2003) (on file with the authors).  
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2003.146  This near-comprehensive 14,000-page report consists of 
53 individual reports written by 160 international researchers 
over a period of four and a half years, the results of which were 
summarized in a 453-page final report issued on January 24, 
2003.147  This summary final report is divided into two parts: a 
discussion of the expropriation of property during the World 
War II and an examination of the political, economic and legal 
aspects of restitution and compensation after 1945.148  The total 
costs for this research and report amounted to €6.5 million.149  
The Commission criticized Austria’s postwar governments for 
their reluctance to indemnify Nazi victims, but also claimed 
that the government had made attempts to compensate the vic-
tims but their attempts were often hampered by ambiguous 
laws and subject to bureaucratic obstacles.150 
4. France 
The private French banks did not follow the example of the 
Swiss banks by creating a parallel Volcker Committee.  The 
French government, however, seeing the writing on the wall, 
followed the example of the Swiss authorities.  In December 
1997, French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin created the “Prime 
Minister’s Office Study Mission Into the Looting of Jewish As-
sets in France,”151 essentially a French version of the Bergier 
Commission.  The Study Mission was popularly known as the 
  
 146. See Press Release, Final Report by Historical Commission: Expropria-
tion in Austria During NS Era and Compensation After 1945 (Feb. 28, 2003), 
available at http://www.austria.org/press/318.html [hereinafter Final Report: 
Expropriation in Austria]. 
 147. For further information, see The Austrian Historical Commission, at 
http://www.historikerkommission.gv.at (last visited June 21, 2003).  The final 
report is in German, but the Commission plans to issue the report in English. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Final Report: Expropriation in Austria, supra note 146. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE, THE PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE STUDY 
MISSION INTO THE LOOTING OF JEWISH ASSETS IN FRANCE, EXTRACTS FROM THE 
SECOND PROGRESS REPORT OF THE STUDY MISSION INTO THE LOOTING OF JEWISH 
ASSETS IN FRANCE (1999) (on file with the authors).  See also REPUBLIQUE 
FRANCAISE, THE PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE, EXTRACTS FROM THE SECOND REPORT 
OF THE STUDY MISSION INTO THE LOOTING OF JEWISH ASSETS IN FRANCE § 1 
(1999) [hereinafter REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE, EXTRACTS FROM THE SECOND 
REPORT].  
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“Mattéoli Commission,” named after its chairperson, former 
cabinet minister and Resistance fighter, Jean Mattéoli.152  Its 
task was to study “the various forms of spoliation visited upon 
the Jews of France during World War II” and the postwar ef-
forts to remedy such spoliation.153   
The mandate of the nine-member commission was limited.  
Its task was merely to determine what was taken from the Jews 
in France during wartime, and it had no power to grant com-
pensation.154  Before the Commission was disbanded, it recom-
mended the establishment of a successor governmental com-
mission to consider making payments to the victims of the spo-
liation.  In the words of Jean Mattéoli, the Commission “pro-
posed the creation of a body that would examine individual 
claims from victims of anti-Semitic legislation passed during 
the Occupation.”155 
Prime Minister Jospin followed Mattéoli’s recommendation.  
On September 10, 1999, Jospin announced the creation of the 
so-called “Commission for the Compensation of Victims of Spo-
liation Resulting from Anti-Semitic Legislation in Force During 
the Occupation,” otherwise known as the “Drai Commission,” 
after its chairman, the noted French jurist Pierre Drai.156  As 
observed at that time by the head of the Jewish community in 
France, “this marks the first time a state, other than Germany, 
recognizes the principle of individual reparation.  It’s something 
  
 152. Taking a cue from the Swiss government’s effort in public relations, the 
Mattéoli Commission published an English-language newsletter describing its 
work.  Compare Update from the Mattéoli Commission (Newsletter of The 
Study Mission Into The Looting of Jewish Assets in France) (Sept.1999) [here-
inafter Mattéoli Commission Update], with Dialogue (Latest News from the 
Task Force on Switzerland — World War II).  See REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE, 
EXTRACTS FROM THE SECOND REPORT, supra note 151.  See also French Panel to 
Pay Jews Persecuted During War, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12, 1999, at 10 (statement 
of Henri Hadjenberg, president of the Representative Council of French Jew-
ish Organizations, known by its French acronym “CRIF”). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Moreover, while the nine-member commission is supposed to determine 
what was taken, it cannot issue compensation. (“The Mission of which I am 
chairman is a study mission.”).  Mattéoli Commission Update, supra note 152 
(Feb. 1999), at 1.  
 155. Id. at 1. 
 156. See French Panel to Pay Jews Persecuted During War, CHI. TRIB., supra 
note 152. 
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we have been waiting for years.”157  France was making signifi-
cant progress.  The Drai Commission was later given the task of 
paying the Holocaust victims from the fund created by the nego-
tiations of the United States and France.   
In April 2003, the Drai Commission recommended that the 
French government pay $91 million in compensation and that 
the French banks pay $3.7 million in compensation to Holocaust 
survivors and heirs as damages for spoliation during wartime.158  
The recommendations are not binding, and the French govern-
ment, as of May 2003, is still deciding whether to follow them.   
5. Other Countries 
Many other nations have followed the Swiss, German, Aus-
trian, and French examples by establishing their own bodies for 
investigating previously unexamined conduct during World War 
II.  Since the beginning of the Holocaust restitution campaign 
in 1996, the following countries have created commissions of 
inquiry into Holocaust issues:  Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Israel, It-
aly, Latvia, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey.159  Other coun-
tries, while not formally creating a commission, have also con-
ducted new research on their wartime conduct, including:  Al-
bania, Australia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, 
South Africa, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Uruguay.160 
The pinnacle of this movement to create bodies to study the 
Holocaust and to promote Holocaust education and remem-
brance came in January 2000, at the Stockholm International 
Forum on the Holocaust, held at the invitation of the Swedish 
  
 157. Id.  
 158. France Owes WWII Jews Millions, AP ONLINE, Apr. 16, 2003, available 
at 2003 WL 19159298.  
 159. See PCHA FINAL REPORT, supra note 110, app. D, at 53 (2000).  See also 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, List of Government-Appointed 
Historical Commissions Concerning the Holocaust, at http://taskforce.ushmm. 
org/combody.htm (last visited June 21, 2003). 
 160. PCHA FINAL REPORT, supra note 110, app. D, at 54.  
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Prime Minister Göran Persson.161  At the Stockholm Conference, 
the participating nations pledged to continue educating their 
populace about the Holocaust and its lessons, and to periodi-
cally judge the progress of their work.  
Without the impetus from the U.S.-driven Holocaust restitu-
tion movement, which created a new awareness of the crimes 
committed during World War II, it is unlikely that any of these 
bodies would have been established.  
III. HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
While pressuring Europeans to provide restitution to World 
War II survivors worldwide, the United States has failed to rec-
ognize the role played by its own government and that of corpo-
rate America in disreputable dealings both during and after the 
war.  Although the U.S. federal government has made signifi-
cant contributions to wartime restitution funds, it can, and 
should, do more.  Corporate America, implicated in wartime 
economic dealings with the Nazis, has done even worse.  Ameri-
can corporations doing business with Nazi Germany and in 
wartime Europe have failed both to confront their negative war-
time past and to disgorge profits they earned from such behav-
ior.   
A. Post-World War II Payments by the U.S. Government 
During World War II, the U.S. government froze assets 
owned by nations with whom it was at war and nations occu-
pied by the Axis powers, including their nationals.162  The freeze 
included U.S.-based assets of Jews who fled Nazi Germany or 
Nazi occupied countries.163  Soon after the war ended, Holocaust 
survivors, heirs of victims, and Jewish organizations began 
making claims against these frozen assets held by the U.S. Of-
fice of the Alien Property Custodian.164  Based on extensive re-
  
 161. The official website of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holo-
caust can be found at http://www.holocaustforum.gov.se (last visited June 21, 
2003). 
 162. See Joan Gralla, US Holocaust Reparation May Have Been Inadequate, 
JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 7, 2001, at 4.   
 163. Id. 
 164. See Id.  See also PCHA FINAL REPORT, supra note 110, at Staff Report, 
SR-162 to SR-172.   
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search into the Office of Alien Property Custodian, the Jewish 
Restitution Successor Organization (“JRSO”)165 claimed that $3 
million was due from the U.S. government.166  In a 1956 report 
to the U.S. Senate, a Jewish official put the figure at 
$865,000.167  By the early 1960s, it was believed that the United 
States possibly had frozen $1.5 million in Holocaust families’ 
assets.168 
The freezing of assets belonging to foreign nationals had be-
gun almost six months before the United States officially en-
tered the war.  With the authority vested in the Trading with 
the Enemy Act of 1917 (“TWEA”),169 President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt issued an executive order on June 14, 1941 freezing 
assets of certain designated foreign nations and their nation-
als.170   
  
 165. In Germany, organizations were created to trace and recover heirless 
property of those Jews who were victims of the Nazis.  The first Jewish body 
to make claims in the American Zone of Germany was the Jewish Restitution 
Successor Organization (“JRSO”).  The JRSO was created in 1947 by Jewish 
groups in the United States to “acquire, receive, hold, maintain and distribute 
for purposes of Jewish relief . . . the property of Jews, Jewish organizations, 
cultural and charitable funds and foundations, and communities which were 
victims of Nazi or Fascist persecution or discrimination.”  PCHA FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 110, at Staff Report, Abbreviations and Glossary, SR-219.  
In 1948, the United States recognized the JRSO as the “official successor or-
ganization allowed to claim identifiable heirless assets and to obtain title to 
Jewish property in the U.S. Zone of Germany unclaimed as of December 31, 
1948.” Id.  Where the former Jewish property owner within the American 
Zone had died without an heir, or where no claim was made, the JRSO was 
empowered to file claims and apply the proceeds to the relief of needy Jewish 
refugees anywhere in the world. The JRSO also claimed restitution of Jewish 
communal property, meaning property owned by Jewish communities in pre-
war Europe, such as synagogues.  See The Museum of Tolerance Multimedia 
Learning Center, Jewish Successor Organizations, at http://motlc.wiesenthal. 
com/index.html (citing ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA (1972)).  
 166. PCHA FINAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 13.   
 167. Id. at SR-170 to SR-171.  
 168. Gralla, supra note 162, at 4.  
 169. See 50 U.S.C app. §§ 1–39 (2000).  
 170. See Exec. Order No. 8785, 3 C.F.R. 948 (1938–43).  The foreign coun-
tries designated in this order were: Norway, Denmark, The Netherlands, Bel-
gium, Luxembourg, France (including Monaco), Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania, Andorra, Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, Danzig, Finland, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, Poland, Por-
tugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics.  Id. at 949.  
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The TWEA was initially enacted in response to the outbreak 
of World War I as a tool to weaken Kaiser Germany’s wartime 
economy.171  Since its enactment in 1917, the TWEA, which au-
thorizes the President to regulate certain transactions in times 
of war and during peacetime emergencies, 172 has been used 
against numerous other countries designated as enemies of the 
United States.173  
By 1946 under the TWEA, the Office of Alien Property Custo-
dian held or froze “enemy” property totally approximately $400 
million (the value eventually appreciating to $900 million).  
This included U.S.-located property of Nazi victims who were 
nationals of Germany and other Nazi-occupied nations.174  In 
August 1946, Congress enacted an amendment to Section 32 of 
the TWEA,175 which returned assets to “enemy” citizens who 
were persecuted survivors of the war.176  The 1946 amendment, 
however, did not cover Nazi victims who died without leaving 
an heir.177 
Several years later, in August 1954, Congress once again 
amended the TWEA to address the issue of heirless assets.178  
The amended section allowed these assets to be inherited by 
certain Jewish charitable organizations, who would then use 
the money to assist victims of Nazi persecution to build new 
lives. 179  The amendment set a $3 million limit on the total 
amount of property that could be turned over to the organiza-
tions.180  President Dwight D. Eisenhower then issued Executive 
  
 171. Marielise Kelly, Artwork from “Enemy” Nations: Informational Mate-
rial Under the Trading with the Enemy Act, A Relic of the Perceived Commu-
nist Threat, Cernuda v. Heavey, 14 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J., 567, 569–70 
(1991).  
 172. 50 U.S.C. app § 5(b) (2000).   
 173. Beth Castelli, The Lifting of the Trade Embargo Between the United 
States and Vietnam: The Loss of a Potential Bargaining Tool or a Means of 
Fostering Cooperation?, 13 DICK. J. INT’L L., 297, 302 (1995).  
 174. See EIZENSTAT REPORT I, supra note 10, at xxxiii. 
 175. An Act to Amend the First War Powers Act of 1941, ch. 878, § 1, 60 
Stat. 925 (50 App. §§ 32–37) (1946).  See EIZENSTAT REPORT I, supra note 10, 
at xxxiii.  
 176. See EIZENSTAT REPORT I, supra note 10, at xxxiii. 
 177. Id.  
 178. See 50 U.S.C. 32(h). 
 179. EIZENSTAT REPORT I, supra note 10, at xxxiv. 
 180. Id. at 197. 
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Order 10587, which designated the JRSO as “successors in in-
terests” to the heirless properties.181   
By August 1955, the JRSO had filed approximately 11,000 
claims; however, two years into the claims process, by June 
1957, some 9,000 of the filed claims had either been withdrawn 
or closed because the JRSO could not prove that the claims in-
volved heirless property.182  Since standards for recognizing a 
claim were unduly strict, several attempts were made to pro-
vide instead a lump sum settlement amount to the JRSO.183  The 
first attempt, H.R. 7830, introduced by Representative Isidor 
Dollinger in May 1957, would have provided a lump sum pay-
ment of $1 million to the JRSO.184  However, H.R. 7830 failed to 
become law.185  
The next attempt to deal with the problem was made during 
the Kennedy Administration.  H.R. 5028,186 introduced in Au-
gust 1961, amended Section 32 of the TWEA to reduce the limit 
from the $3 million to $500,000.187  In support of the bill, Deputy 
Attorney General Byron R. White stated that there were no 
more than approximately five hundred outstanding claims filed 
by the JRSO that would satisfy the burden of the existing law, 
and a lump sum payment of $500,000 would allow for their 
rapid disposition.188  Monroe Goldwater, President of the JRSO, 
also supported H.R. 5028.  Goldwater thought it would be the 
most expedient method for assuring that Jewish victims could 
receive the heirless assets.189  In a letter to Congress, he wrote: 
[T]he processing of individual claims, case by case, is an im-
possible task. There still remain thousands of claims, many of 
them small in amount.  A number of claims involve compli-
cated facts, and hearings on them would consume more time of 
  
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See id. at 197–98. 
 184. Id. at 197. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 197–98. 
 189. Id. at 198. 
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the Government and the JRSO than the amounts involved 
would warrant.190   
H.R. 5028 finally became law in October 1962.191  President 
John F. Kennedy, in February 1963, issued Executive Order 
11087, transferring $500,000 to the JRSO.192  With the moneys, 
the JRSO allocated $350,000 to help set up housing projects for 
Holocaust survivors, $100,000 for scholarship funds for the 
children and grandchildren of Holocaust victims, and $50,000 to 
the Catholic Relief Service — National Catholic Welfare Con-
ference in New York to provide disabled survivors with 
rehabilitation grants.193   
Almost forty years later, this drawn-out process was exam-
ined anew.  In 2000, the Presidential Advisory Commission on 
Holocaust Assets in the United States reviewed this chain of 
events and found the $500,000 lump sum settlement to have 
been “inadequate.”194  According to the Commission, “the JRSO 
reluctantly accepted the . . . lump sum settlement of all claims 
it made for unclaimed property vested in the Office of Alien 
Property.”195  The United States would not contribute any more 
funds for Holocaust survivors and other still-living victims of 
World War II until 1997, as part of its role in the current efforts 
in Holocaust restitution.196 
  
 190. See id. at xxxii (quoting a letter from Monroe Goldwater on July 28, 
1961 to Representative Peter F. Mack of the House Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce Committee). 
 191. Amendment to the War Claims Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 87-846, tit. I, 
76 Stat. 1107 (Oct. 22, 1962). 
 192. EIZENSTAT REPORT I, supra note 10, at 198.   
 193. PCHA FINAL REPORT, supra note 110, at SR-171.  
 194. PCHA FINAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 13.  
 195. Id. at SR-171. 
 196. Irwin Nack, Investigative Counsel for the New York State Banking 
Department and expert in the field, disagrees with the presumption that the 
U.S. government had an obligation to make additional contributions or to 
conduct further studies of its wartime and postwar activities.  
I disagree with the premise of your article that there was wrongdoing 
by the U.S. government which necessitates the kind of historical re-
view that took place in Switzerland and other European countries.  
There were detailed and documented instances of collaboration and 
facilitation leveled against those countries which clearly warranted 
the reviews they undertook.  Indeed, the reports themselves make 
amply clear that such self examination was indeed warranted.  In the 
context of the U.S. government, however, you simply did not (and still 
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B. Nazi-Looted Books 
The fate of books looted by Nazis from Jewish collectors has 
received little attention.  After the defeat of Nazi Germany, the 
U.S. Army seized several million of such books, which were 
then collected in a warehouse outside Frankfurt at the Offen-
bach Archival Depot and placed under the control of the Monu-
ments, Fine Arts, and Archives Section of the First U.S. Army.197  
  
do not) have that smoke — you don't have those allegations of gov-
ernment collaboration, facilitation or acquiescence. Switzerland, for 
example had a detailed roadmap to work from — they knew what the 
allegations were — they knew that there were serious allegations re-
garding the Swiss National Bank gold purchases from Nazi Germany.  
That was not and is not the case with the U.S. government — al-
though one can criticize the effectiveness of certain post-war restitu-
tion efforts such as those involving heirless Holocaust victims’ assets 
which vested with the U.S. government after the war, I don't think 
anybody can say (or has said) that these shortcomings were the result 
of deliberate misconduct.  Moreover, the extensive documentary re-
cord points to a concerted wartime effort by the U.S. government to 
protect the U.S.-based assets of Europeans (Jews and non-Jews) who 
fell under the Nazi yoke.  Nor should we forget that President Roose-
velt began exercising this executive authority as early as April of 
1940 — more than a year and a half before the U.S. entered the war.  
Similarly, the post-war effort to facilitate the return of assets to their 
non-enemy owners was not a perfect one, but it was well-intentioned.   
E-mail from Irwin Nack to Michael J. Bazyler, June 25, 2003 (on file with the 
authors).  
 197. STUART GOLDMAN, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, ACQUISITIONS IN POSTWAR 
GERMANY (Nov. 24, 1999), at http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Holocaust/ 
crs12.html [hereinafter GOLDMAN REPORT].  Stuart Goldman is a specialist in 
the Congressional Research Services of the Library of Congress’ Russian Af-
fairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division.  
  In 2003, the issue of World War II-stolen books resurfaced, however, 
not with books stolen by the Nazis, but as a result of looting by Japanese 
troops in occupied Hong Kong.  As reported by the Hong Kong-based South 
China Morning Post:  
They are Hong Kong’s most overdue library books — 60 years past 
their return date and, on the basis of a daily $1 charge for late re-
turns, the “borrowers” are liable for a $3.5 million fine. The Univer-
sity of Hong Kong is not imposing any charges, however. It just wants 
books back.  Missing from the collection are 168 books, 138 of which 
were taken by the Japanese military during the World War II occupa-
tion.  Another 30 were stolen in a burglary during the occupation. 
They are believed to be still in Hong Kong. HKU librarian Anthony 
Ferguson said: “We wouldn’t make them pay a dollar. Instead we’d 
just have a celebration if they returned our books to us.” 
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In early 1946, the U.S. Army attempted to repatriate the books 
to their previous owners or heirs.198   
At the same time, the U.S. Library of Congress199 representa-
tives assigned to U.S. military intelligence sent a mission to the 
American-occupied zone of Germany with the  authority  to 
requisition the Nazi-looted books.200  Between March and Sep-
tember 1946, the Library of Congress shipped back to Washing-
ton, D.C. 382 crates containing some 77,000 items, including 
Jewish cultural materials.201   
In addition to the books, the Library of Congress also received 
from the Jewish Cultural Reconstruction, Inc. (“JCR”)202 5,708 
books, pamphlets, periodicals, and newspapers, 107 of which 
were defined as rare.203  By agreement with the U.S. govern-
ment, in 1949 the JCR received these “heirless” and “unidenti-
fiable” books from the U.S. Military Government in Germany, 
which had taken steps to identify and restitute items seized by 
the Nazi regime to their original owners or to their countries of 
origin.204  The JCR subsequently distributed almost 500,000 of 
these books to scholarly institutions in the United States, Is-
rael, Europe, and Latin America.205  Between July 1, 1949 and 
January 31, 1952, approximately 158,000 items went to librar-
ies in the United States.206  However, “some libraries, including 
unfortunately, the Library of Congress, had for whatever rea-
  
Patsy Moy, Library Seeks Return of Books 60 Years Overdue, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Mar. 4, 2003, at 1.  
 198. See Michael Dobbs, Epilogue to a Story of Nazi-Looted Books: Library 
of Congress Trove of War Propaganda Included Many Stolen Jewish Works, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2000, at C1.    
 199. The Library of Congress was established as a legislative library in 
1800.  It is the largest library in the world, with more than 120 million items 
on approximately 530 miles of bookshelves. The collections include more than 
18 million books, 2.5 million recordings, 12 million photographs, 4.5 million 
maps, and 54 million manuscripts.  See Library of Congress, at 
http://www.loc.gov (last visited June 21, 2003). 
 200. See Dobbs, supra note 198. 
 201. GOLDMAN REPORT, supra note 197. 
 202. The JCR was created in 1947 to preserve the cultural assets of the 
Jewish people.  Id. 
 203. PCHA FINAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 13. 
 204. GOLDMAN REPORT, supra note 197. 
 205. Id. 
 206. PCHA FINAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 13. 
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son, failed to put the JCR bookplates into the books.”207  In fact, 
by the late 1990s, the Library of Congress still had the book-
plates that it had received from the JCR over fifty years ago.208  
The JCR had specifically requested that the institutions receiv-
ing the books affix the bookplates to recognize that they were 
formerly owned by victims of the Holocaust.209 
In the late 1990s, the issue of the Nazi-looted books subse-
quently captured by the U.S. government was resurrected by 
the Nazi War Criminal Records Interagency Working Group 
(“IWG”).210  As a result of questions asked by the IWG at its De-
cember 1996 meeting,211 the U.S. Justice Department’s Office of 
Special Investigations (“OSI”), whose mission it is to hunt down 
Nazis and their accomplices living in the United States, began a 
comprehensive study in 1997 to determine whether the Library 
of Congress had improperly acquired Nazi-looted books.  In Sep-
tember 1999, the OSI issued its report: a fifty-five page study 
that exonerated the Library of Congress.212  The report con-
  
 207. Bennett Freeman, Holocaust Era Assets — The Politics of Archival 
Openness, Address at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the Research Libraries 
Group, Inc. (2001), available at http://www.rlg.org/annmtg/freeman-
klothen01.html (last visited June 21, 2003) (Bennett Freeman is the former 
U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy Human Rights and 
Labor).   
 208. PCHA FINAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 14.  
 209. Id. 
 210. Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-246, 112 Stat. 
1859.  President Clinton established the Nazi War Criminal Records Inter-
agency Working Group (“IWG”) in accordance with the Nazi War Crimes Dis-
closure Act.  For more information on the TWG, see the official website of the 
National Archives and Records Administration, at http://www.archives.gov/ 
iwg/index.html (last visited June 21, 2003).  
The group is made up of public members and federal agency repre-
sentatives who are directed to locate, inventory, recommend for de-
classification, and make available all classified Nazi war criminal re-
cords, subject to certain specified exceptions; coordinate with federal 
agencies and expedite the release of such classified records to the 
public; and complete its work to the greatest extent possible and re-
port to Congress within one year. 
Exec. Order No. 13110, Nazi War Criminal Records Interagency Working 
Group, WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 37 (Jan. 11, 1999), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/clinton/eo13110.html.   
 211. GOLDMAN REPORT, supra note 197. 
 212. Id. 
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cluded that the library had made a good faith effort to distin-
guish books that could not be restituted.213  
In 1999, the PCHA also took up the issue.214  The commission 
found that beyond the 5,708 books received from the JCR, it 
“also suspected that other items looted by the Nazis had made 
their way to the Library of Congress through other channels.”215 
On September 29, 2000, the commission reached an agreement 
with the Library of Congress,216 under which the latter agreed 
“that the JCR collection should be handled in a manner suited 
to its special provenance” and further to identify, recognize, and 
provide special access to the JCR collection.217  As a result of the 
negotiations with the PCHA, the Library of Congress created 
the Holocaust-Era Judaic Heritage Library.218    On its website, 
it also reveals that “[i]n addition — through federal transfers 
that occurred before JCR began its distributions in 1949 — the 
Library received approximately 150 Hebraic volumes bearing 
the stamps of anti-Semitic Nazi organizations that are also 
  
 213. Id.  The report stated: 
During the course of research for this report, no documentation was 
located in the recorded of the MFA&A at the National Archives or the 
Library of Congress Mission at the Library of Congress that sug-
gested or stated that agents or representatives of the Library of Con-
gress had acted inappropriately in securing books and other materi-
als before they could be restituted to their proper owners.   
Id. 
 214. PCHA FINAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 13. 
 215. Id. 
 216. See id. app. E, at 56 (Letters of Agreement, Letter from James H. Bill-
ington, The Librarian of Congress, to Edgar Bronfman, Chairman, PCHA). 
 217. Id.  Billington also wrote: 
Working diligently, staff of both the Library and Commission located 
sufficient information to enable the Commission to undertake a sam-
pling of the Library’s Hebraic collections.  During July, we accorded a 
team of samplers from the Commission unprecedented and total ac-
cess to the Hebraic stacks, in compliance with the Library’s collec-
tions security procedures.  Using a sampling method . . . the team 
physically examined more than 25,000 Hebraic volumes.  
Id. 
 218. See Library of Congress, The Holocaust-Era Judaic Heritage Library, 
at http://lcweb.loc.gov/rr/amed/hs/hscoll.html (last visited June 21, 2003) (con-
taining a link to the “virtual library,” which is its online search catalogue).   
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likely to have been seized by the Nazis from Jewish victims of 
the Holocaust.”219 
C. Royalties from Mein Kampf   
It is not well known that the U.S. government had, for many 
years, made money from the sale of Hitler’s notorious anti-
Semitic tract, Mein Kampf.  Since Adolf Hitler became an en-
emy alien as soon as the United States entered the war in De-
cember 1941, the U.S. government, pursuant to the TWEA, 
froze and began collecting royalties on the American edition of 
the book, always freely available in the United States since it is 
constitutionally protected speech.  By June 1945, the royalties 
amounted to $20,580.220  The United States quietly continued to 
receive the royalties for thirty-four more years, until 1979.221  By 
that time, the royalties totaled $139,000.222  In 1979, the U.S. 
government sold the royalty rights to the book’s American pub-
lisher, Houghton Mifflin,223 which continues to publish the 
book.224  Over time, the monies received by the U.S government, 
and maintained by the Justice Department were eventually 
transferred into the War Claims Fund.225   
  
 219. See Library of Congress, African and Middle Eastern Reading Room, 
About the Hebraic Collections, at http://lcweb.loc.gov/rr/amed/hs/hscoll.html 
(last visited June 21, 2003). 
 220. PCHA FINAL REPORT, supra note 110, at SR-62. 
 221. David Whitman, Money From a Madman, Houghton Mifflin’s Mein 
Kampf Profits, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 16, 2000. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. In 1962, Congress required the Justice Department to return the 
copyright interests to works by foreign artists who were Nazis or Nazi sympa-
thizers to their owners.  Mein Kampf, however, was specifically excluded from 
that move.  Id. 
 224. See Houghton Mifflin Company, at http://www.hmco.com (last visited 
June 21, 2003). 
 225. See David Whitman, Money From a Madman, Houghton Mifflin’s Mein 
Kampf Profits, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Oct. 16, 2000.  The War Claims 
Fund was established on July 3, 1948.  See 50 U.S.C. § 2012 (“There is hereby 
created on the books of the Treasury of the United States a trust fund to be 
known as the War Claims Fund.  The War Claims Fund shall consist of all 
sums covered into the Treasury pursuant to the provisions of section 39 of the 
Trading With the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, as amended (section 39 of 
this Appendix).  The moneys in such fund shall be available for expenditure 
only as provided in this Act (sections 2001 to 2017p of this Appendix) or as 
may be provided hereafter by the Congress.”).  
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D. Nazi Persecutee Relief Fund 
Decades had passed before the United States would make ad-
ditional contributions to benefit Holocaust survivors and other 
wartime victims beyond its pittance payment in 1963 of 
$500,000.  In December 1997, with the term “Nazi Gold” blaring 
in the headlines,226 the London Gold Conference was convened227  
at the urging of the British Government.228  At the conference, 
forty-two countries came together over a half-century after the 
war to finally uncover the full extent of the Nazi plundering of 
gold during World War II and its present-day implications.  The 
delegates discussed the issues surrounding how much gold was 
actually stolen by the Nazi regime, where it went, and what 
work still remained to rectify the harm, including the distribu-
tion of the remaining gold being held by the Tripartite Gold 
Commission (“TGC”).229   
  
 226. The term “Nazi gold” is actually a misnomer, since it implies that the 
gold belonged to the Nazis. In fact, the gold was not Nazi gold, but gold stolen 
by the Nazis during their plunder of Europe.  Two types of “Nazi gold” are at 
issue: (1) “monetary gold” stolen by the Nazis from the central banks of the 
countries they conquered; and (2) “private gold” forcibly taken from the Jew-
ish victims killed by the Nazis, including gold teeth and fillings ripped from 
the victims’ mouths.  See, e.g., TOM BOWER, NAZI GOLD: THE FULL STORY OF THE 
FIFTY-YEAR SWISS-NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL BILLIONS FROM EUROPE’S JEWS 
AND HOLOCAUST SURVIVORS (1998); GEORGE CARPOZI, JR., NAZI GOLD: THE REAL 
STORY OF HOW THE WORLD PLUNDERED JEWISH TREASURES (1999); ISABEL 
VINCENT, HITLER’S SILENT PARTNERS: SWISS BANKS, NAZI GOLD AND THE 
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE (1997); Lyonette Louis-Jacques, Law-Related Resources on 
Nazi Gold and Other Holocaust Assets, Swiss Banks During World War II, 
and Dormant Accounts (last modified Oct. 23, 1999), available at 
http://www.lib.uchicago.edu/~llou /nazigold.html (providing resources on 
Holocaust restitution assets by the University of Chicago Law Library).  See 
also Political Scene: Ratification of OECD Pact on Corruption Delayed, 
Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report — Switzerland 2nd Quarter, 1999 
(Apr. 6, 1999), available at 1999 WL 14365009 (containing section entitled 
“Nazi gold and Jewish assets” that summarizes Swiss government and private 
industry efforts to correct wrongs committed during World War II).  
 227. For a first person account of the conference and its aftermath, see 
EIZENSTAT, supra note 2, at 111–14. 
 228. The chief promoter of the conference was Lord Greville Janner, who 
had worked as a war-crimes investigator after the war.  Lord Janner is the 
head of the London-based Holocaust Educational Trust.  
 229. Stuart Eizenstat, Closing Plenary Statement at the London Conference 
on Nazi Gold (Dec. 4, 1997), available at http://www.ess.uwe.ac.u/c/ 
documents/eizen_nazigold.html; STUART D. GOLDMAN, OVERVIEW OF LONDON 
GOLD CONFERENCE, REPORT TO THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1999), 
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Formed in 1946 by the United States, Britain and France, the 
TGC was created to deal with the gold stolen by Nazi Germany 
from the national treasuries of occupied countries and which 
the Allies recovered after the war.230  However, some of the re-
covered gold also included “victim gold,” i.e., gold usually 
stripped from corpses of Jews and other victims after being re-
moved from gas chambers and before being burned in the cre-
matoria or open air.  Since 1946, the TGC has distributed gold 
to fifteen countries whose treasuries were looted during World 
War II.231  Surprisingly, a half-century after its creation, the 
TCG had not yet distributed about 5.5 tons of gold, worth some 
$60 million.232   
At the conference, TGC officials recommended that the coun-
tries contribute their portions of the remaining assets held by 
the TGC to the still-living survivors of the Holocaust.233  The 
conference delegates agreed, 234 and nine countries that still had 
portions of their assets being held by the TGC decided to forego 
their claims to the assets.235 
  
available at http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Holocaust/crstoc.html [hereinaf-
ter GOLDMAN, OVERVIEW OF LONDON GOLD CONFERENCE].  See also GOLDMAN 
REPORT, supra note 197. 
 230. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRIPARTITE GOLD COMM’N (1997), available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/tripartite_gold_commission.ht
ml.  See also U.K. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, POST HOLOCAUST 
ISSUES (2000), available at http://files.fco.gov.uk/info/briefs/holocaust.pdf 
[hereinafter POST HOLOCAUST ISSUES].   
 231. Ten countries originally submitted claims, but due to the splitting up of 
former Yugoslavia and former Czechoslovakia, fifteen countries received gold 
distributions: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovak Republic, and 
Slovenia. See POST HOLOCAUST ISSUES, supra note 230. 
 232. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRIPARTITE GOLD COMM’N, supra note 230.  See 
also POST HOLOCAUST ISSUES, supra note 230.  
 233. See POST HOLOCAUST ISSUES, supra note 230; GOLDMAN, OVERVIEW OF 
LONDON GOLD CONFERENCE, supra note 299. 
 234. See POST HOLOCAUST ISSUES, supra note 230; GOLDMAN, OVERVIEW OF 
LONDON GOLD CONFERENCE, supra note 299. 
 235. See Press Release, Treasury Department, Treasury Deputy Secretary 
Stuart E. Eizenstat First Report, Remarks to the United State Chamber of 
Commerce, Office of Public Affairs (May 1, 2000), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ls586.htm; POST HOLOCAUST ISSUES, 
supra note 230.  The nine countries are: Austria, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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The participating governments also decided to take immedi-
ate steps to help the still-living and most needy Holocaust vic-
tims by creating the International Fund for Needy Victims of 
Nazi Persecution, or the “Nazi Persecutee Relief Fund.”236  Sev-
enteen countries contributed to the fund,237 which was managed 
by the British government, with the moneys held at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York.238  Of the $58 million collected, the 
United States, eventually, contributed almost half of the total 
amount, a fact specifically recognized in the Fund’s Final Re-
port.239   
The United States initially pledged $4 million to the fund.240  
Since the conference delegates agreed that each country could 
determine how its contribution would be distributed, the United 
States chose to spend its money providing support to so-called 
“double victims,” i.e., Holocaust victims who had survived Na-
zism but were then trapped behind the Iron Curtain after the 
war.241  As a consequence of the breakup of the Soviet Union and 
the fall of the Iron Curtain, these survivors have become “the 
neediest of the needy,” since today they are no longer protected 
by the social safety net which had existed in the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe under Communist rule.242  
The grants from the fund are channeled through non-
governmental organizations (“NGOs”) that have an established 
record of previously working with Nazi victims.  The United 
States chose the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against 
Germany (“Claims Conference”) as the venue to distribute its 
  
 236. See GOLDMAN, OVERVIEW OF LONDON GOLD CONFERENCE, supra note 
299. 
 237. Contributions were received from Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Croatia, France, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States.  INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE VICTIMS OF NAZI 
PERSECUTION, FINAL REPORT 4 (2002) [hereinafter NAZI PERSECUTEE FUND 
FINAL REPORT]. 
 238. Id. at 4.   
 239. Id. at 20.   
 240. See GOLDMAN, OVERVIEW OF LONDON GOLD CONFERENCE, supra note 
299. 
 241. Treasury Secretary Stuart E. Eizenstat, Testimony of Deputy Treasury 
Secretary Stuart E. Eizenstat before the House Banking Committee (Sept. 14, 
1999), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ls96.htm.   
 242. Id. 
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shares of the fund.243  The Claims Conference is an NGO repre-
senting twenty-three Jewish NGOs globally.244  Created in 1951 
as a conduit to distribute reparation payments by West Ger-
many, the Claims Conference has used its pre-existing contacts 
with local aid networks in Eastern Europe and the former So-
viet Union to deliver food, medicine and clothing to Holocaust 
survivors in the region.245  
In 1998, Congress passed the Holocaust Victims Redress Act 
(“HVRA”),246 which appropriated $25 million for the Nazi Perse-
cutee Relief Fund.247  Of this amount, $10 million was allocated 
to surviving slave and forced laborers.  The HVRA was intended 
to address three main issues:  
  
 243. See Claims Conference, at http://www.claimscon.org/index.asp (last 
visited June 21, 2003).  The Claims Conference has also distributed funds on 
behalf of the governments of Spain, France, and Austria.  According to the 
Claims Conference:  
The Spanish government made a grant of $1.5 million in 2001 for 
Sephardic Jewish victims of Nazi persecution residing in Bulgaria, 
Greece, Tunisia, and the former Yugoslavia. The money will be used 
for medical care, medication, medical equipment, and capital im-
provements to old age homes . . . . The French government made a 
grant of 5 million Francs (approximately $690,000). The money will 
be used in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova for basic medical needs 
and social assistance programs . . . .  The Austrian National Fund 
made a grant of $230,000 for medical care, modernization of medical 
facilities, and social welfare programs in Romania, Hungary, and 
Slovakia.   
Id.   
 244. The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany or 
“Claims Conference” was formed in 1951 to negotiate compensation and resti-
tution for survivors of the Holocaust and heirs of victims.  For more informa-
tion, see Claims Conference, at http://www.claimscon.org (last visited June 21, 
2003). 
 245. Id.  
 246. Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-185, 112 Stat. 15 
(1998). 
 247. See id.  The Act provides three important measures: (1) it authorizes 
the President to commit the U.S. to contribute up to $25 million over three 
years to international organizations for the benefit of Holocaust survivors, 
§103(a); (2) it authorizes the President to commit $5 million for archival re-
search and translation services to assist in the restitution of assets looted or 
extorted from victims of the Holocaust, §103(b); and (3) commits the Congress 
to seek appropriate means for addressing the issue of restituting private prop-
erty, including works of art.  Id. § 202.   
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First, it seeks to redress a perceived inequity in earlier Holo-
caust legislation. Second, it both instructs the United States to 
work toward a speedy resolution of the claims some 15 coun-
tries have on a stock of gold seized from their central banks by 
the Nazis during World War II that is now under the control of 
the United States, Britain, and France, and urges these coun-
tries, once distribution is made, to use all or a substantial por-
tion of this gold to aid Holocaust survivors. Third, it expresses 
the sense of the Congress that all governments undertake good 
faith efforts to return works of art confiscated from rightful 
owners during the period of Nazi rule.248   
Stuart Eizenstat, who headed the U.S. delegation at the Lon-
don Gold Conference, later explained:   
The U.S. had no claim on any of the gold. Indeed, our armed 
forces, at the end of the War, had actually collected over 300 
tons of gold hidden by the Nazis and returned it to the coun-
tries from which it had been stolen. Nevertheless, to show 
moral leadership [,] Congress and the Administration . . . 
made a $25 million contribution to the Fund . . . .249  
In 2001, as part of the $25 million allocated by the HVRA, the 
U.S. government made a grant of $4.5 million for Jewish vic-
tims of Nazi persecution in Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, Yugo-
slavia, and in the former Soviet Union through the Hesed cen-
ters.250 The funds are being used for medication, winter relief, 
food packages, and homecare.251  
The United States made its pledge to the Nazi Persecutee 
Fund as a good-will gesture, with no legal or moral obligation to 
do so.  As Eizenstat explains in his memoir: “I have rarely been 
more proud of my country than when I formally announced our 
contribution of $25 million over three years, approved without 
dissent by Republicans and Democrats in Congress.”252  The U.S. 
  
 248. See GAIL E. MAKINEN, STATUS OF HOLOCAUST VICTIMS REDRESS ACT, 
REPORT TO THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (1999), available at 
http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Holocaust/crs3.html. 
 249. Press Release, Treasury Department, Treasury Deputy Secretary Stu-
art E. Eizenstat Remarks to the United States Chamber of Commerce, Office 
of Public Affairs (May 1, 2000), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/ 
releases/ls586.htm. 
 250. NAZI PERSECUTEE FUND FINAL REPORT, supra note 237, at 4.  
 251. Id.  
 252. EIZENSTAT, supra note 2, at 114.  
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government was finally contributing not only words, but also 
substantial dollars to help Holocaust survivors.  
E. The Eizenstat Reports 
The U.S. Department of State coordinated the creation of two 
different reports, commonly referred to as the “Eizenstat Re-
ports,” which analyzed the efforts of the United States, its war-
time allies, and the efforts (or lack thereof) of neutral nations to 
recover and restore assets stolen by Nazi Germany.253  The 
Eizenstat Reports were initiated in part because of a sense of 
duty stemming from our major role in the war effort, and in 
part because of a feeling that the United States did not do 
enough to recover stolen assets in the period directly after the 
war.254 
The coordination of these reports, which involved more than a 
dozen federal agencies, was led by Eizenstat, then Under Secre-
tary of State.  The reports themselves were prepared by the 
State Department’s chief historian, Dr. William Slany.  The re-
ports analyze the role of neutral countries in helping to sustain 
  
 253. The first report is entitled Preliminary Study on U.S. and Allied Ef-
forts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Ger-
many During World War II and was issued in May 1997.  See EIZENSTAT 
REPORT I, supra note 10.  The final report is a supplement to the first report 
and is entitled U.S. and Allied Wartime and Postwar Relations and Negotia-
tions with Argentina, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey on Looted Gold 
and German External Assets and U.S. Concerns about the Fate of the Wartime 
Ustasha Treasury.  It was issued in June 1998.  See EIZENSTAT REPORT II, 
supra note 10.  A summary of the June 1998 report can be found at U.S. Dep’t 
State, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/ 
eur/rpt_9806_ng_links.html (last visited June 21, 2003). 
 254. See Bennett Freeman, United States and Allied Efforts to Recover and 
Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany During World 
War II, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 137, 143 (1998) (transcript of the proceedings 
at the Conference on Neutrality, Morality, and the Holocaust, on April 23, 
1998 at the American University Washington College of Law).  Speaking at a 
law school conference in 1998, a top State Department official explained:  
We have a particular responsibility because we were one of the major 
Allies in the war. We also feel a particular responsibility given the 
fact that our particular record on recovery of Nazi-confiscated assets 
was less than perfect, despite the tremendous amount of hard work 
and attention given by Seymour Rubin and others immediately after 
the war. 
Id.  
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the Nazi regime, including its war effort, and also cover the 
steps taken by the United States and the Allies to make assets 
available for assistance to stateless victims of Nazi atrocities.255   
The first Eizenstat Report was issued in May 1997, after a 
seven-month effort by eleven U.S. government agencies.256  The 
focus of this report was the U.S. negotiations with wartime neu-
tral countries pertaining to Holocaust assets.257  With the issu-
ance of the first report, Eizenstat recognized “that if we were 
going to shine the bright light of history on other nations, we 
also had to look carefully at America’s role, and the study does 
so.”258  The report’s major focus was on neutral Switzerland, due 
to close ties between Nazi Germany and Switzerland, and the 
leading role of the Swiss in helping Germany trade with other 
countries.259  The report also included a brief analysis of issues 
  
 255. Id at 138–39.  See also Bennett Freeman, The U.S. Government and the 
Wartime Neutrals: History of Justice After Half a Century, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 
453 (1998); Malvina Halberstam, Framing the Issues, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 443 
(1998).  
 256. The following agencies involved in creating this report were: the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, the Department of Commerce, the Department of 
Defense, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, the Department 
of the Treasury, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Federal Reserve Board, 
National Archives and Records Administration, National Security Agency, 
and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. 
 257. See EIZENSTAT REPORT II, supra note 10.  See also Freeman, supra note 
255, at 138. 
 258. EIZENSTAT REPORT II, supra note 10, at iv.  The report stated that: 
American leadership in the postwar negotiations to retrieve Nazi gold 
and other assets was clearly well-intentioned, but unfortunately lim-
ited. There was a demonstrable lack of senior level administration 
support for a tough and consistent U.S. negotiating position with the 
neutrals.  Moreover, there was an even greater lack of attention to 
ensuring the implementation of agreements already negotiated, like 
the 1946 Washington Agreement.  The reason is quite clear when one 
goes through the report, and that is that war-time objectives were re-
placed by new Cold War imperatives.  
U.S. Dep’t of State, Special Briefing, on the Record Briefing by Undersecre-
tary of Commerce for International Trade Stuart Eizenstat and State De-
partment Chief Historian William Slany on Release of Report of U.S. and 
Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden 
by Germany During World War II, available at http://www.state.gov/www/ 
regions/eur/970507eizenstat.html (last visited June 21, 2002) [hereinafter 
Special Briefing]. 
 259. Id. 
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involving wartime neutrals Argentina, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, and Turkey.260  
Released in June 1998, the second Eizenstat Report was 
meant to “take the heat off” the Swiss by detailing the shady 
business dealings of the “other neutrals.”261  The report did not 
shy away from criticizing the postwar actions of the U.S. gov-
ernment and its military.  Asked about these self-criticisms, 
Eisenstat commented:   
We clearly had short-comings in terms of our pursuit of the recov-
ery of looted gold and of German external assets. . . .[O]ur own fo-
cus drifted from trying to get this back and trying to put pressure 
on neutrals to our understandable pre-occupation with the new 
Cold War which was emerging.  This is likewise a recognition that 
we might have done more.262 
Both reports are significant historical documents, as they un-
covered, more than a half-century after the war, malfeasance by 
Switzerland and other neutral nations both during and after 
the war.   
  
 260. Id. 
 261. EIZENSTAT, supra note 2, at 111.  The Swiss government issued the 
following statement in response to the second Eizenstat Report:  
The Federal Council today acknowledged receipt of the so-called Sec-
ond Eizenstat Report published by the American government; it 
views it as a further contribution to clarifying events before, during, 
and after World War II. . . . In regard to Switzerland, the American 
report contains no essentially new findings. Thus no change is appro-
priate in the Federal Council’s consistently pursued course concern-
ing the principles of truth, justice, and solidarity. . . . The Federal 
Council already clearly denied the unacceptable criticism of the ini-
tial Eizenstat Report when it was published. . . . It hopes that the re-
port now in hand will contribute to more objective discussion, particu-
larly in the United States, on Switzerland’s role during World War II.   
Swiss Federal Chancellery Information Service, Federal Council Declaration 
on Second Eizenstat Report (June 2, 1998), available at http://www.admin.ch/ 
cp/f/1998Jun2.180304.9513@idz.bfi.admin.ch.html. 
 262. State Department, Special Briefing Upon the Release of the Report, 
U.S. and Allied Wartime and Postwar Relations and Negotiations with Argen-
tina, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey on Looted Gold and German Ex-
ternal Assets and U.S. Concerns about the Fate of the Wartime Ustasha 
Treasury (June 2, 1998), available at http://www.state.gov/www.policy_ 
remarks/1998/980602_eizenstat_nazigld.html [hereinafter Special Briefing II]. 
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F. American Industry Fund  
In May 2000, in the midst of the Holocaust restitution battles 
with European companies, Eizenstat announced plans for a new 
fund for Holocaust survivors to be created by American indus-
try.263  The impetus for the fund was the establishment a year 
earlier by German industry and the German government of the 
DM10 billion German Foundation Fund.264  American industry 
was now going to create its own fund to help elderly and needy 
Holocaust survivors.265   
Altruism was not the only reason for the fund’s creation.  At 
the time of the proposal, various U.S. corporations had either 
been sued or threatened with litigation stemming from their 
financial activities in wartime Europe. 266  The American Indus-
try Fund, formally referred to as the Center for Corporate Citi-
zenship Foundation (“CCCF”), was to be established through 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,267 which, like the German 
Foundation, would solicit voluntary donations from local indus-
try.268  Eizenstat and the U.S. Chamber officials contemplated 
that donations would not be limited only to companies that did 
business in Nazi Germany and occupied Europe during World 
War II.269  Like the German initiative, where companies that 
had not existed during the war made contributions, it was an-
  
 263. Press Release, Treasury Department, Treasury Deputy Secretary Stu-
art E. Eizenstat Remarks to the United States Chamber of Commerce, Office 
of Public Affairs (May 1, 2000), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/ 
releases/ls586.htm [hereinafter Eizenstat Treasury Press Release]. 
 264. Id.  
 265. Brigitte Greenberg, U.S. To Start War Reparation Fund, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 29, 2000, available at 2000 WL 19886122. 
 266. See Joseph Kahn, U.S. Firms Plan Fund for Victims of Hitler Move 
Partly Aimed at Heading off Lawsuits, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 30, 2000, at 11. 
 267. Press Release, United States Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber 
Announces Humanitarian Aid Fund Donations to Support Disaster Victims 
and Others (May 1, 2000), available at www.uschamber.com/press/releases/ 
2000/may/00-61.htm. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Eizenstat stated that “among those benefiting from conscript labor 
were scores of companies that had been owned, in whole or in part, by Ameri-
can firms before they were nationalized by the Nazi regime. . . .  Many of the 
subsidiaries were returned to their American parents after the war.”  Eizen-
stat Treasury Press Release, supra note 263.   
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ticipated that American companies founded after the war would 
become participants.270    
Eizenstat announced the creation of the Fund at a press con-
ference held in the U.S. Chamber’s Washington, D.C. headquar-
ters.271  According to Eizenstat: 
[T]he U.S. Chamber is again showing its leadership and fore-
sight by moving ahead with the establishment of a humanitar-
ian fund of a Center for Corporate Citizenship and a special 
institution to create a fund for a variety of humanitarian pur-
poses: to assist in natural disaster relief and to relieve the suf-
fering of survivors of one of the greatest human disasters of 
our time, the Holocaust, and the travails of slave and forced 
laborers.272   
The variety of projects for which fund money was to be used 
appeared to be strange.  Holocaust survivors were to compete 
for funds with victims of natural disasters and other humani-
tarian concerns.273  How this amalgam of causes came together 
was never explained.   
At the urging of American companies, former slave and forced 
laborers of wartime Germany still living in the United States 
both Jews and non-Jews would receive a supplemental lump 
sum payment on top of the one-time payment they would be 
receiving from the German Foundation Fund.274   
  
 270. Eizenstat had hoped “that not only those parent companies [doing 
business in Nazi Germany and late wartime Europe] but also other American 
companies now operating in Europe will see their way clear to participate, 
whether their subsidiaries had World War II activities or not.”  Id.   
 271. Id. 
 272. Id.  
 273. Id.  
 274. Id.  Eizenstat explained: 
[A] number of U.S. companies have suggested a way be found to cre-
ate a fund, under the auspices of the Chamber, to voluntarily sup-
plement the payments to be made by the German Foundation. This 
would be a very important moral gesture. It will ease the situation of 
some who are most in need. Since only those slave laborers and those 
forced laborers living in the five nations of Central and Eastern 
Europe that participated in our talks are receiving specific national 
allocations of funds from the German Foundation, with 800 million 
DM set aside for those living elsewhere, such a fund would be espe-
cially meaningful to those survivors living in the rest of the world, in-
cluding tens of thousands who are U.S. citizens. 
Id. 
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Unfortunately, almost nothing came from this grand idea. 
While the U.S. Chamber began taking steps to create a non-
profit corporation to which American companies could make 
contributions, over one year after Eizenstat’s announcement, 
not one pledge had been made to the Fund.275  
In December 2001, more than eighteen months after the 
Chamber’s announcement, came the first pledge.  Ford, which 
had already been sued for using slave labor in its German plant 
during the war, announced that it would contribute $2 million 
to the American Industry Fund.276  Ford made the promise as 
part of its response to the release of an internally-funded study 
on Ford’s activities in Nazi Germany.277   
Eizenstat stated that he hoped this move by Ford would in-
spire other American corporations to make their own dona-
tions.278  American industry, however, answered with silence.  
Even Ford, according to the company’s website, has still not 
fully honored its pledge.279  As of June 2003, it appears that the 
Chamber of Commerce fund is moribund.  In sum, Eizenstat’s 
grand announcement in May 2000 has, thus far, amounted to 
nothing.280 
  
 275. See also Henry Weinstein, Ford Says WWII Study Clears Firm, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at C1.  
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. See Ford Motor Company, Human Rights: Report Issued on Ford-Werke 
Under the Nazi Regime, at http://www.ford.com (last visited June 21, 2003) 
(“Ford will donate the other $2 million to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Cen-
ter for Corporate Citizenship to support its World War II Humanitarian Fund.  
It is anticipated that the money will be used to fund internationally recog-
nized organizations whose mission is to help survivors of economic terrorism 
under the Nazi regime, including forced and slave laborers.”). 
 280. In his memoir, Eizenstat explained his disappointment:   
We jointly launched [the Fund] with fanfare at a news conference at 
the Chamber’s Washington D.C. headquarters. But the money never 
arrived.  Despite several more meetings with [John] Rintamaki 
[Ford’s group vice president and chief of staff], who made a genuine 
effort to convince other firms to join, it was a dry hole.  In December 
2001, two years after my first meeting with Rintamaki and well after 
the end of the Clinton Administration, one of Rintamaki’s aides told 
me that the Ford Motor Company would contribute $2 million.  No 
other American company ever gave a nickel to the chamber fund, re-
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There are a variety of reasons why the Chamber’s American 
Industry Fund initiative was a failure.  First, the Chamber 
never properly promoted the fund.  It failed to send solicitation 
letters, publicize the fund, or engage in any other activities to 
inform American companies, their stockholders, and consumers 
that a fund had been created to assist, among other projects, 
aging Holocaust survivors living in the United States.  This is 
in contrast to Germany, where German industry and the Ger-
man government put together an extensive media campaign for 
the German Foundation.281  Eizenstat also has spoken little 
about the Fund since his initial May 2000 press conference.   
Even if American industry did not feel a responsibility to aid 
elderly Holocaust survivors, a good way to promote the Fund 
would have been to publicize its other humanitarian purposes.  
  
lying upon their German subsidiaries to pay instead into the German 
foundation.   
EIZENSTAT, supra note 2, at 255.  Craig Johnstone, who had been spearhead-
ing the creation of the Fund at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, commented in 
April 2002:   
Here is where things stand. The initial impetus for the fund came in 
the expectation that there would be a prompt legal settlement in 
which the US companies would be held harmless for the use of their 
assets by others in World War II.  A few companies indicated their 
possible willingness to contribute to a fund for the victims of disasters 
as a demonstration of their good will provided such contributions 
were not seen as any kind of admission of guilt or liability.  The crea-
tion of the fund was held up for some time because the legal issues 
remained unresolved.  The fund is now being created and Ford Motor 
Company has agreed to provide an initial contribution.  Although the 
final paperwork has not yet been done, the fund will be a humanitar-
ian fund in which the donors will be able to specify their preferences 
for ultimate disposition of funds they contribute.  Donations from 
some donors might go to the victims of national disasters in any part 
of the world.  Donations from some will be targeted for the victims of 
the Holocaust, and for some more specifically for those WWII slave 
laborers.  In all cases the fund will act only as a pass-through mecha-
nism providing grants to others who will actually disperse the funds 
for the victims.  We want to facilitate humanitarian assistance and 
want to maximize the levels actually going to victims.  We are con-
sulting a board of unpaid supervisors.  As you can see, this is a slow 
process. Not much more to report at this time.  
E-mail from Craig Johnstone to Ian Kaufman (student and research assistant 
of Michael J. Bazyler), Apr. 15, 2002 (on file with authors). 
 281. Bazyler, The Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative Perspec-
tive, supra note 69, at 66.   
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For example, one idea possibly considered by Chamber mem-
bers supporting the Fund was to help former American POWs 
who had been slaves of Japanese industry during World War 
II.282  Like their German counterparts, these aging survivors of 
Japan’s slave labor program had also been struggling since the 
end of the war to secure justice for their wartime suffering.  
However, unlike the former slaves of corporate Germany, these 
survivors have been unsuccessful in obtaining either compensa-
tion or recognition of wrongs from corporate Japan.283  
A U.S. Chamber campaign publicizing the plight of these ag-
ing American POWs — especially in light of the current climate 
of patriotism in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 and the 
placing of American troops in combat in Afghanistan and Iraq 
— surely would have been successful in obtaining donations to 
the Fund.  The U.S. Chamber, however, has done nothing on 
this issue.   
Second, fears of American litigation have acted as a deterrent 
to the Fund.  At the time of the Fund’s announcement, Ameri-
can companies were embroiled in lawsuits for their allegedly 
wrongful wartime activities, and the U.S. lawyers who had filed 
these suits signaled that lawsuits against other American com-
panies would soon follow.284  Contribution to the Fund could be 
interpreted as an admission of liability, so American companies 
that had done business in wartime Europe were reluctant to 
participate.  Even if the exposure to potential liability could be 
worked out — for example, by the issuance of an official state-
ment by the U.S. Chamber and the contributing company that a 
  
 282. Id. at 60. 
 283. Id.  To date, Japanese corporate defendants sued in American courts 
have beaten back the suits.  In contrast to German companies, Japanese com-
panies implicated in wartime slave labor have been unwilling even to discuss 
the creation of a fund for the POWs.  Charles Burress, State Is Ground Zero 
for WWII Lawsuits: California Lets Ex-POW’s Take Aim at Japan, SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRON., Apr. 22, 2001, at A1.  The British government, in the face 
of Japanese intransigence, made its own payment of £10,000 (approximately 
$15,000) to each of the still-living British soldiers who worked as slaves for 
Japanese industry.  Richard Norton-Taylor, £10,000 Payout to Japan POWs: 
“Debt of Honour” Repaid After 50-Year Struggle, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 8, 
2000, at 12.  Payments to Begin for Former POWs, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at 
A4.  The United States government has not followed suit. 
 284. Pauline Jelinek, Actions of U.S. Firms in Nazi Era Targeted, 
COLUMBIA, Aug. 28, 2000, at E1.  
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contribution is not an admission of guilt285 — there still re-
mained the problem that a company making a contribution 
would appear tainted by this action.   
Third, immediately after Eizenstat’s May 2000 announce-
ment, German government officials expressed their concern 
that a U.S. fund could rival its own restitution efforts.  If an 
American company made a contribution to the U.S. Fund, its 
German subsidiary, the Germans argued, would feel relieved of 
responsibility to make a contribution to the German Founda-
tion.286  On the other hand, an American company currently do-
ing business in Germany that made a pledge to the German 
Foundation felt relieved of the responsibility to make a contri-
bution to the American Fund.  As a result, no American com-
pany doing business in Germany — other than Ford — offered 
to contribute to the Fund, and Ford itself has yet to follow 
through on its offer. 
Eizenstat has not given up.  Now out of government, he has 
taken the initiative of salvaging the idea of creating the “mirror 
image” fund he first proposed in May 2000 at the Chamber’s 
headquarters.  In 2003, he and Craig Johnstone, a former col-
league at the State Department and a vice president of Boeing 
who assisted Eizenstat in trying to create the fund through the 
Chamber of Commerce, formed the Humanitarian Aid Founda-
tion (“HAF”).  The aim of HAF is to “fund organizations that 
provide services and assistance to groups of individuals and 
specific populations that are, or have been, victims of acts 
against humanity or natural disasters.”287  The Chamber of 
Commerce is now out of the picture.  HAF is purely a private 
  
 285. Eizenstat confronts this problem in his memoir, stating that it had 
been worked out:   
Craig Johnstone, head of the international division of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce and a former State Department colleague, 
made it easier for the companies to contribute without appearing to 
admit wartime guilt by persuading the Chamber of Commerce to ap-
prove a humanitarian fund that its corporate membership could use 
for everything from hurricane relief to Holocaust relief. 
EIZENSTAT, supra note 2, at 255.  
 286. Germany Fears Rivalry from U.S. Holocaust Fund, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
May 2, 2000 (on file with authors).   
 287. See Humanitarian Aid Foundation (“HAF”), at 
http://www.humanitarianaidfoundation.org (official website of HAF and listed 
as under construction) (last visited June 21, 2003). 
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effort by Eizenstat and Johnstone.288  Ford provided initial funds 
to create HAF, as part of its initial contribution it had earlier 
pledged to the now-defunct Chamber of Commerce fund.289  As of 
April 2003, HAF is in a “very early development phase.”290  It 
has does not yet have a full board of directors, and Ford still 
remains the only company pledging to the fund.  
G. Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the 
United States 
In June 1998, during the Clinton Administration, Congress 
established the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust 
Assets in the United States (“PCHA”).291  Created during the 
heyday of the Holocaust restitution movement, the Commission 
was seen as an important symbol.  The United States, once 
leading the charge to have the Europeans examine their shady 
wartime history, was now going to examine its own.  As ex-
plained by Representative Jan Schakowsky: 
While we are actively pursuing reparations internationally on 
behalf of Holocaust victims and survivors, we also need to look 
carefully at the role of the United States.  The United States 
  
 288. HAF was incorporated by the McCormick Group, a Williamston, Michi-
gan-based consulting firm specializing in the creation of foundations and non-
profit entities.  All information about HAF comes from Dan McCormick, prin-
cipal of the McCormick Group.   
 289. Ford is listed as one of the clients of the McCormick Group.  See 
http://www.mcc-group.com/history.htm (last visited June 21, 2003).   
 290. E-mail from Dan McCormick to Michael Bazyler, Apr. 28, 2003 (on file 
with authors). 
 291. PCHA was established by the U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 
1998, Pub. L. No.105-186, 112 Stat. 611.  Section 2 provides that the Commis-
sion consisted of twenty-one members, which was mandated to include eight 
Congressional members, representatives of the Departments of Army, Justice, 
State and Treasury, the Chair of the Holocaust Memorial Council, and eight 
private citizens.  Id.  The members included Senator Barbara Boxer, Edgar M. 
Bronfman (Chair) (Head of the World Jewish Congress), Senator Christopher 
Dodd, Stuart E. Eizenstat, former Rep. Ben Gilman, Patrick T. Henry, Roman 
R. Kent, a Holocaust survivor and leader in the Claims Conference, former 
Rep. Rick A. Lazio, Ira H. Leesfied, Miles Lerman, former Rep. James H. Ma-
loney, Dr. Jehuda Reinharz, Margaret Milner Richardson, James Robinson, 
former Rep. Patricia Schroeder, Rep. Brad Sherman, William S. Singer, Sena-
tor Gordon H. Smith, Senator Arlen Specter, Rev. Cecil Williams and Neal 
Wolin).  For more information on these members, see PCHA, at 
http://www.pcha.gov/aboutpcha.htm (last visited June 21, 2003).   
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has been a strong leader on Holocaust claims issues.  We 
should also set an example of what it means to conduct trans-
parent self-evaluation.292 
Two stalwarts of the Holocaust restitution movement were 
the prime movers for the establishment of the PCHA.  Senator 
Alfonse D’Amato, who had played a key role in pressuring the 
Swiss banks to come to terms with their past, introduced legis-
lation in April 1998 to create the commission.293  Upon the estab-
lishment of the PCHA, President Clinton appointed Edgar 
Bronfman, Sr., the billionaire scion of the Seagram’s liquor em-
pire and head of the World Jewish Congress, to chair the 
twenty-one-member commission.294  This seemed like a natural 
choice, since Bronfman first brought the issue of Holocaust res-
titution to the attention of the Clinton Administration.  
Bronfman was also the first to confront the Swiss banks with 
accusations that they failed to return monies deposited in Holo-
caust-era dormant accounts.  For this reason, the PCHA was 
sometimes called the “Bronfman Commission.”295 
The PCHA was created for many of the same reasons that 
had inspired the Eizenstat Reports.296  However, its track record 
has been poor.  For example, while the Commission recognized 
that “[t]he need for action is urgent, as the survivors are aging,” 
members of the Commission were not named until November 
1998, five months after the body’s creation, and the PCHA did 
not begin work until March 1999.297  Due to this delay and other 
reasons, such as an unexpected volume of documents, Congress 
  
 292. See 145 CONG. REC. H9256 (daily ed., Oct. 4, 1999) (statement of Rep. 
Schakowsky). 
 293. David E. Sanger, Inquiry to Ask if Nazi Loot May Also Be in U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 2, 1998, at A8. 
 294. Lynn Sweet, Justice Urged for Nazi Victims, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 1, 
1998, at 23.   
 295. See, e.g., Bronfman Commission to Continue Study of U.S. Handling of 
Looted Assets; An Update on the Progress in Seeking Restitution for Holocaust 
Survivors, INT’L MONITOR, Jan. 2000, available at http://www.comptroller.nyc. 
ny.us/2000MONITOR.shtm. 
 296. See 145 CONG. REC. H9253–54 (daily ed., Oct. 4, 1999) (statement of 
Rep. Rick. A. Lazio).   
 297. Id. 
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allocated the Commission an additional $2.5 million, and ex-
tended its one-year mandate for an additional year.298 
The PCHA’s mission was to investigate what happened to 
these Holocaust victim’s assets which came into the possession 
or control of the U.S. government.299  Critically, the Commission 
was not charged with locating and returning assets; rather, it 
was to write the history of the collection and disposition of as-
sets of Holocaust victims that had come under U.S. control.  
Once the historical truth was revealed, the Commission was to 
make recommendations based upon its findings.  In its mission 
statement, the Commission pledged that its work would “dem-
onstrate the leadership of the United States in the international 
effort to obtain justice for the victims and survivors of the Holo-
caust and their families.”300   
  
 298. See U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Extension Act of 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 106-155, 112 Stat. 1740.  According to Gregg Rickman, Legislative Direc-
tor to former Senator Alfonse D’ Amato, the mandate of the Commission had 
to be extended because, soon after its creation, the Commission ran into “or-
ganizational difficulties.”  E-mail from Gregg Rickman to Michael J. Bazyler, 
Apr. 11, 2003 (on file with the authors).  For Rickman’s account of the Holo-
caust restitution movement and his personal involvement, as well as the con-
tribution of former Senator D’Amato, see GREGG J. RICKMAN, SWISS BANKS AND 
JEWISH SOULS (1999).   
 299. Congress specifically mandated the Holocaust Assets Commission to: 
(1) study and develop a historical record of the collection and disposition of 
specified assets of Holocaust victims if they came into the possession or con-
trol of the federal government, including the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System or any Federal Reserve bank, at any time after January 
30, 1933 (Section 3(a)(1)); (2) comprehensively review any research by others . 
. . .“the collection and disposition” of Holocaust victims assets “to the extent 
that such research focuses on assets that came into the possession or control 
of private individuals, private entities, or non-Federal government entities 
within the U.S.”  (Section 3(b)); and (3) submit a final report to the President 
containing any recommendation for legislative, administrative, or other action 
as deemed necessary or appropriate (Section 3(d)(1)).  Pub. L. No. 105-186, 
112 Stat. 611 (1998).  
 300. PCHA Mission Statement, available at http://www.pcha.gov/ 
missionstatement.htm.  See also 145 CONG. REC., supra note 294 (statement of 
Rep. Rick A. Lazio: “I am confident that the United States Holocaust Assets 
Commission will establish that America is doing all it can to return all man-
ner of assets to their rightful owners.  In so doing, we will confirm our leader-
ship in the international effort to obtain justice for the victims of the Holo-
caust and their families.”). 
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The areas of focus for the Commission were art and cultural 
property, gold, and non-gold financial assets.301  Congress also 
mandated the Commission to review research done by private 
individuals or entities, as well as by any federal and non-federal 
government entities.302  Thus, the Commission also worked in 
collaboration with international and state Holocaust commis-
sions, banking and insurance companies, and other agencies.303  
As the Commission proceeded with its investigations, it discov-
ered that more than seventy-five separate U.S. government 
  
 301. Pub. L. No. 105-186, sec. 3(a)(2), 112 Stat. 611, 612 (1998).  The Com-
mission’s focus, according to section 3(a)(2), included the following types of 
assets: 
(A) gold, including gold bullion, monetary gold, or similar assets in 
the possession of or under the control of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System or any Federal reserve bank; 
(B) gems, jewelry, and non gold precious metals; 
(C) accounts in banks in the United States; 
(D) domestic financial instruments purchased before May 8, 1945, by 
individual victims of the Holocaust, whether recorded in the name of 
the victim or in the name of a nominee; 
(E) insurance policies and proceeds thereof; 
(F) real estate situated in the United States; 
(G) works of art; and 
(H) books, manuscripts, and religious objects.   
Id. 
 302. Pub. L. No. 105-186, § 2(b), 112 Stat. 611, 613 (1998). 
 303. PCHA FINAL REPORT, supra note 110, at Staff Report, ch. 1.  The Com-
mission limited the scope of its report to the following issues: 
(1) how Nazis acquired assets from Holocaust victims throughout 
Europe came into the control of U.S. government agencies; (2) how 
U.S. agencies came to control victims' assets through measures de-
signed to wage economic warfare; (3) how these agencies handled vic-
tims’ assets while they remained under U.S. control; (4) how the U.S. 
government restituted or disposed of the assets; (5) how well the 
structure controlling the flow of assets actually worked; (6) how resti-
tution policy evolved in its sensitivity to the interests of individual 
victims; (7) what the role of the U.S. government was in establishing 
Jewish successor organizations; and, (8) what the role of successor 
organizations was in the restitution of victim assets.  
Id. at SR-2.  
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agencies or their branches may have been involved in the pass-
ing of assets of Holocaust victims.304   
Unfortunately, Congress never specifically mandated the 
PCHA to examine the role of private industry in the United 
States.  Arguably, its mandate was broad enough for it to do so, 
but the PCHA never looked at the behavior of American private 
enterprise during the war.  Gregg Rickman, Legislative Direc-
tor to former Senator D’Amato, explains, “Every line of the leg-
islation creating the PCHA was negotiated with the Clinton 
White House legislative staff.  There was a fear of expanding 
any investigation beyond the concept of U.S. government re-
sponsibility for assets.  Even if this idea had gained support, the 
resulting investigation would have taxed the Commission far 
beyond its physical and material capabilities.  This requirement 
would have drastically changed the mission and operation of 
the Commission and would have rendered it inoperable.”305  Of 
course, this begs the question: Why did Congress not ade-
quately staff and fund the Commission so that it could conduct 
a full investigation of Holocaust assets in the United States 
without straining its physical and material capabilities?  The 
answer, it seems, is that the U.S. government was unwilling to 
do what was necessary (and what many European nations had 
done) to assess its role and that of private industry for wartime 
and postwar acts.   
Based upon its investigation, the Commission uncovered sev-
eral factors that impeded the postwar process of restitution of 
  
 304. See 145 CONG. REC. H9253-54 (daily ed., Oct. 4, 1999) (statement of 
Rep. Rick A. Lazio).  Millions of World War II document pages also were found 
to contain additional information on victims’ assets.  Id.  
 305. E-mail from Gregg Rickman to Michael J. Bazyler, Apr. 11, 2003 (on 
file with the authors).  According to Marc Masurovsky, co-founder of the 
Washington, D.C.-based Holocaust Art Restitution Project who was later ap-
pointed as director of research on monetary gold for the PCHA, the Commis-
sion made a calculated decision not to investigate American companies, de-
spite the fact that other U.S. government agencies, notably the U.S. Treasury, 
including its Foreign Funds Control Division, the Wartime Office of Censor-
ship, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Bureau of Customs, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Strategic Services, the Office of 
Naval Intelligence, the Military Intelligence Service, and other government 
offices had come across information linking American companies and busi-
nesspeople with activities that were inimical to the interests of  the United 
States and its allies at war with Nazi Germany and its allies.  Id.     
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Holocaust victims’ assets both in Europe and within the United 
States.306  First, the PCHA discovered that Holocaust victims’ 
belongings found in the United States were returned after the 
war to the countries of origin, such as Germany and Austria, or 
to other international organizations,307 and not to survivors or 
victim’s heirs.308  The United States also did not monitor the 
treatment of the property to ensure that the recipient govern-
ments or organizations located the rightful owner.309  It did pro-
vide a legal basis for internal restitution, which allowed perse-
cutees to file petitions for the return of property, but strict 
deadlines hindered this process and non-restituted assets were 
therefore transferred to the governments of Germany and Aus-
tria.310 
The Commission also found that the politics surrounding the 
Cold War led to inconsistent restitution policies.311  Rather than 
helping individual Holocaust victims, the United States at 
times impeded the restitution process to survivors or heirs in 
Eastern bloc countries.312   
Finally, the Commission found problems at central collecting 
points.313  Because these collecting points lacked regulations and 
security, U.S. government officials and others had ample oppor-
tunity to purloin some of the property.314  One illustrative exam-
ple is the story of the Hungarian Gold Train, discussed infra. 
  
 306. See PCHA FINAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 8–18. 
 307. Id.  They included the Jewish Restitution Successor Organization 
(JSRO), the American Joint Distribution Committee and the Preparatory 
Committee of the International Refugee Organization (“PCIRO”).  E-mail from 
Marc Masurovsky to Michael J. Bazyler, May 11, 2003 (on file with the au-
thors) [hereinafter Masurovsky E-mail].  
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. 
 310. See Michael J. Kurtz, Inheritance of Jewish Property, 20 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 625, 638-39 (1998) (discussing U.S. Military Law 59, which provided the 
legal basis for internal restitution).  
 311. See PCHA FINAL REPORT, supra note 110. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id.  This is “despite an otherwise astonishing and unprecedented prop-
erty rescue and collection operation undertaken almost single-handedly by the 
U.S. military in liberated Europe.”  Masurovsky E-mail, supra note 307.   
 314. See id. at 11.  According to Masurovsky,  
[T]here is no compelling evidence that U.S. government officials 
looted the property at the collection points.  Rather, there were many 
instances where soldiers and employees at collecting points abused 
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Overall, however, the PCHA praised the work of the United 
States in returning assets to Holocaust victims in the aftermath 
of the war.315  In its Final Report, totaling 313 pages, the Com-
mission made six general recommendations to the President, 
summarized as follows:  
(1) The President should establish a foundation to promote 
further research and education concerning Holocaust-era as-
sets; 
(2) The President should require federal institutions to search 
their records or holdings for Holocaust-era assets and if any 
assets are located, return the belongings to the victims or their 
heirs;  
(3) The federal government should preserve archival records of 
the holocaust era and facilitate research into such records;  
(4) The Department of Defense should create regulations for 
future conflicts which may involve restitution of victims’ as-
sets; 
(5) “The United States should continue its leadership to pro-
mote the international community’s commitment to address-
ing asset restitution issues”; and  
  
their position to supply the black market with cultural property 
awaiting restitution.  Most of the abuses by U.S. officials occurred in 
the field.  However, no light has yet been shed on the misappropria-
tion of identifiable property dubbed “heirless” in Germany and Aus-
tria by groups, acting in collusion with sympathetic U.S. Army offi-
cers and restitution officials, seeking to acquire them for the purpose 
of liquidating them and distributing the resulting funds as they saw 
fit. 
Id.   
 315. PCHA FINAL REPORT, supra note 110, at 5–6.  The Commission con-
cluded:  
United States forces in Europe made extraordinary efforts to locate, 
safeguard, identify and restitute assets taken by the Nazis and their 
collaborators from victims of the Holocaust. Because of the enormity 
of Nazi crimes, the undertaking by U.S. agencies to preserve, protect 
and return looted assets was unparalleled in history and willingly 
carried out by a victorious power committed to righting the wrongs of 
a defeated enemy regime.  U.S. military and civilian personnel en-
countered a myriad of obstacles under the very difficult circum-
stances prevailing in postwar Europe.  Their achievements were 
nothing short of heroic. 
Id. 
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(5) Congress should pass legislation to remove impediments to 
the restitution of Holocaust victims’ assets such as amending 
the Federal Immunity from Seizure Act and the National Sto-
len Property Act.316 
As of this writing, none of the recommendations have been 
adopted.  Already this has created negative consequences.  For 
instance, the Department of Defense has no regulations in place 
to restore victims’ assets in postwar Iraq.  Moreover, the work 
of the PCHA has been widely criticized.317  The Commission 
spent a total of $6 million,318 with little to show for it.  Its first 
report, on the Hungarian Gold Train,319 issued on October 14, 
1999, was condemned, at least by one scholar, as being inaccu-
rate.320  Its final report, issued in December 2000, also was not 
enthusiastically greeted, and included grumblings that the re-
  
 316. Id. at 21–26 (Commission Recommendations). 
 317. For a response to the critics, see Appendix infra (E-mail reply from 
Kenneth Klothen, former executive director of the PCHA). 
 318. See U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Extension Act of 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 106-155, § 2(b)(1), 112 Stat. 1740.  This bill authorized an additional $2.5 
million for the Commission’s work, an increase of 71% over the original $3.5 
million.  PCHA Commission Chair Edgar M. Bronfman explained, “The more 
the Commission uncovers, the more we discover we have to examine.  This 
unanimous agreement to extend the Commission and drastically increase our 
authorized funding proves the House’s commitment to our work and America’s 
commitment to achieving justice for Holocaust victims and their families, . . . I 
look forward to prompt consideration in the Senate.”  The primary author of 
the House bill was Rep. Rick Lazio (R-NY), who was joined by twenty-seven 
Members of Congress as co-sponsors. Rep. James Maloney (D-CT), Rep. Brad 
Sherman (D-CA), International Relations Chairman Benjamin Gilman (R-
NY), Banking Committee Chairman Jim Leach (R-IA), and Banking Commit-
tee Ranking Democrat Rep. John LaFalce (D-NY) signed on as original co-
sponsors.  PCHA Press Release, House Votes Unanimously To Extend Holo-
caust Commission, Final Report Due by December 2000, 71 Percent More 
Funds Authorized (Oct. 4, 1999), available at http://www.pcha.gov/pr991004. 
htm. 
 319. PCHA, PROGRESS REPORT ON: THE MYSTERY OF THE HUNGARIAN “GOLD 
TRAIN,” available at http://www.pcha.gov/goldtrainfinaltoconvert.html. [here-
inafter PCHA GOLD TRAIN REPORT].   
 320. See RONALD W. ZWEIG, THE GOLD TRAIN: THE DESTRUCTION OF THE JEWS 
AND THE LOOTING OF HUNGARY (2002).  Zweig is a professor at Hebrew Univer-
sity in Jerusalem and a Holocaust scholar. His account of the Hungarian gold 
train saga differs significantly from the findings of the PCHA.  Unlike the 
PCHA Report, he does not find that the U.S. Army stole significant items from 
the Gold Train.  Id. at 118–30, 155. 
File: BAZYLER Base Macro Final_2.doc Created on:  6/24/2003 12:17 PM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:22 PM 
756 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:3 
port was a whitewash.321  Gregg Rickman, who was closely in-
volved in the creation of the PCHA, comments, “The problem 
with the Commission was that despite being given a defined 
mandate, they were their own worst enemy.  They delayed their 
own work through inaction.  Moreover, they found nothing of 
any original or lasting value and quite honestly wasted the tax-
payer’s money.”322   
The private criticisms did not become public until more than 
two years later.  In March 2003, the New York Times published 
an article quoting “experts, historians and economists who 
worked from 1998 to 2000 on the panel.” 323  The article accused 
the Commission of “fail[ing] to examine critical records pertain-
ing to traffic in looted art before, during and after World War 
II.”324  Specifically, the PCHA neglected to review the vast array 
of documents found in the U.S. National Archives relating to 
World War II and the Holocaust.  The Commission also failed to 
examine the records of American museums to determine how 
they had acquired works of art that originally came from post-
war Europe.325  Benjamin Gilman, a former New York Con-
gressman who served on the Commission, explained, “The tents 
were folded much to the chagrin of many of us.  I felt we should 
have been doing much more than we did.”326  According to 
Eizenstat, who also was a Commission member, “Lack of time 
  
 321. See Richard Chesnoff, Holocaust Debts Haunt the U.S., Too, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS, Jan. 24, 2001, at 37.  It appears that former Rep. Patricia Schroeder 
was wrong when she stated on the eve of the issuance of the PCHA Final Re-
port that “I hope they [Europe] react by saying we’ve done a very thorough job 
of trying to clean our own house or at the least  say we’re not perfect. . . . This 
is not a whitewash.”  See Joan Gralla, US Holocaust Reparation May Have 
Been Inadequate, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 7, 2001, at 4.  For the critics of the 
PCHA, the final report, indeed, was a whitewash. 
 322. E-mail from Gregg Rickman to Michael J. Bazyler, Apr. 11, 2003 (on 
file with the authors).  
 323. Ralph Blumenthal, Panel on Nazi Art Theft Fell Short, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 3, 2003, at E1.  
 324. Id. 
 325. Id.  According to Masurovsky, “the Commission obtained U.S. govern-
ment documents from the National Archives detailing the activities of un-
scrupulous American art dealers and museum officials in the U.S. zone of 
Germany after the end of the war, but chose to ignore them.”  Masurovsky E-
mail, supra note 307.   
 326. Blumenthal, supra note 323.   
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was a major problem.”327   Eizenstat also agrees that the PCHA’s 
mandate was too narrow.328  As a result, according to these in-
siders, the PCHA “came up with a report that broke little new 
ground and failed to come to grips with the question of how 
much stolen art passed through American controls.”329  
The greatest problem appears to be that the PCHA was dis-
solved before it finished its work.  As a result, the PCHA never 
answered the question of how much Nazi-looted art made its 
way to the United States — the largest art market in the world.   
The Commission also failed to meet one of its primary goals: to 
assemble a database of Holocaust-era assets still present in the 
United States.330  Moreover, because of its limited mandate, the 
Commission failed to make critical inquiries into the activities 
of U.S. non-governmental actors during and after the war.  
These include:  
• American museums and private art dealers, with respect to 
their involvement in the trade of Nazi-looted art; 
• American banks, with regard to activities of some banks in 
Nazi-occupied Europe, and the possible existence of Holocaust-
era dormant bank accounts in the United States;   
• American insurance companies, and their possible complic-
ity with the Nazi industrial machine.  
  
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id.  
 330. According to Masurovsky,  
[T]he idea of a database antedates the Commission by nearly four 
years. In fact, the leadership of the Commission was averse to this 
task.  Lucille Roussin, former deputy director of the Commission’s Art 
and Cultural Property Team, made preliminary inquiries into the vi-
ability of such a database in the summer of 1999 shortly before she 
left the Commission.  Financial concerns prevented the Commission 
from following through on this idea until the following year when it 
agreed to create a basic computerized listing of specific works of art 
listed on claims filed with the occupation military government U.S. 
(“OMGUS”).  The Commission never acknowledged the efforts made 
by U.S. restitution groups towards the creation of such a database.   
Masurovsky E-mail, supra note 307. 
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All of these questions have been answered in Europe by local 
governmental commissions, but in the United States the PCHA 
managed to avoid them.331  
Now that the PCHA’s mandate has officially expired, the 
question of what can still be done must be asked.  With regard 
to the outstanding issues involving Nazi looted art, Eizenstat 
favors another international art conference, akin to the one held 
in Washington, D.C. in 1998.332  He also wants the private sector 
to continue the work, favoring the creation of a private founda-
tion to take up where the PCHA left off.333  Kenneth Klothen, 
the PCHA’s former executive director, also favors this approach, 
indicating, “efforts were under way to continue the commis-
  
 331. Masurovsky points out that “even more glaring is the PCHA’s suppres-
sion of the findings of the 4-person gold team [which Masurovsky headed] 
charged with examining the fate of so-called victim gold that fell under the 
control or possession of the U.S. government.”  Masurovsky E-mail, supra note 
307.   
  Among the findings reached by the gold team, according to Masu-
rovsky, were: 
The U.S. gold policy since 1934 made it possible for victim gold [gold 
stolen or forcibly taken from Holocaust victims] to enter the monetary 
reserves of the United States without concern for the origin of the 
gold as of 1939; that the U.S. Department of the Treasury uncovered 
the presence of more than 2000 gold bars on deposit in its vaults in 
New York City that potentially contained traces of Holocaust victims 
gold; that the U.S. government recruited Albert Thoms as its gold ex-
pert in April 1945, the former director of the Reichsbank’s precious 
metals department, responsible for the incorporation of Jewish-
owned gold into the monetary reserves of the Third Reich from 1939–
1945. 
Masurovsky also points out that:  
[T]he gold team also discovered that the postwar settlements relative 
to looted gold reached between the United States and its allies, on the 
one hand, and the governments of the so-called neutral countries — 
Spain, Sweden, and Portugal, on the other hand, were in fact aimed 
at allowing hundreds of tons of looted gold to circulate freely in the 
international gold market, thus depriving Holocaust victims and sur-
vivors of the opportunity to recover millions of dollars of stolen prop-
erty. 
Id.  
 332. Blumenthal, supra note 323.  
 333. Id. 
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sion’s work as a citizens’ commission constituted as a private 
nonprofit foundation.”334  
IV. RESTITUTION LITIGATION AGAINST U.S. GOVERNMENT AND 
CORPORATIONS 
A. Holocaust Litigation against the U.S. Government  
In May 1945, while liberating Nazi-occupied territories, the 
U.S. Army seized a train allegedly containing millions of dollars 
worth of gold, jewelry, art, and other valuables that had been 
confiscated from Hungarian Jews.335  This train became known 
as the Gold Train.  Despite protests from the Hungarian Jewish 
community, and contrary to international norms and its own 
internal regulations, the U.S. government did not attempt to 
return the property to the country of origin or to the original 
owners.336  Instead, the items were labeled “unidentifiable” and 
  
 334. Id.  Masurovsky comments that: 
[A]lthough the creation of such a foundation is laudable, it bespeaks 
the failure of the PCHA to provide the leadership and vision neces-
sary to carry out in full the mandate set forth by Congress in 1998 [in 
creating the PCHA]: fully accountability and transparency of the U.S. 
government’s treatment of Holocaust victims’ assets and its knowl-
edge of the private sector’s misappropriation of such assets before, 
during, and after the Second World War.  Nothing guarantees that 
such a foundation will not repeat the mistakes of the PCHA. 
Masurovsky E-mail, supra note 307.    
 335. See PCHA GOLD TRAIN REPORT, supra note 319, at Introduction.  Zweig, 
in his story of the Gold Train, disagrees with the PCHA researchers, both as 
to the contents on the train and their value by the time the train was seized 
by the U.S. Army.  As proof, he cites, among other evidence, the report of Abba 
Schwartz, a young American lawyer appointed by the U.S. Army to “organize 
the taking over of the victim assets and their sale.”  ZWEIG, supra note 320, at 
192.  Schwartz, upon inspecting the contents of the so-called Gold Train by the 
time they were stored in a U.S. Army warehouse in Salzburg, reported to his 
superiors that “this property consists largely of bulky silver items, rugs, fur 
coats, cameras, all of doubtful value, and a relatively small quantity of valu-
able personal property.  I do not believe that we will net from the Hungarian 
Gold Train property nearly as much as I anticipated before I viewed it.”  Id. at 
195.  
 336. After the close of World War II, the United States signed two interna-
tional agreements which should have governed the disposition of the property 
found on the Gold Train.  The Final Act of the Paris Reparation Conference 
and the Five-Power Agreement for Non-Repatriable Victims of Germany both 
allowed the sale of ownerless property for the benefit of non-repatriable refu-
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were either auctioned off, sold at U.S. Army Exchanges, per-
sonally appropriated by American officials, or stolen outright.337  
None of the property was returned, nor was any restitution 
made to the owners.  The PCHA concluded in October 1999 that 
“[t]he story of the Gold Train provides both a comprehensive 
illustration of the questions that arose from the United States’ 
restitution policy and its implementation, and a mysterious ex-
ample of one egregious failure to follow that policy.”338   
1. Background on the Gold Train 
The Gold Train saga is part of the story of the Nazis’ final at-
tempts to destroy the Jews of Hungary.339  In the final fourteen 
months of the war, Hitler’s henchmen sent over 400,000 Jews 
  
gees.  Id.  Also, in adherence to international law, the United States had its 
own procedures which provided that “[i]dentifiable looted works of art and 
cultural material will be restituted to the governments of the countries from 
which they were taken, and all property had to be ‘restored to the government 
of the country from which it was taken’ or acquired in any way. . . .”  See id. 
(citing both NARA, RG 59, Lot 62D-4, Box 28, Problem: External Restitution 
of Cultural Property, tit. 18, Change No. 1, Feb. 12, 1947, Pt. I. Policy and 
Organization; NARA, RG 59, Lot 62D-4, Box 28, Problem: External Restitu-
tion of Cultural Property, Extension of Restitution to Austria and Satellite 
Countries, Mar. 4, 1946). 
 337. Then-Secretary of State George C. Marshall made the following state-
ment attempting to explain why the assets were not returned: “American 
Forces having examined the portion of the Hungarian train in the American 
Zone of Austria, the U.S. Commander [General Mark Clark] determined that 
the contents therefore were unidentifiable as to owners and, in view of the 
territorial changes in Hungary, as to national origin; restitution to Hungary 
being therefore not feasible, it was determined, with the approval of this gov-
ernment, that the property in question would be given to the Intergovernmen-
tal Committee for Refugees.”  See id.   
 338. See id. at Introduction.  
 339. See U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, HUNGARY AFTER THE GERMAN 
OCCUPATION, at http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en (last visited June 21, 2003). 
In mid-May 1944, the Hungarian authorities, in coordination with 
the German Security Police, began to systematically deport the Hun-
garian Jews.  SS Colonel Adolf Eichmann was chief of the team of 
‘deportation experts’ that worked with the Hungarian authorities.  
The Hungarian police carried out the roundups and forced the Jews 
onto the deportation trains.  In less than two months, nearly 440,000 
Jews were deported from Hungary in more than 145 trains.  Most 
were deported to Auschwitz.   
See id. 
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from Hungary and its annexed territories to Auschwitz and 
other concentration camps.340 
While Hungary established ties with the Nazi regime after 
Hitler came to power in 1933, it did not become an official ally 
of Germany and the Axis powers until November 1940.  None-
theless, Germany invaded Hungary on March 19, 1944.  Before 
this invasion, the pro-Nazi Hungarian regime enacted a number 
of anti-Jewish laws, and approximately 63,000 Jews lost their 
lives during this time.  After Germany occupied Hungary, a 
program of large scale extermination of Hungarian Jewry 
started as Nazi officials began deporting Jews to concentration 
camps in the east for extermination.  The architect of the ex-
termination program was the notorious Adolf Eichmann. 
Concomitant with this occupation, the Nazis, using Hungar-
ian administrators, began passing new, more stringent anti-
Jewish laws in Hungary.  At the close of the first business day 
after Germany’s invasion, the Hungarian Finance Minister 
banned all Jews from withdrawing large amounts of money 
from their accounts and sealed all their safe deposit boxes.341  
Subsequently, over one hundred anti-Jewish laws were passed 
during 1944 alone.342   
  
 340. ZWEIG, supra note 320, at 49.  Zweig provides a detailed account not 
only of the course of events surrounding the Gold Train, but also the anti-
Semitic events that occurred in Hungary during World War II.  After the first 
German troops reached Budapest on March 19, 1944 and created a new gov-
ernment, the Germans and their Hungarian collaborators prepared the proc-
ess to deport the Jews from Hungary.  “The elimination of the Jewish commu-
nity was able to proceed with a relentlessness and speed that was unprece-
dented elsewhere in Europe.”  Id. 
 341. Id. at 53 
 342. Id. at 50.  Zweig explained: 
The destruction of European Jewry was not only racial warfare 
against the Jewish people, but was also a very profitable venture for 
the German state, for the bureaucracies within that state were in-
volved with the killing programme, and a lucrative opportunity for 
personal enrichment by thousands of officials, SS and soldiers.  The 
Third Reich had become used to the idea that as the Final Solution 
was introduced into each occupied country in turn, new opportunities 
were opened up for individual looting and for the official seizure of 
Jewish property.  Now that the installation of the Sztojay govern-
ment ensured Hungarian cooperation with German plans for the 
largest remaining Jewish community in Europe, new possibilities of 
enrichment opened up for Germany. 
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The new Hungarian government passed several decrees con-
cerning Jewish property.343  On April 6, 1944, police depart-
ments were issued orders to prevent Jews from hiding, selling, 
or giving away their valuables.344  The same day, the Hungarian 
government passed the most restrictive law against Jewish 
property, Decree No. I.66/1944, “Concerning the Declaration 
and Sequestration of the Wealth of the Jews.”345  This regulation 
required Jews to officially declare the value of their property 
and surrender valuables, including wedding rings, to the au-
thorities by April 30.346 
After the official process of gathering the possessions of the 
Jews, the Hungarian government began its process of herding 
Jews into ghettos.  During this stage, the remaining property of 
the Hungarian Jews was plundered as they were forced from 
their homes into collective living quarters.  In the end, the pos-
sessions of 800,000 people had been stolen.347  
With the advance of the Soviet Red Army in late 1944, the 
Nazis began to take steps to evacuate the most valuable Jewish 
possessions from Hungary.  A train of forty-two freight wagons 
was prepared in Budapest, containing thousands of stolen 
items.  On the train there were “literally tons of Jewish reli-
gious silverware (Sabbath candlesticks, Kiddush cups, Torah 
crowns and breastplates, Hallah plates, and other items) . . . .”348  
  
Id. at 50–51. 
 343. Id. at 53. 
 344. Id.  
 345. Id. at 54. 
 346. Id.  Zweig explained the process in detail:  
During April long lines of Jews formed outside the offices of the Royal 
Hungarian Post Savings Bank across the country, waiting to surren-
der their possessions.  First they were required to surrender their bi-
cycles and radios, and later their savings, jewelry, gold and other 
valuables.  The latter items were placed in individually named enve-
lopes and detailed receipts were issued, creating the illusion that one 
day they would regain their belongings.  The deception was total.  
Each stage of the legalized plunder was designed to keep the flames 
of hope alive, and to cultivate the belief that by making yet another 
material sacrifice, by giving up more and more of their personal pos-
sessions following each new decree and official demand, they would 
be able to avoid the fate of other Jewish communities across Europe. 
Id. at 55. 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. at 73.  
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The train was under the command of Árpád Toldi, who at that 
time held the title of Hungarian Commissioner for Jewish Af-
fairs.349  Toldi was given the responsibility of overseeing the sto-
len property.350 
As the Gold Train made its way westward from Budapest, it 
eventually reached the town of Brennbergbanya, on the Aus-
trian-Hungarian border.  After hiding the train and taking in-
ventory of its contents, Toldi’s appointed commander, a Hun-
garian official named Laszlo Avar, ordered the train to continue 
into Austrian territory.351  With the looming threat of Russian 
capture and the disorganization of the final days of the Third 
Reich, the train with its confiscated Hungarian Jewish property 
was concealed in the Tauern Tunnel in Western Austria.352   
On July 11, 1945, an American military intelligence unit fi-
nally discovered the train.353  On July 19, 1945, the Hungarian 
military was relieved of its guard duties and the train came un-
der complete U.S. control.354  In the following weeks, various 
Hungarian officials asked for some kind of acknowledgement 
that the contents of the train were Hungarian property.  De-
spite these pleas, American authorities considered the cargo 
“persecutee property” and “looted goods,” and gave no credence 
to the Hungarian government’s claims.355  The U.S. Army then 
transferred the train’s assets to a storage facility in Salzburg, 
Austria.356 
  
 349. Id.  
 350. Id. 
 351. For a detailed description of the treatment of the train and its contents 
while in Brennbergbanya, Hungary, see id. at 79–92.   
 352. For a detailed description of the events that took place while the Gold 
Train was transported from Brennbergbanya to its final hiding place inside 
Austria, see id. at 93–117. 
 353. Id. at 123. 
 354. Id.  
 355. Id. at 124. 
 356. Former U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall acknowledged this 
event:  
Prior to their withdrawal from Hungary the Nazis had collected a 
considerable quantity of movable property belonging to Jewish vic-
tims of Nazi action. It is understood that this property belonged to 
Jewish victims in all parts of so-called Greater Hungary. It was re-
moved by train to Austria, where, having been separated into two 
trains, it was found by American and French forces.   
See PCHA GOLD TRAIN REPORT, supra note 319, at Pt. II. 
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As early as December 1945, the Hungarian Jewish commu-
nity became aware that the contents of the Gold Train were in 
the possession of the United States.357  Despite pleas by Hun-
garians Jews358 that the property could, in fact, be identified, the 
United States determined that the property would be auctioned 
off because “it was impracticable to return individual items to 
the original owner[s] or heirs and is believed to be in the best 
interest of [the] class who were despoiled.”359  In late 1946, U.S. 
authorities, concerned with increasing power of the Soviet Un-
ion in postwar Hungary, decided that none of the goods from 
the Gold Train would be returned to Hungary.360  Instead, the 
U.S. Army turned over most of the Gold Train assets, along 
with other Hungarian assets, to the International Refugee Or-
ganization (“IRO”).361  The IRO auctioned off the assets and used 
the proceeds to aid displaced populations and refugee resettle-
  
 357. On December 20, 1945, the Temporary Managing Committee of the 
Central Bureau of Hungarian Jews sent a letter to the U.S. Legation inform-
ing them that:  
In the country, all valuables in Jewish property — even golden wed-
ding rings — have been collected by official persons before the Jews 
have been transported to gathering places in order to be deported. 
The valuables deposited by Jewish persons or by the authorities that 
have collected them have been loaded up, later in railway-cars and 
carried away in western direction, and, as the defeat of the German 
Army became evident, transported to Austria, after having been 
tithed several times. 
Id. 
 358. The Committee also made the following emotional plea, which was 
ignored: 
The Jews having been robbed also of everything else they possessed, 
all clothes, underwear, furniture, etc. it is not only their undoubted 
right to claim that the objects stored in the railway-cars under 
American Control, should be rendered to them, but their demand is 
justified from humane standpoint too. By recovering a part of the 
valuables lost, many of them could begin to rebuild their homes and 
their existence. 
Id.   
 359. See PCHA GOLD TRAIN REPORT, supra note 319, at Pt. III (citing NARA, 
RG 84, Papers of the U.S. Legation in Budapest, Box 4, Robert S. Folson of 
U.S. Legation in Budapest to Central Board of Jews in Hungary, May 19, 
1947). 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. 
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ments.362  Many Gold Train valuables not turned over to the IRO 
were stolen.363  Some U.S. military personnel requisitioned ma-
terials for their personal use and numerous high-ranking offi-
cials appropriated materials that had been found on the Gold 
Train to furnish their residences.364  Gold Train assets were also 
  
 362. ZWEIG, supra note 320, at 191–206.  Zweig concludes that, in the end, 
the wealth, which was recovered from the Gold Train, turned out to be worth 
a fraction of the hundreds of millions of dollars, which had been widely 
claimed.  Rather, Zweig finds that the Gold Train took on mythical propor-
tions.  In contrast to the PCHA, he also does not lay much blame on the U.S. 
government or its military authorities.  
The assets of the Hungarian Gold Train may well have been worth 
$120 million or even $300-350 million in the circumstances of 1938, 
or even of those of 1944, when the owners of the items of value were 
still alive.  By 1945, after the items had been vandalized and broken 
up, and the original owners could no longer be traced, the expropri-
ated goods were worth very much less.  It was a fantasy to believe the 
prosperity of a community could be seized and redistributed, or trans-
ferred to the Reich.   
Id. at 220.  Zweig also concludes: 
It was the people who used [the goods] who gave real value to the 
items of the Gold Train; the value was not inherent in the objects 
themselves. . . .  Some degree of wealth could be transferred from one 
population to another by organized plunder, especially where that 
wealth was concentrated in a few hands.  But the roots of popular 
wealth and prosperity are social, and they were destroyed when the 
societies that sustained them and gave them value were laid waste.   
Id. at 220–21. 
 363. See PCHA GOLD TRAIN REPORT, supra note 319, at Pt. IV. 
 364. Id.  Even though Zweig concedes that there was some “pilfering by 
American soldiers,” he nevertheless criticizes the PCHA for inflating the 
amount of theft committed by U.S. Army personnel.  ZWEIG, supra note 320, at 
219.  Zweig first points out that the items taken by U.S. Army personnel were 
mostly “household goods,” which they needed to borrow when they were sta-
tioned temporarily in “Austrian homes that had usually been stripped bare by 
their owners prior to army personnel moving in . . . .”  Id. at 155.  He then 
explains that “when army officers took household items from the train’s cargo. 
. . .[t]he [U.S. Army] Property Control Office kept a detailed record, but the 
goods were rarely returned.  As the quantities borrowed were a very small 
fraction of the overall cargo, these losses were not significant.”  Id.  Challeng-
ing directly the PCHA’s findings about the culpability of the U.S. Army in the 
theft of the Gold Train booty, Zweig concludes:  
Nevertheless, in its 1999 Interim Report the Presidential Advisory 
Commission On Holocaust Assets in the United States accused the 
US army of large-scale larceny, an accusation that made front-page 
news in the Washington Post and the New York Times on 15 October 
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sold at U.S. Army Exchange stores.365  In short, the U.S. gov-
ernment’s handling of the Gold Train and its valuables was far 
from perfect. 
The Gold Train also contained over 1,000 paintings taken 
from Hungary.366  However, despite a 1952 U.S. State Depart-
ment statement that the art belonged to middle-class Hungari-
ans, the U.S. Army neither returned the artworks to their right-
ful owners nor to their place of origin.367  In the following year, a 
State Department representative recommended that all cul-
tural property, including the paintings of Hungarian origin, be 
held indefinitely for eventual return to their rightful owners in 
Hungary.368  Nevertheless, the United States never informed the 
Hungarians about the paintings and, instead, transferred them 
into Austria’s custody.369 
  
1999.  There is no evidence to support these charges; in fact the oppo-
site is true.  The Property Control Division of USFA went to great 
lengths to protect the cargo against theft.  The charges by the Presi-
dential Commission were not repeated in the Commission’s Final Re-
port in 2001. 
Id. at 155.  A contrary account is found in KENNETH D. ALFORD, THE SPOILS OF 
WORLD WAR II:  THE AMERICAN MILITARY’S ROLE IN STEALING EUROPE’S 
TREASURES 6–16, 72–74, 85–86, 221–28 (1994) (Alford is an amateur historian 
focusing his research on wartime looting of Europe).  Alford put the “1945 
estimated value of the contents of the train [at the time it came into U.S. cus-
tody at]. . . . $206 million — which would translate to several billion dollars 
today.”  Id. at 16.  Zweig, in his study, states that Alford allowed him to exam-
ine Alford’s “document collection” in the course of writing his book, but that he 
“strongly disagree[s]” with Alford’s “interpretation of the[se] documents.”  
ZWEIG, supra note 320, at xiii.  
 365. At first, the plan to sell the items at the exchange stores was rejected 
because “it is believed there may be claims from original Hungarian owners 
for identifiable private property.”  See PCHA GOLD TRAIN REPORT, supra note 
319, at Pt. IV(2) (citing NARA, RG 260, Box 77, USACA Records, RD & R 
Division, Property Control Branch, Letter from RD&R Division Property Con-
trol Branch to the Chief of Legal Division. Dec. 8, 1945). Eventually, the Prop-
erty Control Branch approved the sale of the items.  Id. at Part VI. 
 366. Id.  
 367. See id. (citing NARA, RG 59, Box 16, Disposition of Art Objects and 
Scientific Works under USFA Control. From Walter Dowling, the Deputy 
High Commissioner to the Department of State, Jan. 12, 1951) (“Disposition of 
Art Objects and Scientific Works under USFA Control”). 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. 
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2. Gold Train Litigation: Rosner v. United States 
In May 2001, Hungarian Holocaust survivors filed a class ac-
tion suit against the United States in the Southern District of 
Florida,370 alleging that the U.S. Army received their identifiable 
property from the Hungarian Gold Train371 and made no at-
tempts to return the property to the rightful owners.372  Accord-
ing to one plaintiff's attorney, “[t]his is the first case of its type 
— a class action brought on behalf of Holocaust survivors that 
charges the U.S. government with improperly disposing of as-
sets.”373  The Holocaust survivors’ complaint alleged three 
counts: (1) unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; (2) breach of an implied-
  
 370. See Complaint, at 1, Rosner v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1202 
(S.D. Fla. 2002).  The complaint was filed by twelve plaintiffs, seven of whom 
reside in Miami-Dade County, Florida. 
 371. Complaint, at 1–3.   
The U.S Army found documents on the Gold Train which listed the 
identities of an undetermined number of the owners of the valuables 
that had been forcibly placed on the Gold Train by Arrow Cross offi-
cials and Nazi officials.  Many of the items on the train were in care-
fully locked containers with the names and addresses of the owners 
on the outside.   
Id. 
 372. Complaint, at 3, Rosner v. United States.   
The U.S. made no attempt to identify the rightful owners of the Gold 
Train property; it did not publish any notices in newspapers in 
Europe, the U.S. or Israel regarding the property, nor did it respond 
to repeated requests from the Hungarian Jewish Community Organi-
zations for information about the property.  It ignored identification 
of many items which would have made return of the property possi-
ble.   
Id. 
 373. Henry Weinstein, Hungarians Sue U.S. Over Seized Holocaust Loot 
Reparations: Plaintiffs Seek Payment for Assets Stolen by Nazis and Captured 
by Americans, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 2001, at A14.  Zweig has disputed the law-
suit’s claims, stating that he believes the plaintiffs were suing the wrong gov-
ernment and that the real stolen treasure consisted of gold jewelry that was 
melted down and sent in trucks to Austria, where it was buried by Hungarian 
soldiers and later discovered by French troops.  The gold was eventually re-
turned to the Hungarian Communist government.  See Tal Abbady, Holocaust 
Survivors Sue U.S. Government, AP ONLINE, Oct. 12, 2002, available at 2002 
WL 101561328.  
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in-fact bailment contract; and (3) violation of conventional and 
customary international law.374   
On August 28, 2002, federal judge Patricia Seitz, presiding 
over the case, granted in part and denied in part the U.S. Gov-
ernment’s motion to dismiss.375  Judge Seitz first addressed the 
issue of the government’s sovereign immunity and ruled that 
while the continued violation doctrine does not provide relief, 
the plaintiffs’ claims could proceed under the equitable tolling 
doctrine.376  The plaintiffs alleged that the Government had ig-
nored their repeated requests for information about their prop-
erty and only in October 1999, when the PCHA released its re-
port on the Gold Train, did the necessary facts arise to permit 
filing of a complaint.377  Judge Seitz accepted plaintiffs’ argu-
ment that the government has kept them ignorant of vital in-
formation necessary to pursue their claims, “without any fault 
or lack of diligence on their part” and ruled that plaintiffs were 
entitled to the benefit of equitable tolling.378   
  
 374. Rosner, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 1204.  The Government moved to dismiss 
the complaint on grounds that it was: (1) untimely and, therefore, barred by 
sovereign immunity; (2) an international law violation claim requiring a 
waiver of Congressional sovereign immunity; (3) failed to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted, for both the Fifth Amendment and breach of 
implied contract claims.  Id. 
 375. Id.  The court ruled:  
(1) based on the allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiffs’ viable claims 
are not time-barred under the principles of equitable tolling; (2) to 
the extent that Plaintiffs seek non-monetary relief pursuant to the 
Administrative Procedure Act, the international law claim (Count III) 
is viable; (3) Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claim (Count I) fails to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted, and thus, will be dismissed 
with prejudice; and (4) Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of an implied-in-
fact contract of bailment (Count II) does state a claim upon which re-
lief can be granted. 
Id.  See also Abbady, supra note 373; Catherine Wilson, Judge Lets Hungar-
ian Jews File Suit, AP ONLINE, Aug. 30, 2002, available at 2002 WL 26542071.  
Concerning the PCHA’s two reports issued in 1999 and 2000, the survivors’ 
attorney, Samuel Dubbin, concedes that the government’s final report re-
leased in 2000 is less damning than the 1999 findings.  See also Abbady, supra 
note 367.   
 376. Rosner, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 1206–10. 
 377. Id. at 1209. 
 378. Id. at 1208–09 (“The equitable tolling doctrine allows plaintiffs to sue 
after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, provided they have 
been prevented from doing so due to inequitable circumstances”) (citing Ellis 
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With respect to whether sovereign immunity bars these 
claims, the court found that the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”) 
did not provide the necessary waiver of sovereign immunity be-
cause it is solely a jurisdictional statute;379 and that the Little 
Tucker Act also did not provide a waiver because a claim based 
on international law does not fall within the terms of the Act.380  
The court did find, however, that the Administrative Procedure 
Act waived the sovereign immunity for plaintiffs’ international 
law claims for non-monetary relief of the return and accounting 
of all property.381   
In examining whether the political question doctrine bars 
these claims, the court held that although the courts usually 
defer military matters to the political branches, “such deference 
does not extend to all actions which could arguably be traced 
back to an exercise of military authority.”382  The court further 
found that:  
  
v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 706 (11th Cir. 1998)); Jus-
tice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1475, 1479 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating that 
equitable tolling is applied when necessary to prevent an injustice). 
 379. The ATCA supplies federal courts with jurisdiction over tort claims 
brought by aliens for violation of international law.  Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.”); Goldstar v. United States, 967 F.2d 
965, 968 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he Alien Tort Statute has been interpreted as a 
jurisdictional statute only — it has not been held to imply any waiver of sov-
ereign immunity.”). 
 380. Rosner, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 1210 (“Through passage of the Little Tucker 
Act [28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(2)] Congress has waived sovereign immunity for non-
tort claims against the United States ‘founded either upon the Constitution, or 
any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon 
any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or 
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.’”); Phaidin v. United 
States, 28 Fed. Cl. 231, 234 (1993) (“[T]he Tucker Act contains no language 
permitting this court to entertain jurisdiction over claims founded upon 
customary international law.”).  
 381. Rosner, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 1211.  The APA waives the sovereign im-
munity of the United States for non-monetary suits against federal agencies 
under specified conditions.  5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000) (“A person suffering legal 
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency 
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review 
thereof.”). 
 382. Rosner, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 1212 (citing Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 
291, 300 (D.D.C. 1978) (“Whether the deference due particular military de-
terminations rises to the level of occasioning non-reviewability is a question 
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Plaintiffs’ Complaint makes specific allegations regarding 
conduct that, although exercised by military personnel, is de-
cidedly non-military in its nature.  Accordingly, just as Plain-
tiffs’ argument that the war function exception does not apply 
to orders coming from U.S. soil states too much, so too does the 
Government’s attempt to bring all its actions with respect to 
the Gold Train within the shield of the “war function” excep-
tion.383 
Plaintiffs also alleged that, in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment, the U.S. government took possession of plaintiffs’ prop-
erty from the Gold Train and used it for public purposes with-
out compensating plaintiffs.384  The court, however, dismissed 
plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment Takings claim because the plain-
tiffs, being non-U.S. citizens and not having espoused any “vol-
untary association” with the United States, lacked the neces-
sary U.S. connections at the time of expropriation.385 
In their claim for breach of an implied-in-fact contract of 
bailment, plaintiffs alleged that the Government:  
(1) accepted possession of Plaintiffs’ property with the express 
knowledge that the property belonged to Plaintiffs; (2) never 
claimed to be the owner of the property; (3) took possession of 
the property with the express intent of undertaking to return 
the property to its rightful owners; (4) stored and guarded the 
property in warehouses for protection so that it could be re-
turned to its rightful owners; (5) indicated, expressly and 
through applicable laws, that any identifiable property from 
the Gold Train would be returned in accordance with U.S. pol-
icy and custom; and (6) falsely declared that the property was 
unidentifiable, thus breaching the agreement.386  
The court found, based on these allegations, that the plain-
tiffs alleged sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss and 
did not decide whether plaintiffs could eventually prove their 
claim.387 
  
that varies from case to case and turns on the degree to which the specific 
determinations are laden with discretion and the likelihood that judicial reso-
lution will involve the courts in an inappropriate degree of supervision over 
primary military activities.”)). 
 383. Id. 
 384. Id.  
 385. Id. at 1214. 
 386. Id. at 1214–15. 
 387. Id. at 1215. 
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In a February 26, 2002 hearing, Judge Seitz again refused 
the U.S. government’s request to dismiss the suit.  At the hear-
ing the judge reprimanded the U.S. Justice Department for 
“dragging [its] feet,” and made it known that she found the gov-
ernment’s conduct “unacceptable.”388  She then ordered the par-
ties to enter into jurisdictional discovery, and gave plaintiffs’ 
lawyers “access to all Presidential records in the custody of the 
Archivist of the United States [that] pertain[s] in any way to 
the so-called ‘Hungarian Gold Train’ and/or the claims or de-
fenses asserted in this action.”389  Judge Seitz’s rulings allowing 
the case to proceed were significant victories for plaintiffs.  As 
of June 2003, the Hungarian Gold Train litigation continues.390 
  
 388. Malcolm Balfour, Court OKs Holocaust Suit vs. U.S., N.Y. POST, Feb. 
28, 2003, at 22. 
 389. See 2003 Order, Rosner v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (S.D. 
Fla. 2002).   
 390. Following the Judge’s ruling Eizenstat noted: 
The Hungarian Jewish community is seeking justice for the Hungar-
ian “gold train” incident . . . . A presidential commission appointed by 
Bill Clinton and ably led by Edgar Bronfman found that some of the 
items were used by high-ranking American military officers to deco-
rate their homes, in a rare departure from the generally exemplary 
conduct of the American army in handling Nazi-looted assets. Despite 
repeated requests from the Hungarian Jewish community to be per-
mitted to identify the stolen property, the bulk was apparently sold or 
otherwise distributed.  Whatever the merits of the class action suit 
brought against the federal government in U.S. District Court in the 
Southern District of Florida . . . the American government is morally 
obliged to provide an accounting for what was lost, an apology if 
wrongdoing is found, and some token payment to the Hungarian Jew-
ish community. 
Stuart Eizenstat, Justice Remains Beyond Grasp Of Too Many Holocaust Vic-
tims, FORWARD, Oct. 18, 2002, available at 
http://www.forward.com/issues/2002/02.10.18/oped1.html.  In April 2003, 
Eizenstat added: “This should be settled out of court.  There should be some 
effort to return what can be found to the Hungarian Jewish community.  And 
if it cannot be found, there should be a general payment to this community.”  
Jay Weaver, Holocaust Survivors Suing Over Lost Assets U.S. Captured from 
Nazi Train, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 7, 2003 at 1.  Following this story, the Miami 
Herald published a lead editorial urging the U.S. government to settle the 
Hungarian Gold Train litigation.  Editorial, Settle “Gold Train” Case, Restitu-
tion Denied Holocaust Survivors, MIAMI HERALD, May 11, 2003.   
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B. Holocaust Litigation against U.S. Corporations  
Holocaust survivors and activists involved in the Holocaust 
restitution movement started to look at the role of the U.S. cor-
porations after filing numerous lawsuits and achieving agree-
ments with European defendants.391  Soon after the end of World 
War II, U.S. government reports named various American com-
panies as having profited from dealings with the Nazi regime.  
These companies include Chase Manhattan Bank, Standard 
Oil, Texaco, IBM, ITT, Ford Motor Co., and General Motors.392  
As Eizenstat points out in his memoir, many of these same 
companies, through their German subsidiaries, used slaves dur-
ing the war.393    
Many companies in Switzerland, Germany, Austria, and 
France have already acknowledged their egregious wartime be-
havior toward Jews.  American companies, on the other hand, 
either continue to deny any dealings with the Nazis or attempt 
to rationalize their behavior.  One excuse has been compulsion: 
that while doing business in Nazi Germany and occupied 
Europe, the companies were compelled to participate in the 
German wartime economy.  American companies also assert 
that the U.S. parent companies lost all effective control over 
their European subsidiaries during the war.  Last, the compa-
nies insist that their current corporate make-up has nothing to 
do with past activities, and should therefore be forgotten.   
The following section examines U.S. litigation against Ameri-
can companies for their wartime behavior in Europe, as well as 
  
 391. See Pauline Jelinek, Actions of U.S. Firms in Nazi Era Targeted, 
COLUMBIA, Aug. 28, 2000, at E1 (“It’s their turn.  American companies were 
collaborating with Nazi Germany at a time when we were at war, because 
there was an ethos that demanded huge profits at the expense of everything 
else.”) (quoting Elan Steinberg, World Jewish Congress official).  
 392. For a general discussion of this subject see CHARLES HIGHAM, TRADING 
WITH THE ENEMY: AN EXPOSÉ OF THE NAZI-AMERICAN MONEY PLOT 1933–1949 
(1983).  Higham, a former New York Times writer and author of various biog-
raphies of Hollywood celebrities, was the first to write a popular treatment of 
the activities of American corporations in Nazi Germany and occupied Europe.  
An earlier, sensationalist account can be found in ANTHONY C. SUTTON, WALL 
STREET AND THE RISE OF HITLER (1976).  The book jacket describes the author 
as a former research fellow at the Hoover Institution for War, Revolution and 
Peace.   
 393. EIZENSTAT, supra note 2, at 254. 
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claims against other American companies that may eventually 
lead to litigation.   
1. Ford Motor Company   
During World War II, Ford used slaves at Ford-Werke, A.G., 
Ford’s German plant in Cologne, Germany.394  The slaves were 
civilians from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union that 
were dragooned into Germany and requisitioned by private 
companies from the German military.395   
Ford’s involvement first came to public light during a U.S. 
Senate subcommittee hearing in 1974.396  By 1939, Ford, along 
with General Motors (“GM”), attained control over 70% of the 
lucrative German market.397  With the outbreak of war, both 
companies repositioned themselves to provide supplies to the 
Nazi army.398  German and American archival documents dem-
onstrate that while these companies were resisting requests to 
change their factories in the United States to wartime produc-
  
 394. See FORD-WERKE REPORT, supra note 143, at 45.  For a treatise on the 
subject, setting out the wartime histories of both Ford’s Werke plant and Gen-
eral Motors’ German Opel subsidiary and including recollections of some of 
Ford’s and General Motors’ still-living wartime slaves, see WORKING FOR THE 
ENEMY, supra note 19, at 135–48. 
 395. FORD-WERKE REPORT, supra note 143, at 45.  See also WORKING FOR THE 
ENEMY, supra note 19, at 135–48. 
 396. Extracted from BRADFORD C. SNELL, AMERICAN GROUND TRANSPORT: A 
PROPOSAL FOR RESTRUCTURING THE AUTOMOBILE, TRUCK, BUS AND RAIL 
INDUSTRIES, REPORT PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIARY, 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY, UNITED STATES SENATE 16–24 
(1974):  
Due to their concentrated economic power over motor vehicle produc-
tion in both Allied and Axis territories, the Big Three inevitably be-
came major factors in the preparations and progress of the war.  In 
Germany, for example, General Motors and Ford became an integral 
part of the Nazi war efforts.  GM’s plants in Germany built thousands 
of bomber and jet fighter propulsion systems for the Luftwaffe at the 
same time that its American plants produced aircraft engines for the 
U.S. Army Air Corps. . . . Due to their multinational dominance of 
motor vehicle production, GM and Ford became principal suppliers 
for the forces of fascism as well as for the forces of democracy.  
Id.  See also WORKING FOR THE ENEMY, supra note 19, at 33–36 (same discus-
sion). 
 397. Michael Dobbs, Ford and GM Scrutinized for Alleged Nazi Collabora-
tion, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1998, at A1. 
 398. Id. 
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tions, their American managers were agreeing to military pro-
ductions in German plants.399  Documents have shown that both 
parent companies were aware of their German subsidies’ deal-
ings and never intended to divest themselves of the German 
assets.400  
When the U.S. Army liberated Ford-Werke, A.G., they discov-
ered that the plant had been using slave labor.401  A September 
5, 1945, U.S. Army issued report stated that the Ford-Werke, 
A.G. plant also supplied the Nazi regime with military vehi-
cles.402 
On March 8, 1998, a class action suit was filed against Ford 
for the forced labor performed at Ford-Werke, A.G. between 
1941 and 1945.403  The lead plaintiff, Elsa Iwanowa, was seven-
teen when in 1942 the Germans abducted her and 2,000 other 
teenage children to provide labor in Nazi Germany.404  At the 
plant, she was forced to drill holes into truck engines, working 
under severe inhumane conditions and without pay.405  At the 
case’s first hearing on March 8, 1999, Ford stated that it did not 
owe anything to the laborers of its German plant.406  Ford alleg-
edly admitted that they had control over the plant, but argued 
that they did not profit from it.407  The suit was dismissed in 
1999 when the court ruled that such a claim should be resolved 
  
 399. Id. 
 400. Id. 
 401. Id. 
 402. Id.  
 403. See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999). 
 404. Id. at 433.  See also WORKING FOR THE ENEMY, supra note 19, at 239-49.  
In September 1995,  Elsa Iwanowa and seven other former Ford slaves, all in 
their seventies, returned to the Ford-Werke plant in Cologne.  They came at 
the city’s expense, invited by the mayor of Cologne.  “The men and women 
moved within the rattle and din of workers and machines, searching for rem-
nants of anything they remembered.  Deeply moved, they were escorted by 
Ford-Werke executives to a conference room.  There, they were presented with 
sales-video tributes to the latest Ford models, cars with powerful engines and 
comfortable features.”  According to Iwanowa, “[Ford] didn’t want to speak to 
us at all.  They gave us nothing, nothing other than [a] pin.”  Id.  Iwanowa 
“perceived it as a final indignity.”  Id.   
 405. Id. at 433–34. 
 406. Id. at 434. 
 407. Id. at 467–68. 
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by international treaties established between the two coun-
tries.408 
Ford later retreated from its previous position that it had not 
profited from any forced labor in Germany409 and acknowledged 
that the plant had employed around 2,000 slave laborers.410  
Ford then issued a report based on its three and a half year 
study of its activities in Germany.411  Ford’s internal probe ex-
amined its twelve-year involvement with the Third Reich, pro-
ducing 98,000 documents located across some thirty public and 
private archival repositories in the United States, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom.412  The effort involved some forty-five 
researchers, historians, and translators.413  Company historians 
found documents showing that Ford received dividends for its 
German subsidiary from 1940 to 1943.414   
Ford also donated the documents compiled for this project, 
along with a searchable database, to the Benson Ford Research 
Center at the Henry Ford Museum & Greenfield Village, where 
they will be available for research.415  As discussed above, Ford 
also agreed to provide $2 million to the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce’s American Industry Fund (but has yet to make the ac-
tual contribution), and its German subsidiary contributed 
  
 408. Id. at 490–91.  On the same day, a different court dismissed similar 
claims against German companies.  See BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE, supra 
note 2, at 74–77. 
 409. See Edwin Black, Ford’s Better Holocaust Idea, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 16, 
2001, at H5; Jonathan Yardley, Henry Ford and the Jews, WASH. POST, Nov. 
25, 2001, at T2.  See also Ken Silverstein, Ford and the Führer: New Docu-
ments Reveal the Close Ties between Dearborn and the Nazis, NATION, Jan. 24, 
2000, at 11.   
 410. Tom Brown, Report Explains Ford’s Role in Nazi Germany, SAN DIEGO 
UNION -TRIB., Dec. 7, 2001, at A21. 
 411. For Ford’s report, see Ford Motor Co., Research Findings About Ford-
Werke Under the Nazi Regime (Dec. 6, 2001), at http://media.ford.com/events/ 
fw_research.cfm [hereinafter Ford-Werke Research Findings].   
 412. Id.    
 413. See Black, supra note 409, at H5.  See also Brown, supra note 410, at 
A21. 
 414. Dobbs, supra note 397, at A1.  See also Brown, supra note 410, at A1; 
Black, supra note 409, at H5.  
 415. David Runk, Ford Releases Nazi Labor Report, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 
6, 2001. 
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DM13 million to the German DM10 billion slave labor settle-
ment.416   
2. J.P. Morgan and Chase Manhattan   
In December 1998, a class of Jewish bank account holders 
sued American financial giants Chase Manhattan Bank 
(“Chase”) and J.P. Morgan & Co (“J.P. Morgan”) for having con-
fiscated their assets during the German occupation of France.417  
Chase was one of the five American banks with branches in 
Paris when the Nazis took control.418  Chase remained opened in 
Paris with branch manager Carlos Niedermann running the 
office.  Niedermann began conducting business with the Nazis 
after the German takeover of Paris. 419  German accounts were 
opened at Chase’s Paris branch, and Niedermann approved 
loans to German companies.420  In a letter to Chase U.S., Nied-
ermann mentioned his friendship with the Nazis and potential 
business opportunities with the Third Reich.421 
The U.S. government was aware of Chase Manhattan’s opera-
tions with Nazi Germany.  In April 1945, the U.S. Treasury is-
sued a 220-page report of its investigation of Chase.422  The re-
port concluded that Niedermann’s superiors at Chase’s New 
York headquarters were aware of the activities taking place in 
the Paris branch, but did nothing to halt its transactions with 
the Nazis.423 
  
 416. Pauline Jelinek, U.S. Firms in Holocaust Spotlight, DESERET NEWS, 
Aug. 28, 2000, at D8.   
 417. For a detailed discussion of this litigation, see BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST 
JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 172–201.  Eizenstat discusses his role in the settle-
ment of this litigation and how it was achieved, in EIZENSTAT, supra note 2, at 
314–37.  
 418. Chase Manhattan today is one of the world’s largest banks.  In 2002, it 
merged with J.P. Morgan, to become J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. 
 419. See Dateline NBC: Profile: Just Rewards? German Companies That 
Used Jewish Slave Labor Being Sued Now for Damages (NBC television 
broadcast, Nov. 10, 1998), available at 1998 WL 22610135 [hereinafter Date-
line: Paper Trail].  Two of the other branches were closed and the Nazis shut 
down one branch. 
 420. See Silverstein, supra note 303, at 409. 
 421. See Dateline: Paper Trail, supra note 419. 
 422. Yamir Sheleg & Shlomo Shamir, Chase Manhattan’s Wartime Acts 
Probed, HA’ARETZ (Israel), Aug. 11, 2000.   
 423. Id  
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The bank today maintains, however, that Chase U.S. could do 
nothing to prohibit the activities in Paris.424  Chase U.S. also 
claims that the Paris branch scaled back its involvement with 
the Third Reich.425  Its own internal probe has revealed only 
three accounts that were looted and eleven stolen safety-deposit 
boxes.426  
J.P. Morgan was the other American bank to continue opera-
tions in Paris after the Nazi occupation.  In order to continue 
business dealing with the Nazi regime, J.P. Morgan boasted of 
its anti-Semitic hiring policies to the Nazi authorities, including 
the absence of any Jewish partners.427  A U.S. Treasury report 
stated that J.P. Morgan also maintained a close relationship 
with the collaborationist French Vichy government.428 
In September 2000, J.P. Morgan separately settled the litiga-
tion against it for $2.75 million.429  Chase also settled in January 
2000 as part of the overall French-American agreement effectu-
ated by Eizenstat at the end of the Clinton Administration.  As 
of June 2003, J.P. Morgan’s distribution of proceeds in both set-
tlements is still pending.430 
3. IBM   
Revelations about the role of computer giant IBM with Nazi 
Germany came out in 2001 through the publication of a single 
  
 424. Id.  
 425. Id.  
 426. Id.  
 427. See Dateline: Paper Trail, supra note 419.  See also U.S., French Banks 
Named in Holocaust Lawsuit, CNN.COM, Dec. 24, 1998, at http://www.cnn. 
com/US/9812/24/nazi.bank.  J.P. Morgan was also labeled as an “international 
Aryan organization.”  See id. 
 428. Id.   
 429. For a detailed discussion of the settlements see BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST 
JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 185–88, 192–98.  Information about the J.P. Morgan 
settlement and distribution of the funds can be found at Barclays Bank and 
J.P. Morgan Co. French Bank Settlements, at http://jpmorganfrenchclaims. 
org.  
 430. See http://jpmorganfrenchclaims.org for more information including the 
Claim Forms and the Notice of Pendency of Class Action, Proposed Settlement 
of Class Action and Settlement Hearing.  As of May 13, 2003, the toll free 
recording (1-800-714-3304) states that the program has not even begun.   
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book, IBM and the Holocaust.431  The author, Edwin Black, a 
journalist and researcher who authored one previous study on 
the Holocaust,432 is a son of Polish Holocaust survivors.  Black 
first came upon the idea of researching IBM’s business activi-
ties in Nazi Germany and occupied Europe during a visit with 
his parents to the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Wash-
ington D.C.433  There, prominently displayed for the last ten 
years of the Museum’s existence, is an IBM Hollerith D-11 sort-
ing machine used by the Nazi regime in 1933 to help conduct a 
national census that identified the Jewish citizens of Germany.  
The sorting machine used punch card technology created by 
IBM and was the precursor of the modern computer.434  
According to Black’s study, IBM was deeply involved with the 
Nazi regime through its German subsidiary, Dehomag.435  Nazi 
Germany was IBM’s largest client outside the United States.436  
In the book, Black produces powerful evidence demonstrating 
how IBM profited in assisting the Nazis to run a race war.437  
Dehomag supplied the Nazis with custom-made punch cards 
and tabulating machines, which enabled the Nazis to identify 
and categorize their Jewish victims.438  Later, when the Nazis 
placed Jews and other victims in concentration camps, IBM 
technology made it possible to collect and store background data 
— including ethnicity — on the millions who came through the 
Nazi concentration camp system.439  According to Black, IBM 
was fully aware of the Nazis’ use of its technology and ulti-
mately collected the profits made by its German subsidiary dur-
ing the war.440   
  
 431. EDWIN BLACK, IBM AND THE HOLOCAUST: THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE 
BETWEEN NAZI GERMANY AND AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL CORPORATION (2001) 
[hereinafter EDWIN BLACK, IBM AND THE HOLOCAUST]. 
 432. EDWIN BLACK, THE TRANSFER AGREEMENT: THE DRAMATIC STORY OF THE 
PACT BETWEEN THE THIRD REICH AND JEWISH PALESTINE (1984) 
 433. EDWIN BLACK, IBM AND THE HOLOCAUST, at 11. 
 434. Id. at 8.  
 435. Id. at 9. 
 436. Id.  
 437. Id. 
 438. Id.  
 439. Id.  
 440. Id. at 375–78. 
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In 2002, Black published a new edition of his book.441  The 
new edition contains two additional chapters, in which Black 
lays out further evidence of IBM’s collaboration with the Nazis.  
According to Black, after Nazi Germany’s invasion of Poland in 
September 1939, IBM New York established a new subsidiary 
in occupied Poland — Watson Business Machines.442  The new 
subsidiary was completely separate from IBM Germany’s De-
homag and was directly controlled by IBM’s headquarters in 
New York.443  Its sole purpose, Black claims, was to service the 
Nazi occupation of Poland,444 including the categorization of vic-
tims transported to Auschwitz.445 
In the new edition, Black relates the recollections of Leon 
Krzemieniecki, a forced laborer for the Polish railway office in 
Krakow during the war.  Krzemieniecki remembers fifteen ma-
chines in the railway office, each staffed by a female employee 
who tabulated information through these IBM machines.446  
Three German officials supervised the operation.447  The col-
lected information was then shipped off in secrecy to an undis-
closed location.  According to Black, Krzemieniecki now realizes 
that the office he worked in was used to coordinate the extermi-
nation of Jews and other victims at nearby Auschwitz.448  The 
machines, according to Krzemieniecki, bore the seal “Watson 
Business Machines” written in English.449 
Black also alleges, based on documents he uncovered, that a 
senior IBM U.S. representative traveled to Europe to meet with 
executives there and arranged for a lease of machines to “calcu-
  
 441. EDWIN BLACK, IBM AND THE HOLOCAUST: THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE 
BETWEEN NAZI GERMANY AND AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL CORPORATION (2002) 
[hereinafter BLACK, THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE].   
 442. EDWIN BLACK, IBM AND THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 431, at 193. 
 443. Id. 
 444. Oliver Burkeman, IBM “Dealt Directly with Holocaust Organisers” — 
Author Says US firm Had Control of Polish Subsidiary, GUARDIAN (London), 
March 29, 2002, at P14 (According to Black, “IBM’s new Polish company’s sole 
purpose was to service the Nazi occupation during the rape of Poland.”). 
 445. Id. (According to Black, IBM’s punch card machines were used to “cal-
culate exactly how many Jews should be emptied out of the ghettoes each 
day.”). 
 446. BLACK, THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE, supra note 441, at 436. 
 447. Id.  
 448. Id. at 435–36.   
 449. Id. at 437.   
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late exactly how many Jews should be emptied out of the ghet-
tos each day” and to transport them efficiently on railways lead-
ing to the camps.450   
Black also claims that “IBM recovered all its Polish profits 
and machines.”451  Black primarily blames Thomas J. Watson, 
the all-powerful chairman of IBM, for IBM’s activities in Nazi 
Germany and occupied Europe.452  Watson’s credo, according to 
Black, was to make more money for the company, regardless of 
the means.453  According to Black, “Watson didn’t hate the Jews.  
He didn’t hate the Poles.  He didn’t hate the British, nor did he 
hate the Americans.  It was always about the money.”454  
In this sense, Black’s accusations against IBM are akin to 
those being made today against multinationals doing business 
in the global economy:  that the companies’ sole concern is the 
profit motive, and that they will do business with any regime, 
no matter how despotic or corrupt, if there is money to be made 
in the venture.455    Black perceives corporate activities during 
  
 450. Id.   
 451. Id.  IBM disputed the findings in the new book stating, “We have seen 
no proof of that. . . .  Facts which had been known for many years were used 
as the basis of allegations in the first book, and they seem to be used in simi-
lar fashion in the paperback. We’re not convinced that there are any new find-
ings here.”  See Burkeman, supra note 444.   
 452. See, e.g., BLACK, IBM AND THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 431, at 115–25. 
 453. Id. at 22. 
 454. Burkeman, supra note 444.  For a contrary view of Watson, see Kevin 
Maney, IBM Founder Wasn’t the Bad Guy the Book Portrays, USA TODAY, Feb. 
14, 2001, at 10B (“I’ve never come across the scheming, rotten, morally bank-
rupt opportunist that haunts practically every page of IBM and the Holocaust. 
. . . Watson certainly wasn’t immoral or so empty that all he cared about was 
money.  When friends ask me what I find striking about Watson, one of my 
replies is always his decency.”) (Note: Author is writing biography of Watson). 
 455. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2002) (American 
oil company accused of aiding and abetting use of slave labor in Burma; fed-
eral appeals court allows case to proceed forward); The Presbyterian Church 
of Sudan v Talisman Energy, Inc, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (2003) (Canadian oil 
company accused of international human rights violations resulting from its 
oil exploration activities in Sudan, including extrajudicial killing and en-
slavement; district judge allows case to proceed forward, denying defendant’s 
motion to dismiss); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola, No. 01-03208-CIV (S.D. Fla. 
filed July 21, 2001) (American company accused of using of paramilitary death 
squads in Colombia to hinder trade unionist activities and alleged to have 
violated international human rights standards, such as murder, torture, kid-
napping, unlawful detention, and violations of right to associate and organize; 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss pending); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 
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the Holocaust as the birth of globalization.  In Black’s view, 
what we now term as globalization was initiated as a means to 
make money from the Nazi regime.456  
  
282 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), vacated sub nom. and Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 
(2d Cir. 1998) (American oil company accused of dumping toxic substances 
into local rivers and contaminating local property in Ecuador, resulting in 
physical injuries; case dismissed, on condition that Texaco submits to the 
jurisdiction in Ecuador.)   
  For a recent news story on the litigation against Texaco (now Chevron 
Texaco) see Abby Ellin, Suit Says Chevron Texaco Dumped Poisons in Ecua-
dor, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2003, at C8 (“Group of American lawyers representing 
more than 30,000 indigenous people in Ecuador file $1 billion lawsuit against 
Chevron Texaco Corp; suit is filed in Ecuador on behalf of 88 plaintiffs.”).   
  For recent news stories on the Unocal litigation, see Lisa Girion, Uno-
cal Case Focuses on Liability Standards, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2003, available 
at http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-unocal18jun18230417,1,5539385. 
story; Lisa Girion, Pipeline to Justice? A U.S. Appeals Court Offers Hope to 
Myanmar Farmers Who Accuse Unocal of Complicity in Human Rights 
Abuses, June 15, 2003, available at http://www.latimes.com/la-fi-
unocal15jun15,1,4154758.story; Lisa Girion, 1789 Law Acquires Human 
Rights Role, NATION, June 15, 2003; Jason Hoppin, 9th Circuit Wrestles With 
ATCA Standards, RECORDER, June 18 2003; Michael O’Donnell, Capitalism 
vs. Conscience, Companies Abuse Human Rights and the Feds Don’t Care, 
June 9, 2003, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/opinion/ 
la-oe-odonnell9jun09,1,3136915.story; Ka Hsaw Wa, Court Is Villagers’ Only 
Hope: The Justice Department and Unocal Oppose a Suit Brought by Alleged 
Victims of Abuse in Burma, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2003, available at 
http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/opinion/la-oe-wa9jun09,1,7077069. 
story.   
  For recent law articles discussing potential corporate responsibility for 
human rights and environmental abuses, see, e.g. Tawny Aine Bridgeford, 
Note, Imputing Human Rights Obligations on Multinational Corporations: 
The Ninth Circuit Strikes Again in Judicial Activism, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
1009 (2003); Terry Collingsworth, Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate 
over Application of the Alien Tort Claims Act to Violations of Fundamental 
Human Rights by Corporations, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 563 (2003); Claire Moore 
Dickerson, Human Rights: The Emerging Norm of Corporate Social Responsi-
bility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1431 (2002); Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsi-
bilities of Private Corporations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 801 (2002); Brett G. 
Scharffs & Stephen G. Wood, Applicability of Human Rights Standards to 
Private Corporations: An American Perspective, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 531 (2002); 
Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Re-
sponsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001); Kathryn L. Boyd, Collective Rights 
Adjudication in U.S. Courts: Enforcing Human Rights at the Corporate Level, 
1999 BYU L. REV. 1139 (1999).   
 456. Dominic Rushe, Wartime Nazi Ghosts Return to Haunt IBM, SUNDAY 
TIMES (London), Mar. 31, 2002, at 10. 
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Jewish leaders in the United States, prompted by the publi-
cation of Black’s book, have urged IBM to issue a formal apol-
ogy akin to the apologies issued by various European companies 
confronted with their wartime connections to the Nazis.  Mal-
colm Hoenlein, a vice-president of the Conference of Presidents 
of Major Jewish Organizations, declared that the new revela-
tions “negate[d] all . . . excuses,” urging IBM to review its role 
in light of such evidence.”457   
IBM has not issued an apology.458  Nor has it issued a point-
by-point response to Black’s allegations.  Rather, IBM’s replies 
have lacked specificity, referring generally to criticisms found in 
some published reviews of Black’s book.459  For example, IBM’s 
  
 457. Burkeman, supra note 444.   
 458. For the official responses by IBM to the book, see IBM Statement on 
Nazi-Era Book and Lawsuit, Feb. 14, 2001, available at http://www-
916.ibm.com/press/prnews.nsf/jan, and Addendum to IBM Statement on Nazi-
Era Book and Lawsuit, Mar. 29, 2002, available at http://www-916.ibm.com/ 
press/prnews.nsf/jan.   
 459. For critiques of Black’s book, both praising some of his findings but 
also finding fault with some of  his conclusions, see, e.g., Saul Friedländer, 
Was IBM Good for the Jews, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2001, at 6; David Cesarani, 
Tricky Trading with the Enemy, TIMES (London) Higher Education Supple-
ment, July 13, 2001, at 31; Gabriel Schoenfeld, The Punch Card Conspiracy, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2001, at 14; Christopher Simpson, Big Bad Blue, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 18, 2001, at T7.  One of the harshest critiques came from Holo-
caust historian Peter Hayes.  Professor Hayes writes: 
Black fosters a new myth — the automated Holocaust — to accom-
pany discredited ones of the motorized German army and the syn-
chronized German economy.  Just as historians have shown that the 
bulk of Nazi forces moved by horse, wagon, and foot, and that its eco-
nomic mobilization was a bumpy affair, historians of the Holocaust 
have long known it was administered by pen and paper, typewriter, 
and teletype. 
See Peter Hayes, Did IBM Really Cozy Up to Hitler?, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Mar. 
19, 2001, at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/01_12/b3724 
036.htm.  Hayes concludes his review by labeling the book a “deplorable 
publication.”  IBM, in its March 2002, press release, relies on Hayes’ book 
review of Black’s book to defend itself against Black’s charges.  See Addendum 
to IBM Statement on Nazi-Era Book and Lawsuit, supra note 458 (“Another 
assessment of the book by a well-regarded academic expert called the original 
charges “implausible” and the book “deplorable.”).  For another critical review 
by a well- respected Holocaust historian, see Omer Bartov, Did Punch Cards 
Fuel the Holocaust, NEWSDAY, Mar. 25, 2001, available at 2001 WL 9223175 
(“While it is clear that modern technology helped the Nazis wage their war, 
just as it helped the Allies defeat Nazism, there is simply no evidence to show 
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spokesperson simply noted that Black’s conclusions had been 
questioned by a number of historians and experts, and that 
these experts had raised “serious questions.”460  In response to 
the new allegation that IBM collected all profits from its Polish 
subsidiary, the spokesperson replied that no proof of that ex-
isted and that IBM was “not convinced” that Black had made 
“any new findings.”461  
While the new revelations and accusations about IBM's war-
time role may be shocking, the truth will never fully be known 
until IBM opens its archives to outside historians for an inde-
pendent critical review.  In response to the latest furor, IBM 
claims that in 1999 it turned over records connected to its Ger-
man subsidiary to a professor at New York University 
(“NYU”).462  Black maintains that this was done as a public rela-
tions ploy, when IBM learned of his work.463  Moreover, Black 
points out that the NYU professor has no expertise in World 
War II; rather, this professor specializes in ancient Jewish his-
tory.464  After having obtained access to these records, Black as-
serted that the records contained no information on IBM’s busi-
ness dealings in wartime Europe.465  IBM, therefore, unlike 
other German companies confronted with their wartime past, 
has not commissioned historians to produce an independent 
historical study of its dealings with the Nazis. 
  
that Hollerith machines played a direct role in the Holocaust. To be sure, had 
it been possible, the Nazis would have gladly made use of them, and IBM 
might well have looked the other way.  As we know, technology often has been 
used to serve evil ends. The lesson from Black’s book, however, is that shoddy 
scholarship and sensational assertions seem to do very well in the current 
marketplace. That is not as bad as IBM helping the Nazis. But is rather de-
pressing that a man who presents himself as the son of Polish survivors would 
join the growing list of Holocaust profiteers.”).   
 460. Rushe, supra note 456, at 10 (quoting Carol Makovich, IBM spokes-
woman).  The spokesperson has also stated that: “[i]f any of the allegations in 
the book turn out to be true, we would condemn any actions that supported 
the Nazis.”  Michael Hirsch, Dark Questions for IBM, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 19, 
2001, at 38. 
 461. Burkeman, supra note 444.   
 462. Michelle Kessler, IBM Faces Lawsuit over Nazis’ Use of Technology, 
USA TODAY, Feb. 13, 2001, at B3.   
 463. Id.  
 464. Id.  
 465. Edwin Black, The Ghosts in the Machine: New Data Show Extent of 
IMB-Nazi Link, FORWARD, Mar. 29, 2002, at 1. 
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In February 2001, Michael Hausfeld, one of the leading plain-
tiffs’ lawyers in Holocaust litigation against European compa-
nies, filed suit against IBM on behalf of five Jewish survivors.466  
The suit was based upon Black’s research and tracked the alle-
gations in the book.467  Hausfeld and his team of lawyers were 
poised to obtain IBM’s archival wartime records through pre-
trial discovery.  The threat of using American style broad judi-
cial discovery, directed previously against European corporate 
defendants, was used against an American company.   
Unfortunately, the suit went nowhere.  Since the suit named 
both IBM U.S. and its German subsidiary as defendants, the 
German government and industry claimed that the filing of 
such a lawsuit violated the settlement agreement made to settle 
all war-related claims against German industry.468  The Ger-
mans insisted that they would not go forward with establishing 
and funding the German Foundation contemplated under the 
settlement if Hausfeld continued with his litigation.469  To keep 
the German settlement going, Hausfeld dropped the lawsuit.470  
While it is now possible to resurrect the lawsuit, since the Ger-
man Foundation is up and running, Hausfeld has not refiled the 
suit.  
In January 2002, however, a new lawsuit was filed against 
IBM relying again on Black’s research, accusing IBM of moral 
wrongdoing and “complicity . . . with the crimes against human-
ity.”471  Surprisingly, the suit was filed not in the United States, 
but in Switzerland, where IBM maintains its European head-
quarters.472  Also, the plaintiffs are not Jews, but Roma, com-
monly known as Gypsies, likewise persecuted and marked for 
extermination by the Nazis.473 
  
 466. See Kessler, supra note 462. 
 467. Id. 
 468. Id. 
 469. Id. 
 470. Id. 
 471. Gypsy International Recognition and Compensation Action (“GIRCA”), 
at http://www.gypsycompensation.org (last visited June 21, 2003) [hereinafter 
GIRCA] (website maintained by GIRCA, the organization filing the suit).  See 
also Gypsies Plan to Sue US Giant IBM over Alleged Nazi Complicity, AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESSE, June 6, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2422721 [hereinafter 
Gypsies Plan to Sue US Giant]. 
 472. Id. 
 473. See id. 
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The plaintiffs created an advocacy group specifically for the 
litigation, known as Gypsy International Recognition and Com-
pensation Action (“GIRCA”), led by a Swiss Protestant pastor of 
Gypsy origin, May Bittel.474  Their lawyer is Geneva attorney 
Henri-Phillipe Sambuc, and the lawsuit was filed in a trial 
court (the Court of First Instance) in French-speaking Geneva, 
where IBM maintained its European headquarters during the 
wartime years.475  They claim damages in the amount of $15 bil-
lion for IBM’s alleged role in the extermination of more than 
600,000 Roma people by the Nazis during World War II.476  Ac-
cording to Pastor Bittel, GIRCA does not seek to profit from the 
Holocaust — its motivation, rather, is to expose IBM and to fi-
nally attain justice for the Roma people.477  Refko Kawczynski, 
chairman of the Roma National Congress, added “[a] lot of 
IBM’s money was generated by its activities in the Second 
World War . . . .  It’s blood money.  IBM shares have the smell of 
Auschwitz.”478  IBM replied that the suit was “without merit.”479  
In February 2003, GIRCA won an initial victory when the Swiss 
court declined to dismiss the lawsuit.480  In May, 2003, however, 
the lawsuit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 481  GIRCA 
now plans to appeal the dismissal.482   
  
 474. See GIRCA, Who We Are: Introduction, at http://www.gypsy 
compensation.org/index.html.  
 475. Gypsies Plan to Sue US Giant, supra note 471.    
 476. Id.  The figure is based on 100,000 Swiss francs (approximately 
$116,000), the maximum allowed under Swiss law, for each of the 1.2 million 
people believed to have been orphaned when their parents were killed by the 
Nazis.    
 477. Peter S. Green, Gypsies’ Suit Against IBM Is Given Green Light by 
Swiss Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2003, at A5. 
 478. Roy Probert, Roma Groups Take IBM to Court, SWISS INFO, Mar. 18, 
2002, at http://www.swissinfo.org (quoting Retko Kawczynski, Chairman, 
Roma National Congress). 
 479. Id.  For a critique of the litigation and also Black’s book, see Hollerith 
and the Holocaust, ANALYSPHERE, June 11, 2001, at http://www.analysphere. 
com/11Jun01/hollerith.htm; Holocaust, ANALYSPHERE, Feb. 4, 2002, at 
http://www.analysphere.com/04Feb02/politics.htm.   
 480. Probert, supra note 478. 
 481. Jugement, Pouvoir Judiciare, Tribunal de Premiére Instance, 7éme 
Chambre, No. JTPI/6469/2003 (May 28, 2003), GYPSY INTERNATIONAL 
RECOGNITION AND COMPENSATION ACTION (GIRCA) et INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
MACHINES (IBM), Cause No.c/1761/2002-7.   For an article discussing the dis-
missal, see Victoria Arrowsmith, Swiss court dismissed gypsies Holocaust case 
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If the GIRCA litigation against IBM does eventually succeed, 
it will turn the Holocaust restitution movement on its head.  
Until now, every settlement of a Holocaust restitution claim 
came as a result of litigation initiated in the United States.  In 
this case, however, the mantle has been taken up by a Euro-
pean lawyer.  The lawsuit’s demand for $12–14 billion in dam-
ages appears to be more for shock value than a real settlement 
figure.  If IBM is prodded into a financial settlement as a result 
of the GIRCA suit, the amount will probably be closer to the 
settlement amounts reached in the U.S. settlements discussed 
above.   
4. Other American Corporations  
The National Archives in College Park, Maryland contain 
tons of files on American companies doing business in Germany 
after the rise of Hitler.483  Some of the files deal with trade by 
American companies in Nazi-occupied Europe, both before and 
after the United States entered the war in December 1941.  To 
date, these files have not been fully examined, and thus the po-
tential moral culpability and legal liability of other American 
companies for their wartime activities remains unclear.   
As research progresses, new information comes to light.  For 
example, an investigative report by the Nation magazine re-
vealed new facts about the American photo giant, Kodak East-
man Co. (“Kodak”).  Like Ford and GM, Kodak’s European sub-
sidiaries used slave laborers during World War II.  At least 
  
against IBM, GLOBAL ETHICS MONITOR, at http://www.globalethicsmonitor.com 
(last visited June 21, 2003) 
 482. Communique de Presse No 4/Press Release No. 4, issued by GIRCA, 
June 2, 2003 (on file with the authors). 
 483. One of the authors of this article, Michael Bazyler, has personally seen 
the storage area containing the files on his visit to National Archives and 
Record’s Administration (“NARA”), in College Park, Maryland on February 
14, 2003.  The area is reminiscent of the last scene from the film Raiders of 
the Lost Ark.  Greg Bradsher, a senior archivist at NARA and director of its 
Holocaust-era Records Project, ironically noted to Bazyler that this is the typi-
cal reaction he gets when taking visitors to view the records area.  For a dis-
cussion by Bradsher of his work on Holocaust-era records at NARA, see Greg 
Bradsher, Turning History Into Justice: The National Archives and Records 
Administration and Holocaust-Era Assets 1996–2001, in ARCHIVES AND THE 
PUBLIC GOOD: ACCOUNTABILITY AND RECORDS IN MODERN SOCIETY 177 (Richard 
J. Cox & David A. Wallace eds., 2002).   
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eighty slave laborers were used at its Stuttgart plant and over 
250 at its Berlin-Kopenick factory.484  
Documents from the National Archives also show that Ko-
dak’s subsidiaries traded with Nazi Germany after the United 
States entered the war.485  U.S. officials did not recommend that 
Kodak halt its business, but rather allowed it to continue in 
order to preserve the company’s market position.486  
Kodak’s Swiss branch bought photographic supplies in 1942 
and 1943 from Germany, occupied France, and Hungary.487  In 
March 1942, more than three months after the United States 
had declared war on Germany, the American Embassy in Ma-
drid recommended to the Secretary of State that Kodak receive 
import licenses because: 
Shutting off of German sources of supply would seriously em-
barrass the company without serving any useful purpose since 
the demand for services in the Spanish market which could 
not be met by Kodak would simply be taken over by its Ger-
man and Italian competitors.  The position of these competi-
tors in this market would thereby be considerably strength-
ened and the recapture of the business by Kodak after the war 
greatly handicapped.488  
The American Embassy in London described Kodak’s 1943 
transactions as “fairly substantial purchases from enemy terri-
tory.”489  In November 1943, a U.S. vice consul in Switzerland 
also noted that “[t]he idea that he has been helping the enemy 
seems never to have occurred’ to Kodak’s Swiss Manager.”490  
The vice consul also stated: “I pointed out to him that our sole 
interest is to shut off every possible source of benefit to our 
enemies, regardless of what American commercial interests 
might suffer.”491  Yet, Kodak’s London legal adviser told the 
British government in 1943 that Kodak branches were able to 
supply more customers as a result of being able to obtain goods 
  
 484. John S. Friedman, Kodak’s Nazi Connections, NATION, Mar. 26, 2001, 
at 7.  Kodak’s German subsidiary is Kodak Holding GmbH, Stuttgart.  
 485. Id. 
 486. Id. 
 487. Id.   
 488. Id. 
 489. Id. 
 490. Id. 
 491. Id. 
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from Kodak factories in Germany, France, and Hungary — 
more than they would have been able to, had they been limited 
to purchasing only from England and America.492 
Kodak did make a $500,000 contribution to the German 
Foundation,493 at which time a Kodak spokesman stated: “I have 
every confidence that Kodak did not do business with any en-
emy country during the war and that it cooperated fully with 
U.S. government regulations and sanctions.  At no time was 
Kodak in violation of any proscriptions from the U.S. or U.K 
war offices.”494   
Like Ford, its automaker counterpart, GM had at first vigor-
ously denied that it assisted the Nazi regime in it war efforts.495  
But the evidence pointed to other conclusions.496  As early as 
1935, GM’s German subsidiary, Adam Opel A.G. (“Opel”), 
agreed to produce the “Blitz” truck that was later used for the 
Nazi's several blitzkrieg attacks.497  Bradford Snell, researcher 
on American companies’ involvement with Nazi Germany, has 
stated: “GM was an integral part of the German war effort.  The 
Nazis could have invaded Poland and Russia without Switzer-
land.  They could not have done so without GM.”498  
In late 1998, it appeared that GM would become the first 
American company to provide access to its wartime records.  In 
  
 492. Id. 
 493. Id.  
 494. Id. 
 495. General Motors issued the following statement: “GM categorically de-
nies that it aided the Nazis in World War II . . . .  The stale allegations re-
peated in the Washington Post today were reviewed and refuted by GM 25 
years ago in hearings before Congress, when more individuals with first-hand 
knowledge of the facts were available.”  GM, Ford Deny Collaboration with 
Nazis During WWII, CNN.COM, Nov. 30, 1998, at http://www.cnn.com/US/9811/ 
30/autos.holocaust. 
 496. See WORKING FOR THE ENEMY, supra note 19, at 33–81; Dobbs, supra 
note 397, at A1. 
 497. Dobbs, supra note 397, at A1.  Apparently the term “Blitz” (lighting) 
was first coined for bicycles produced by Opel in the 19th century and had been 
in use for Opel trucks before Hitler came to power.  See http://www.opel.com 
(official website of Adam Opel A.G.).  The website also contains the corporate 
history of Opel, but no mention of the company’s involvement with the Nazi 
regime.    
 498. Id.  See also WORKING FOR THE ENEMY, supra note 19, at 33–36 (discuss-
ing Bradford Snell’s delivery of a report in 1974 to the U.S Senate Committee 
on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly).  For language 
from Snell’s report see infra note 395. 
File: BAZYLER Base Macro Final_2.doc Created on: 6/24/2003 12:17 PM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:22 PM 
2003] U.S. HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION 789 
December 1998, GM announced that it was hiring Yale Univer-
sity historian Henry Turner to research its activities in Ger-
many during World War II.499  According to GM chairman John 
F. Smith, “Dr. Turner’s work will help us achieve our goal of a 
complete accounting of GM’s and Opel’s activities during World 
War II and to assess our responsibilities.”500  By May 2003, more 
that four years after his commission, Dr. Turner has yet to pub-
lish his findings.501  In December 1999, however, Opel A.G. 
stated that it would contribute to the German fund for Nazi 
slave laborers.502   
V. CONCLUSION  
The United States has led the effort to encourage European 
industry and European governments to both: (1) ferret out and 
recognize their activities during World War II that have caused 
harm to Holocaust victims; and (2) take steps to remedy injus-
tices caused by these activities.  Without the impetus from the 
federal, state, and local governments of the United States, the 
involvement of American judges and lawyers, and the passion 
brought by various Jewish and non-Jewish activists and organi-
zations, “the unfinished business of World War II” would re-
main unfinished.503 
However, while the United States has forced Europe to exam-
ine its ignoble past, the U.S. government and U.S. private enti-
ties have been unwilling to apply the same scrutiny to their own 
acts during and after World War II.  Of course, the level of com-
plicity by American actors with the Nazis is miniscule compared 
to the loathsome actions taken by the Germans, Austrians, 
French, and other Europeans during the war towards Jews and 
  
 499. GM Opens Probe of its War-era Activities, CHI. TRIB., Dec, 23, 1998, at 
10 [hereinafter GM Opens Probe]; GM To Study Its Nazi Activities, AP 
ONLINE, Dec. 23, 1998, available at 1998 WL 25272700 [hereinafter GM to 
Study Its Nazi Activities] 
 500. GM Opens Probe, supra note 499; GM To Study Its Nazi Activities, 
supra note 499.  
 501. Apparently Dr. Turner will be issuing his findings as a book, entitled 
GM and the Nazis, soon to be published.  For an already-published treatise on 
the subject, see WORKING FOR THE ENEMY, supra note 19.  
 502. GM’s Opel Joins Nazi Slave Fund: Ford May Participate in Offering 
Back Pay for WWII Workers, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 14, 1999, at B1.  
 503. EIZENSTAT, supra note 2, title jacket. 
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other victims.  Nevertheless, an injustice remains an injustice 
and requires both self-recognition and a remedy.  This is espe-
cially so if it is an injustice committed by the lead enforcer of 
World War II restitution efforts.  Work still needs to be done, 
both by the U.S. federal government and American private in-
dustry.504  
A. Federal Government 
Congress should resurrect the PCHA and allow it to finish its 
work.  In the alternative, a Presidential Commission on Holo-
caust Restitution should be established, specifically to pick up 
the work of the PCHA.505 The mandate of the new commission 
should include:  
(1) An examination of all documents in the U.S. archives and 
agencies, including the vast collection of documents found at 
  
 504. In an e-mail to one of the authors, Herbert R. Reginbogin, a Holocaust 
historian who has lived and taught over the past thirty years in both the 
United States and Europe, pointed out a benefit to  U.S. foreign relations from 
an ongoing continuing critical self-examination of  America’s wartime and 
postwar behavior.   
[T]he United States government would be well advised to pursue the 
same standards of scrutiny for itself . . . .  This would not only close 
the records in the case of the United States and possible seized assets 
by the U.S. government which rightfully belong to Holocaust victims, 
but would raise our country’s credibility in the eyes of our European 
neighbors whose mainstream conservative pro-American population 
has been alienated by the U.S. government’s strong support for seek-
ing justice in this matter.  This would counter the voice of hypocrisy 
often heard when it comes to criticizing America’s foreign policy. 
E-mail from Herbert R. Reginbogin to Michael J. Bazyler, May 15, 2003 (on 
file with the authors). 
 505. Dr. Greg Bradsher, Director of the Holocaust-Era Assets Records Pro-
ject at the National Archives, observes that if the PCHA is resurrected as a 
“scholarly commission,” then “the work of the PCHA should be carefully stud-
ied and the errors they made should be avoided.”  E-mail from Greg Bradsher 
to Michael J. Bazyler, Apr. 17, 2003 (on file with the authors).  For a more 
ambitious project, he recommends that a new commission “should be loosely 
modeled on the Department of State’s Office of the Special Envoy for Holo-
caust Issues and the Department of Justice’s Office of Special Investigations 
[which tracks still-living Nazi war criminals].  The proposed commission 
should have three major components: research and investigation, claims assis-
tance, and foreign liaison and legal.”  Id.  In either case, he concludes, “the 
mandate and scope of the new Commission should be absolutely and clearly 
defined.”  Id.  
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the National Records and Archive Administration, dealing 
with World War II;  
(2) The power to subpoena records from private entities con-
cerning their wartime activities and immediate postwar con-
duct, including the ability to examine the records of museums 
in the United States regarding how they acquired art that 
originated in Europe and records of American businesses that 
did business in Europe between 1933–1945;   
(3) The creation of a claim process by which individuals having 
a claim against the U.S. government for wrongful activities 
during the war and afterwards may make a claim for restitu-
tion; and 
(4) The creation of a federal fund for the payment of such 
claims. 
The French experience presents a model for the establish-
ment of such a secondary restitution commission in the United 
States.  In March 1997, then French Prime Minister Alain 
Juppé created through a decree the Prime Minister's Office 
Study Mission into the Looting of Jewish Assets in France 
(“Mattéoli Commission”).506  The Mattéoli Commission’s task 
was to study, “the various forms of spoliation visited upon the 
Jews of France during World War II” and the postwar efforts to 
remedy such spoliation.507   
The mandate of the nine-member commission was limited.  
Its job was only to determine what was taken from the Jews in 
France during wartime; it had no power to issue any remedy.508  
After publishing its three reports — two interim and one final 
report — it ceased to exist.  Before disbanding, however, the 
Mattéoli Commission recommended restitution in all cases 
where it had not yet occurred.509  To do so, it urged the estab-
lishment of a successor governmental commission to consider 
making payments to the victims of the spoliation.510   
  
 506. Id. at 318.  It was popularly known as the Mattéoli Commission, 
named after its chairperson, former cabinet minister and resistance fighter 
Jean Mattéoli.   
 507. Id. at 318. 
 508. Id. at 319. 
 509. Id. at 318. 
 510. Id. at 318, 319. 
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The French government followed that recommendation.  In 
September 1999, the prime minister Lionel Jospin announced 
the creation of the “Commission for the Compensation of Vic-
tims of Spoliation Resulting from Anti-Semitic Legislation in 
Force During the Occupation,” otherwise known as the Drai 
Commission, after its chair, the noted French jurist Pierre 
Drai.511  For the last four years, the Drai Commission has been 
engaged in the process of restitution. 
Likewise, in the United States, now that the PCHA has con-
cluded its study mission, a Presidential Commission on Holo-
caust Restitution should be established to follow up on the find-
ings of the PCHA and to issue restitution.    
In addition to creating a post-PCHA commission, or in lieu 
thereof,512 the other task would be the appointment by President 
George W. Bush of a new presidential envoy on Holocaust is-
sues, building on the achievements of Stuart Eizenstat and the 
other individuals who worked diligently on Holocaust issues 
during the Clinton Administration. Like Eizenstat, the envoy 
should be directly responsible to the President, and thereby 
carry the weight of the presidential office when doing his or her 
work.  By reestablishing the position of a presidential envoy for 
Holocaust issues, the Bush Administration will make an impor-
tant statement that it is fully committed to continue the policy 
of the Clinton years 513  in fettering out Nazi-stolen assets in 
  
 511. Id. at 319. 
 512. One possible danger of creating both a post-PCHA commission and a 
successor to Eizenstat is overkill, since existence of both could lead to infight-
ing.  To avoid this, the presidential envoy should be made chairperson of the 
commission.   
 513. For a recent article questioning the commitment of the Bush Admini-
stration to Holocaust restitution, see Nacha Cattan, Administration Said To 
Be Blocking Restitution Push, FORWARD, May 2, 2203, at 1.  According to 
Eizenstat, Randolph Bell, the current State Department envoy on Holocaust 
issues, has not been given sufficient power.  “Eizenstat said that although Bell 
is ‘extremely dedicated’ to restitution, he had not been granted the same 
power and access to the president that Eizenstat had before him.  ‘They ha-
ven’t considered this a sufficiently important issue at the senior political 
level,’ Eizenstat said, referring to the Bush administration.” Id.  Bell, for his 
part, defended the President.  “’This administration, like its predecessors, 
continues to support strongly those [restitution] agreements,’ reached with 
Austria, Germany and France.” Id (brackets in original)  
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both Europe and the United States and to remedy any injus-
tices stemming from the wartime era.514 
B. American Industry 
As with the U.S. government, the level of wrongdoing by 
American corporations during World War II is miniscule com-
pared to the activities of their counterparts in Europe.  Never-
theless, American industry has been unwilling to step forward 
and examine and remedy their wrongful acts.  The following 
must be done:  
(1) All American multinationals accused of having ties with 
the Nazi regime515 should open their records to Holocaust his-
torians and subject themselves to full, fair, and independent 
review of their wartime roles.516  
(2) American multinationals, like their German counterparts, 
should create a fund akin to the fund created by German in-
dustry and government.  The average age of Holocaust survi-
vors today is eighty-two years old, and the survivors are dying 
at the rate of ten percent a year.  Forcing Holocaust survivors 
  
 514. One area where much work still needs to be done in Europe is the res-
titution of properties taken from Jews in Eastern Europe during the war, 
which still have not been returned to their rightful owners or their heirs. A 
Bush envoy on Holocaust issues could speed up the resolution of this still out-
standing problem. 
 515. To determine this information, Masurovsky suggests that the “U.S. 
Government should publish the list of every American company that engaged 
in transactions with the Axis powers and profited directly or indirectly from 
its discriminatory policies toward Jews and other victimized groups from 
1933–1945.”  Masurovsky E-mail, supra note 307.  Masurovsky points out that 
this information is available at the U.S. National Archives.  Id. 
 516. The steps taken by the German media giant Bertelsmann can serve as 
a good model.  Bertelsmann retained noted Holocaust historian Saul 
Friedländer to research and publish a study of the company’s history during 
World War II.  Friedländer accepted the assignment only on the following 
condition: full access to any records he requested; use of his own team of re-
searchers; and Bertelsmann’s receipt of the final report simultaneous with its 
publication.  Bertelsmann, therefore, was not able to interfere or influence the 
findings issues by Friedländer and his team of researchers.  Friedländer’s 
Bertelsmann report was issued on October 7, 2002.  Gunter Thielen, Bertels-
mann, A.G., Chairman and CEO, Statement On the Occasion of the Independ-
ent Historical Commission’s Final Report (Oct. 7, 2002), available at 
http://www.bertelsmann.com/news/press/press_item_content.cfm?id=6537.  
The Report can be located at http://www.bertelsmann.com/bag/history/report_ 
uhk/report_uhk.cfm.    
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to proceed through the slow and painful track of litigation only 
prolongs and extends the injustice created by American com-
panies’ wartime complicity.  The proposal to establish an 
American Industry Fund by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
was an excellent idea.  No reason exists why European com-
panies should be made to relinquish some of their wartime 
profits from dealing with the Nazis while American companies 
are allowed to get off scot-free.  The creation of  such a “mirror 
image”  fund by the Chamber of Commerce fund in the United 
States, akin to the funds established by various European 
companies,  should not have been abandoned.  Such a fund 
should be created and put into place immediately by American 
companies sued for their wartime role. The Humanitarian Aid 
Foundation (“HAF”), Eizenstat’s substitute for the Chamber 
fund, may turn out to be a suitable replacement for the mori-
bund Chamber of Commerce initiative. As more U.S. compa-
nies are identified through historical research to have dealt 
with the Nazis, these companies should join HAF. To have 
proper support, however, the Chamber of Commerce should 
make HAF its own project. 517   
  
 517. One piece of the Holocaust restitution puzzle requiring further investi-
gation is whether American banks, like banks in Switzerland and  Israel (and 
other countries), are still holding moneys deposited with them by European 
Jews prior to the war, and have not returned to survivors or heirs.  Eizenstat, 
in one of his public pronouncements on the creation of the PCHA, stated that 
this was an issue the commission would be looking into: 
Third, we’re setting up — the President has called for the establish-
ment and Congress is now working on legislation which Senator 
D’Amato and Congressman Leach are co-sponsoring a presidential 
commission.  The presidential commission would have members ap-
pointed by the President, the Senate and the House. It is charged 
specifically with looking at what role the US may have had in han-
dling Holocaust-era assets — not only looted gold, but also assets 
from Holocaust victims who would have deposited not only in Swiss 
banks, but in American banks assets and then never recovered them. 
Under US law, under the law of most states in the union, unlike 
European law, where those looted assets remain in the bank, so we 
can trace them, as we are through the Volcker process. In the U.S., 
those looted assets — excuse me, those Holocaust-era assets, after 10 
years, generally returned to the states, and therefore are not easily 
discoverable. We want to see what happened to those.  So in all of 
those ways, we’re trying to be self-analytic. 
U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Spokesman, On the Record Briefing by Under 
Secretary Stuart Eizenstat on Nazi Gold Effort, June 2, 1998, available at 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/holocausthp.html (emphasis added).   
 
File: BAZYLER Base Macro Final_2.doc Created on: 6/24/2003 12:17 PM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:22 PM 
2003] U.S. HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION 795 
  
  Irwin Nack, Investigative Counsel for the New York State Banking 
Department and expert in the field, disagrees with Eizenstat: 
Eizenstat’s comment . . . is incorrect and predicated upon the errone-
ous assumption that U.S. based banks did not return assets to Holo-
caust survivors or their heirs in the 10 year period after the war 
ended.  I have not seen any claims by survivors or their heirs for as-
sets held by U.S. based banks and as far as I know, none of the class 
action lawsuits have raised such claims or identified such claimants 
(I have seen some general inquiries).  This is in marked contrast to 
the thousands of claims made against Swiss banks.  It also com-
pletely ignores the regulatory framework banks were operating under 
during the war which would have rendered such conduct by U.S. 
based banks highly unlikely. Finally, to the extent assets are held by 
N.Y. State, contrary to Eizenstat’s contradictory statement, they are 
easily discoverable.  The N.Y.S. Comptroller has the records from 
that period and indeed, the Comptroller’s database can be searched 
over the internet. 
Nack also disagrees that further investigation is necessary:  
The Presidential Commission did look into the issue and their report 
reflects this . . . .  According to the report (page 15–16 of the Findings 
section), the PCHA went so far as to conduct a pilot project wherein 
400,000 names were compared with the N.Y. State Comptroller’s da-
tabase of dormant accounts resulting in only 18 hits. I spoke with 
representatives of the PCHA at length about this very issue so I know 
they were looking at the issue. Moreover, as the one who headed N.Y. 
State’s investigation into the wartime activities of Swiss banks oper-
ating in N.Y., I also looked into this issue (insofar as it was applicable 
to Swiss banks operating in N.Y. at the time).  Thus, contrary to 
Eizenstat’s assertion, the issue was certainly explored in depth. I’m 
sure this can also be confirmed by the NYS Comptroller. 
E-mail from Irwin Nack to Michael J. Bazyler, May 28, 2003 (on file with the 
authors).   
  The PCHA also never examined the issue of American banks’ dealings 
with the Nazis.  Masurovsky recalls being asked to participate in a conference 
call with Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat, during which he stressed the impor-
tance of examining the roles of Chase and J.P. Morgan during the war.  Ac-
cording to Masurovsky, Eizenstat’s directive was handled as follows:  
While the Commission’s report was being finalized, the New York law 
firm of White & Case shipped approximately a dozen boxes of archi-
val documents pertaining to Chase Bank’s relations with Nazi Ger-
many during the 1930s and 1940s.  Rather than asking a research di-
rector or a qualified historian to examine the records, an intern with 
no background was assigned to review the content of these boxes. 
Masurovsky reports that he took a quick look into one of the boxes with the 
intern’s permission and found records on Aryanizations and on Chase’s Ger-
man railway bond business that it obtained from the Reich Ministry of Econ-
omy.  Masurovsky E-mail, supra note 307.   
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(3) The American companies that profited from their dealings 
with the Nazis should issue formal apologies.  German and 
Austrian companies apologized concomitant with the settle-
ments of the claims against them.  A formal apology should be 
issued by any American company found through historical re-
search to have dealt with the Nazis.  
So much has been accomplished by the United States.  Now is 
the time to finish the job. 
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APPENDIX 
     E-MAIL FROM KENNETH KLOTHEN, FORMER EXECUTIVE 
DIRECTOR OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON 
HOLOCAUST ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES (PCHA), TO 
MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, JUNE 18, 2003, RESPONDING TO 
CRITICISM OF THE PCHA 
I have reviewed the sections of your Article concerning the 
work of the Presidential Advisory Commission.  Many of the 
criticisms you cite come from people who either have an axe to 
grind or who simply do not understand the decision that the 
U.S. Congress made in forming the Commission and giving it 
its mandate. 
As a general matter, I am attaching a copy of a Keynote ad-
dress I made at a recent conference entitled Commissioning 
History: A Comparison of the U.S., German and Austrian Ex-
periences, held at the D-Day Museum in New Orleans.  You 
may quote it. 
First, the criticisms leveled by Mr. Greg Rickman:  The “or-
ganizational difficulties” he cites were the normal delays inci-
dent to the FBI checks that had to be performed on the Com-
missioners appointed by the President.  Just as any Presiden-
tial appointment must be investigated by the FBI, these Com-
missioners were subject to that process which took several 
months.  It must be recognized that Mr. Rickman worked at the 
time for Senator D’Amato, a conservative Republican who had 
been a leader in the Whitewater investigation and in whose in-
terest it was to criticize the Clinton White House.  Mr. Rickman 
remained a Republican staffer after Senator D’Amato was de-
feated, moving to the staff of another conservative Republican, 
Senator Peter Fitzgerald.  Mr. Rickman from the beginning was 
unhappy with the Clinton Administration’s successful attempts 
to focus the Commission’s mandate.   
As to the issue of whether a broader mandate would have 
been better, see my keynote attached.  Mr. Rickman’s claims 
that the Commission “delayed its own work through inaction” is 
unfounded, unsupported and untrue.  Moreover, it smacks of 
revisionist history — when Mr. Rickman was a staffer in the 
Senate while the Commission was conducting its work, neither 
he nor the Senators he worked for voiced this, or any other, 
criticism of the Commission’s approach or results. 
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As to the criticism by Professor Zweig of the Commission’s 
conclusions regarding the Hungarian Gold Train, it should be 
pointed out that the criticisms you cite were of the Commission 
staff’s preliminary report on this research to the Commission — 
the Final Report by the Commission itself significantly 
amended the handling of this incident, in part in response to 
criticism of the preliminary staff report by Mr. Zweig.  By the 
way, as you yourself point out Zweig’s criticism was that the 
preliminary staff report on this matter was overly critical of the 
U.S. role — a charge entirely contradictory of that made later 
by Mr. Masurovsky of a Commission “whitewash” of that role. 
The charge that “the Commission failed to examine the re-
cords of American museums” reveals a misunderstanding of the 
Commission’s mandate and is, in any event, largely untrue.  
Museums in the U.S., unlike in most of Europe, are private in-
stitutions, and the Commission’s mandate did not extend to ex-
amining either the records or the role of private sector entities.  
The country’s most significant public museum — the National 
Gallery of Art — cooperated fully with the Commission and 
kept it apprised of its own work on determining the provenance 
of its collection.  A considerable amount of research was also 
done in the archives of the Getty Museum and others. 
The Commission staff also examined voluminous records re-
lating to the Treasury’s licensing of art importation during the 
war years, and was given access to classified FBI documents 
pertaining to investigations conducted by the FBI of suspected 
art smuggling.  Not only did these documents not warrant con-
clusions about the magnitude of art smuggling; they did not in 
themselves indicate that such smuggling was likely to have oc-
curred in significant volume.  
The Commission did not believe that the historical record in 
this regard was complete enough to say that such smuggling 
had not been a problem.  Apparently Mr. Masurovsky believes 
otherwise — but in the years since the Commission’s report he, 
who works full time in the field of Holocaust assets restitution 
— has never brought forth any evidence to support his claims.   
I do not know what is the source of the charge that “the 
PCHA neglected to review the vast array of documents found in 
the U.S. National Archives relating to World War II and the 
Holocaust.”  This is a patent absurdity — the PCHA had a staff 
of at least a dozen historians housed at the National Archives 
for over a year.  They reviewed literally hundreds of thousands 
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of documents, most of which are referenced plainly in the Com-
mission’s Final Report, and copies of which are in the Clinton 
Library in Little Rock.  This claim is so patently ridiculous and 
so demonstrably false that to repeat it would be unprofessional 
and negligent. 
As to the balance of Mr. Masurovsky’s claims:  suffice it to say 
that Mr. Masurovsky was a disgruntled employee who bridled 
when the Commission’s professional historians and economist 
questioned his conclusions about archival documents, which 
they did on a regular basis.  Specifically, the claims made by 
Mr. Masurovsky regarding victim gold were not “suppressed” by 
the Commission; they were conclusively proved to be without 
foundation by Mr. Masurovsky’s own colleagues on the Com-
mission staff, among them Ms. Helen Junz, an internationally 
recognized expert on Holocaust financial assets who has 
worked, inter alia, for the Bergier and Volcker commissions. 
  
Mr. Masurovsky’s conspiracy-theory approach to history is 
perhaps best illustrated by the fact that his last request as an 
employee of the Commission — which was denied — was to be 
funded to go to Roswell, New Mexico to investigate reports of a 
secret cache of Holocaust gold kept by the U.S. Army at the 
White Sands Missile Range. Again, if his findings were so im-
portant, so revolutionary and so suppressed why has he not 
published them in a peer-reviewed journal (or anywhere else, 
for that matter) in the more than two years since the Commis-
sion finished its work? 
Your claims — without cited authority — regarding the 
PCHA’s alleged failure to make “critical inquiries” into, inter 
alia, the activities of U.S. banks and insurance companies are 
also untrue.  With regard to banks, see the Commission’s Final 
Report at page 15 that includes a description of the agreement 
reached with the New York Bankers Association regarding best 
practices for searches for dormant accounts, and its preliminary 
identification of such accounts in a data cross-match.  With re-
gard to insurance, this work was conducted by the ICHIEC and 
the NAIC; the PCHA regularly consulted with both organiza-
tions as well as with Insurance Commissioners in several states 
regarding the status of that work. 
Finally, the database you discuss was indeed completed and 
turned over to the USHMM. 
File: BAZYLER Base Macro Final_2.doc Created on:  6/24/2003 12:17 PM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:22 PM 
800 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:3 
While in hindsight one might say that investigation into the 
role of the private sector should be undertaken, or that more 
time must be spent researching the additional hundreds of 
thousands of documents declassified since the Commission 
completed its work, this does not diminish the Commission’s 
accomplishments.  The fact that some people’s pre-conceived 
notions about what the historical record should reveal were not 
supported by that record is not a whitewash; it is instead testi-
mony to the fact that a Commission that included among its 
members some of the nation’s most vigorous advocates for jus-
tice for Holocaust victims insisted on high standards of histori-
cal scholarship and proof.  As I have said, the notion that a 
Commission chaired by Edgar Bronfman and including Stuart 
Eizenstat, Roman Kent (a survivor and vice chair of the Ameri-
can Gathering of Holocaust Survivors), Miles Lerman (a survi-
vor and former Chair of the USHMC) and others would sup-
press evidence of U.S. mishandling of victims’ assets is beyond 
absurd, it is insulting to the intelligence of the reader. 
 
 KEYNOTE ADDRESS, DELIVERED BY KENNETH KLOTHEN AT 
CONFERENCE, COMMISSIONING HISTORY: A COMPARISON OF 
THE U.S., GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN EXPERIENCES, HELD AT 
THE D-DAY MUSEUM IN NEW ORLEANS, NOVEMBER 2002. 
Thank you, President Mueller, for that thorough and kind in-
troduction. 
First of all, I would like to thank the German Historical Insti-
tute, University of New Orleans and the D-Day Museum for not 
only inviting me to give this keynote address, but also permit-
ting me to participate in all of the sessions of this timely and 
important gathering.  It has been a chance to renew acquaint-
ances with former colleagues and staff, and to meet others who 
continue to do important work in the areas of the history of 
looted assets and restitution policy.   
That dyad — the history of spoliation and the policy of resti-
tution — sets the stage for what I would like to talk about to-
day.   
Researchers, the press and others have often asked me how 
“politics” has affected the work of the various historical com-
missions.  Indeed, this question has been considered here over 
the past few days.  I think that an examination of the experi-
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ence of the U.S. Commission may help us define what we mean 
by political influence on the process of “commissioning history,” 
and to decide whether that influences is positive, benign or 
negative.  
In the interests of full disclosure, I want you to know a little 
about who you’re listening to here.  I am the son of German 
Jewish Holocaust survivors, and terms such as forced labor, 
Aryanization, stateless persons and genocide were — and are — 
more than abstractions in my family.  So, by the way, are terms 
such as reparations, restitution, and even reconciliation. 
On top of that, I am someone who has spent a considerable 
part of his professional life in one political arena or another.  I 
am an elected official, and I advise others.  I was a political ap-
pointee in the Clinton administration.  I work on campaigns.  I 
actually watch C-Span.  In my life, politics is not a dirty word. 
Now, I’ve been far too absorbed in the compelling presenta-
tions here over the last several days to figure out exactly how 
these various elements of my own life color my thoughts on the 
topic tonight.  Perhaps the psychologist on Professor Rathkolb’s 
team in Linz (oh, could we have used him on our Commission 
staff) could do so.  I will simply leave it to you, as they say, to 
consider the source. 
I also recognize that because the U.S. Commission ended its 
work almost two years ago, my remarks run the risk of not be-
ing about “the politics of memory,” but merely “memories of 
politics.”  Nevertheless, I offer these remarks not as an old pol’s 
war stories, but as an attempt to assess how political concerns 
help or hinder the work of historical commissions. 
In preparing for this talk, I turned to Webster’s Dictionary for 
a definition of the term “politics.”  There I found the following:  
“that part of ethics that has to do with the regulation and gov-
ernment of a nation or state, the preservation of its safety, 
peace and prosperity…” and “the protection of its citizens in 
their rights, with the preservation and improvement of their 
morals.” 
Nothing to raise a red flag there.  But reading further, I 
found this alternative definition:  “artful or dishonest manage-
ment to secure the success of political candidates or parties; 
political trickery.”   
My sense is that those professing concern about political in-
fluences on the process of commissions’ work are worried about 
the latter, and not the former, aspect of politics: that is, the 
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willingness to shape inquiries, shade results, and pre-determine 
findings in order to make a country’s record during the Holo-
caust appear better or worse than it actually was.  It is the 
presence or absence of this type of partisan, outcome-oriented 
politics that I suggest we look for in the story of the U.S. Com-
mission. 
The U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998, Public 
Law 105-186, was passed with unanimous bipartisan support in 
the Congress in the second term of the administration of Presi-
dent Bill Clinton.  That unanimous support, however, masked 
some interesting political background:  the bill creating the 
Commission had been sponsored and pushed by Senator Alfonse 
D’Amato, a New York Republican known equally for his pugna-
cious, partisan style and his attentiveness to his large Jewish 
constituency.  To make matters more interesting, Senator 
D’Amato had recently chaired contentious hearings on the 
President and First Lady’s involvement (long before coming to 
Washington) in a real estate venture known as Whitewater.   
Nevertheless, members of the Clinton Administration’s State 
and Justice Departments, under the leadership of Stuart Eizen-
stat, worked closely with Senator D’Amato’s staff in shaping the 
legislation.  In doing so, they pressed for a narrow mandate for 
the Commission.  While earlier conceptualizations had imag-
ined that a U.S. commission would be charged with examining 
the roles of all levels of government and the private sector in 
handling the looted assets of Holocaust victims, the Administra-
tion representatives argued that a governmental commission 
with limited resources of time and money could only be ex-
pected to thoroughly examine the actions of the federal govern-
ment of the United States.   
Ultimately, a compromise was reached and the Commission 
charged with conducting original research into the actions of 
the federal government, and reviewing the research of others 
into the actions of other levels of government and the private 
sector.   
Was this an example of a political decision based on concerns 
over what might be found about the record of favored constitu-
encies in the banking or other industries, or an attempt to insu-
late state governments from scrutiny?  I think not, for several 
reasons. 
First, consider a unique aspect of the U.S. Commission.  It 
was very much not a commission of experts.  The 21 Commis-
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sioners were comprised, by statute, of Members of Congress, ex-
officio representatives of four departments of the Executive 
Branch, and a variety of prominent private citizens appointed 
at the discretion of the President from very different walks of 
life.  This group of non-experts was charged with conducting a 
historical research project, drawing conclusions from it about 
public policy and making recommendation to the President.   
The limitations of this approach are, of course, many — and 
my former colleague Helen Junz and Gerry Feldman have noted 
only a few of them at this conference.  But I would argue that 
this approach has some surprising strengths, and even that 
these strengths may in the end outweigh the weaknesses.   
I hope I’m not disabusing any of the distinguished academics 
in this room of any cherished notions, but in American society 
(unlike, I believe, that of Europe) the findings of academic his-
torians don’t often enjoy a very high profile or get much political 
traction — Professor Hayes has said as much in an earlier ses-
sion.  I was intrigued by my friend Clemens Jabloner’s comment 
that the Austrian Commission was not charged with making 
policy recommendations, but that its findings “speak for them-
selves.”  Maybe it’s just because of the high degree of back-
ground noise from our widespread, diverse and troubled cul-
ture, but in shaping public policy on this side of the Atlantic 
almost nothing — least of all, I am afraid, the wisdom of histo-
rians — speaks for itself without the megaphone that a promi-
nent advocate can provide. 
This is certainly regrettable, but there are some compensa-
tions: the broad base of a citizen’s commission as opposed to an 
expert’s commission makes its findings more likely to gain pub-
lic acceptance, and the inclusion of elected officials makes it 
easier for the Commission’s policy recommendations to find a 
champion.   
Second, there is the matter of the time and resources that 
conceivably could have been made available to the Commission.  
Under the most generous realistically possible time frame and 
budget (which I assure you the Commission did not receive) it 
would have been impossible to perform a thorough examination 
of the activities of the private and state governmental sectors.  
As it was, literally hundreds of thousands of documents bearing 
on the federal government’s actions were being declassified an-
nually.  It was Ambassador Eizenstat’s insight that a thorough 
review of this quantity of documents alone would be a Hercu-
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lean task that led to the narrowing of the focus of the Commis-
sion’s mandate.  A broader mandate would have led to a shal-
lower inquiry.  Under the circumstances, I submit that the Clin-
ton Administration’s work with Senator D’Amato probably 
saved the project from irrelevance.   
Let me address here the suggestion made by Helen Junz and 
others that the failure to empower the Commission to force the 
opening of private archives left a significant investigative ave-
nue blocked.  I agree.  Indeed, Senator D’Amato originally envi-
sioned giving the Commission subpoena power over private en-
tities — and there were many, many times in the course of our 
discussions with the art dealers, museums, banking and indus-
trial sectors when I would have loved to be able to use, or at 
least threaten to use, that power.   
But — if I take a step back and ask myself whether I would 
want some other advisory commission made up of politicians 
and prominent citizens to be able to subpoena me or my busi-
ness, I have a different reaction.  That reaction, by the way, is 
not altered by the thought of a commission of academics armed 
with the same authority.  Moreover, I can’t help but think that 
the more adversarial tools are included in the armamentarium 
of a commission, the more adversarial the approach to a com-
mission’s work is likely to be.  In terms of gaining widespread 
social acceptance of the Commission’s findings, this could be a 
very mixed blessing indeed. 
Despite the passage of the legislation with the type of man-
date favored by the Administration, the White House was slow 
to name the private citizen Commissioners the President was 
entitled to appoint.  It was rumored that the White House did 
not want to give Senator D’Amato a success to bring back to his 
constituents, although similar delays plagued (and in fact often 
plague, no matter what the party in power) other  appoint-
ments.  Nevertheless, after several months the President did 
ask Mr. Edgar Bronfman to chair the Commission and named 
the remaining private citizen Commissioners.  The leaders of 
the two Houses of Congress named others, and representatives 
of the State, Treasury, Justice and Army Departments were 
appointed, as provided by the statute.  The Commission was 
ready to begin work. 
Except for one problem: money.  This is something in the 
category of more than most people want to know about how our 
Federal government funds the executive branch, but suffice it to 
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say that our governing legislation provided that funds were to 
be passed through other agencies of government.  Agencies of 
government being agencies of government, when the creation of 
the Commission was delayed at the White House the agencies 
simply spent the money designated for the Commission on other 
things.  J.D. [Bindenagel, former U.S. State Department Special 
Envoy on Holocaust Issues], but I hope our first six month’s 
funding from the State Department did something nice for some 
embassy somewhere, but the Commission never saw more than 
a third of it. 
These and other bureaucratic issues aside, the Commission 
was able to begin its work.  As Jonathan Petropolous mentioned 
in his remarks, we were immediately confronted with the need 
to have the Commissioners ratify a work plan that embodied a 
particular interpretation of the mandate, including as a thresh-
old matter a broad definition of the term “victim of the Holo-
caust” to include anyone who was deprived of his or her civil or 
political rights on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, disability 
or sexual orientation.  This was an expansion of Senator 
D’Amato’s original conception, and clearly raised the possibility 
of diffusion of our limited resources, but the Commissioners be-
lieved that an American commission in the 21st century could 
not pick and choose among persecuted groups.   
While I sometimes jokingly referred to the process of getting 
agreement among twenty-one Commissioners — including four 
Members of Congress, the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, 
the Chair of the Holocaust Memorial Council, and one of the 
richest men in the world — as the equivalent of herding cats 
with large egos, I must say that it is a tribute to the business 
sense and trust in his staff of Chairman Bronfman that he 
agreed that most research decisions would be staff-driven.  The 
Commission therefore agreed that the staff would prepare a 
historical report which the Commission would vote to approve 
or disapprove, and from which (whether approved or disap-
proved) the Commissioners would craft policy recommendations 
to the President. 
I think this decision was critical, and it helps to answer our 
question about political influences.  It would have been an easy 
thing for the politicians and Administration policy makers to 
insist on controlling the research agenda, to seek to shape it to 
the narrow interests of constituents or interest groups.  But 
that didn’t happen; in fact, it was never even suggested.  The 
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seriousness of the task at hand, and the fundamental integrity 
of the Commissioners, made this a non-issue.  
There’s a lesson here:  policy makers can be convinced to let 
historians do their work unimpeded, and can base subsequent 
policy decisions on the raw material provided by scholars. In 
fact, they may even welcome the opportunity. 
On the other hand, it is also true that the elected representa-
tives on the Commission often had a hard time remembering 
the distinction between a review of the historical record and a 
search for assets that could be restituted (preferably, of course, 
to their own constituents).  However, this pressure, if such it 
was, did not interfere with the proper function of the Commis-
sion, as it underscored the necessity of maintaining clarity with 
respect to the Commission’s mandate in order not to raise false 
hopes among survivors and their heirs.  Thus, the political im-
pulse to look for potentially restitutable property helped the 
Commission by forcing it to keep the needs of survivors and 
heirs in mind, even though our mission was not to aid specific 
claims for restitution. 
As the Commission’s work progressed, our research staff 
made a series of interim reports to the Commissioners regard-
ing their preliminary findings.  One of these reports led to the 
only significant instance in which political appointees objected 
to the conclusions drawn by the research staff from the raw 
documentary material.  It’s worth examining in some more de-
tail. 
The research staff uncovered a number of documents, some 
previously known, others recently declassified, concerning the 
so-called Hungarian Gold Train.  We have discussed this con-
stellation of incidents several times at this conference, so I will 
not spend time describing it here.  Suffice it to say that the per-
sonal and household belongings of a large segment of the mur-
dered Hungarian Jewish population, along with other unidenti-
fiable personal property, ended up falling into the hands of the 
U.S. Army in Austria, where the goods were warehoused. 
It is undeniable that some goods from this train were soon 
requisitioned from the warehouse for the use of U.S. occupation 
forces and military government personnel.  The staff reported 
these facts in a manner that was critical of the U.S. commander 
in Salzburg, General Harry Collins.  The press jumped on these 
conclusions and proceeded to write stories that magnified not 
File: BAZYLER Base Macro Final_2.doc Created on: 6/24/2003 12:17 PM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:22 PM 
2003] U.S. HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION 807 
only the facts of Collins’ requisitions but also the level of criti-
cism of the Commission staff’s findings. 
The staff of the Commissioner from the Department of Jus-
tice objected strenuously to this interim report as unfair to the 
U.S. Army (interestingly, the Army’s own appointee to the 
Commission was much less vocal in his criticism of the staff 
findings).  He believed that the report cast unfair aspersions on 
Collins, who had commanded the unit that liberated Dachau.  
The Assistant Attorney General announced that he would not 
join in the Commission’s report if the section on the Gold Train 
was not substantially revised. 
This development caused a great deal of soul searching on the 
part of those of us who were responsible for the completion of 
the Commission’s mandate but not involved actively in the re-
search.  We were convinced of the facts as described by our re-
search staff — and convinced that the dissenting Commissioner 
did not actually dispute those facts.  We were also sure that the 
handling of the Gold Train property was illustrative of short-
comings in the United States’ view of the status of recovered 
looted property, and were prepared to insist that the Commis-
sion not back away from citing those shortcomings. 
What followed was a lengthy series of negotiations, between 
my deputy and I and our research staff, between me and staff to 
the Justice Department Commissioner, and among the Com-
missioners themselves.  In the end, I became convinced that the 
focus on General Collins was misleading precisely because it de-
emphasized the less explosive but ultimately more important 
issue of the overall failure of all the Allied governments to un-
derstand the unique and unprecedented aspects of the recov-
ered assets of Holocaust victims.  In the Commission’s Final 
Report, the Gold Train incident was reported more as an exam-
ple of problems encountered by the United States in cataloguing 
and safeguarding such assets, growing out of the more basic 
policy failure to understand their unique significance, than as 
an example of one individual’s self-help and secondary theft. 
Was this an example of political influence on the work and 
conclusions of the Commission?  Yes — for there can be no 
doubt that the dissenting Commissioner, a high-ranking mem-
ber of the Clinton Administration, was concerned for the repu-
tation of a significant unit of the U.S. Army and, by extension, a 
major aspect of our country’s record on restitution.   
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But at the risk of seeming overly defensive of our work I 
would argue this was not an example of a negative influence in 
the sense of the second definition of “politics” that I mentioned 
earlier.  The Justice Department’s view was entirely consistent 
with the facts as they had been uncovered.  It demanded a 
higher standard of historical proof than even some reasonable 
experts might insist on, but that is neither inappropriate nor 
necessarily beneficial to any particular constituency. 
Neither do I think that the process that took place here — 
though we may legitimately label it political — is qualitatively 
different from the peer review process familiar to academics in 
any discipline.  I believe it is often the case that a peer reviewer 
might insist on more or better proof for a proposition than its 
author believes necessary, because the reviewer comes at it 
from a different angle or a different set of priorities. 
This leads me to another reaction to something that my 
friend Jonathan Petropolous — you can see that he maintains 
his reputation for provocative comments by provoking me regu-
larly, and I thank him for that — said yesterday.  In assessing 
the strictures imposed by the U.S. Commission’s mandate, 
Jonathan said that although they were neither good not bad, 
they were something new to academic historians, whose work is 
not normally limited in scope at the outset of an investigation.  
With all due respect, I think that’s wrong.  Any research under-
taking is limited by some factors — time, money, currency, pre-
conceptions about what sources are available, you name it.  
Perhaps many of these contextual limitations are taken for 
granted by the historian, and without a doubt in the Commis-
sion’s case they were all imposed by others.  But I don’t think 
that creates a fundamental distinction between academic his-
tory and commissioned history. 
In fact, I believe that the Gold Train incident strengthened 
our work by demonstrating that political differences had bases 
in principle and were not crude power plays, that they were re-
solvable by reference to the historical record, and that their 
resolution led to a more integrated narrative. 
I suppose that if the goal of our historical enterprise was 
merely to report on who finished first, second and third in some 
hypothetical race; if we did not have to make normative judg-
ments; we wouldn’t have to worry about these issues.  But 
that’s not doing history, and it’s certainly not doing Holocaust 
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history, as several of our speakers have pointed out much more 
eloquently than I can.   
I recall Professor Hayes’ description of the dulling of the 
“moral nerve endings” of Degussa’s top management by their 
own sense of victimization from the First World War.  And Pro-
fessor Ziegler’s recollection of Stuart Eizenstat’s suggestion that 
to achieve justice we need truth, and to achieve truth, knowl-
edge — but that victims, governments and the Dresdner Bank 
all had different versions of the truth.  And Ambassador 
Winkler’s observation that the Austrian gold settlement was in 
part due to the presence of a new generation of political leader-
ship that sought to inject moral notions of human rights and 
dignity into public policy.  And Ambassador Bindenagel’s mov-
ing characterization of the relief accorded by the German fund 
as a measure of justice combined with a measure of recognition. 
These observations lead me to the conclusion that the pur-
pose of all commissioned history is not mere reportage.  Rather, 
it is to take a step perhaps to facilitate material restitution 
where that can be done, but more importantly to facilitate new 
social relations by making the moral restitution that occurs 
when a country or society faces and acknowledges its own ac-
tions and their effects. 
To accomplish this worthy and necessary goal requires a po-
litical process — not, to be sure, in the second sense of Web-
ster’s definition, but certainly in the first.  Face it: nothing else 
works.  Not class action litigation.  Not war.  Not stonewalling.  
Not paternalism.  Not even, I dare say, academic scholarship.  
As I believe Professor Barkan would tell us, how much of a 
measure of justice an action amounts to is a social construction.  
Social constructions are negotiated — you guessed it — socially.  
And social negotiation by another name is politics. 
As in any other negotiation, in the negotiation over commis-
sioned history no party will get everything that it wants.  But 
the best aspect of politics — at least as conducted in the free 
societies in which we are privileged to live — is that the nego-
tiation is always open, always looking both backward and for-
ward.  Mistakes can be corrected, shortcomings supplemented, 
new avenues opened, old ones revisited.  So, I would argue in 
the end, what the process of commissioned history requires is 
more politics, perhaps better politics, but certainly not less poli-
tics. 
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In our own case, are there areas deserving of more detailed 
treatment?  Of course.  Does the private sector need to be 
pushed to make material on dormant securities, museum hold-
ings and private art sales available?  Absolutely.  Does the 
shameful history of the U.S. refusal to open its doors to save 
European Jews and other persecuted groups from extinction 
need to be acknowledged?  As soon as possible.  Does the De-
fense Department need to review how it instructs its troops to 
treat cultural property they encounter in the course of armed 
conflict?  Unfortunately, most urgently.  The profile of the value 
of our historical effort must be kept high. 
This leads me to the final point I would like to leave you with.  
It is essential that there be another stage of “commissioning 
history,” in which the work of all the historical commissions, 
from Argentina to the United States, is collected and integrated 
within the democratic context in which our work has been ac-
complished.  If this can happen, the light of open inquiry can be 
shone on all the work that has been done, deficiencies corrected, 
records supplemented, understanding expanded.  I therefore 
hope that the primary recommendation of the U.S. Commission 
— that our government create a Foundation to support contin-
ued research into asset restitution issues, including an attempt 
to synthesize of the work that has been done around the world 
by the twenty plus commissions like ours — will be realized.  If 
this happens, we may soon be able to write a truly complete his-
tory of Nazi looting and the international community’s still 
incomplete efforts to make restitution. 
But, if it is to happen, it can only happen through the messy, 
unsatisfying, disappointing but irreplaceable process of politics.  
I hope to see all of you in the future as that process unfolds. 
Thank you. 
